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ABSTRACT 
 
FRIENDSHIP, CRISIS AND ESTRANGEMENT:  
U.S.-ITALIAN RELATIONS, 1871-1920 
Gürsel, Bahar 
Ph.D., Department of History 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Timothy Mason Roberts 
April 2007 
 
 
In the 1870s, the united Kingdom of Italy brought together nearly the whole Italian 
peninsula under a single flag, and the United States left behind a civil war and 
strengthened the country and its institutions. This dissertation is an account of the 
relations between the United States and Italy from 1871 to 1920.  This era witnessed 
numerous important incidents like the mass Italian immigration to America 
beginning in the 1880s, military service and the problem of naturalization, the 
lynchings of Italian immigrants particularly in the southern United States, anarchism 
in both countries, Italian colonialist activities in North Africa, the beginning of 
American overseas expansion, and World War I.  By analyzing both countries’ laws, 
political circumstances, internal affairs and ideological developments, the 
dissertation aspires to explore the aspects that shaped Italian and American foreign 
relations. While emphasizing these features, it seeks to clarify the fact that the main 
issue which both countries focused on was national greatness. 
 
Keywords: United States, Italy, foreign relations, late nineteenth century, Risorgimento, 
World War I  
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                                                               ÖZET 
DOSTLUK, BUNALIM, YABANCILAŞMA: 
A. B. D.-İTALYA İLİŞKİLERİ, 1871-1920 
Gürsel, Bahar 
Doktora, Tarih Bölümü  
Tez Yöneticisi: Yard.Doç. Dr. Timothy Mason Roberts 
 Nisan 2007 
 
1870’li yıllarda Birleşik İtalya Krallığı neredeyse bütün İtalyan yarımadasını tek bir 
bayrak altında toplamış ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri de bir iç savaşı geride bırakıp 
ülkeyi ve kurumlarını güçlendirmişti. Bu tez, 1871 ve 1920 yılları arasında Amerika 
Birleşik Devletleri ve İtalya arasında gelişen ilişkileri anlatmaktadır. Sözü geçen 
dönem, İtalya’dan Amerika’ya 1880’li yıllarda başlayan kütlesel göç, askerlik 
hizmeti ve vatandaşlığa kabul edilme sorunu, özellikle Birleşik Devletler’in güney 
eyaletlerinde İtalyan göçmenlerinin linç edilmesi, her iki ülkedeki anarşizm 
hareketleri, Kuzey Afrika’da İtalya’nın kolonileşme faaliyetleri, Amerika’nın 
denizaşırı genişlemesinin başlangıcı ve Birinci Dünya savaşı gibi sayısız önemli 
olaya şahit olmuştur. Bu tez, her iki ülkenin yasalarını, siyasi koşullarını, içişlerini ve 
ideolojik gelişmelerini inceleyerek, İtalya ve Amerika’nın dış ilişkilerine şekil veren 
şartları belirlemeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu konuların üzerinde dururken, aslında her iki 
ülkenin de içişleri ve dış ilişkilerinde odaklandığı ana unsurun ulusal büyüklük 
olduğunu vurgulamaya çalışmaktadır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, İtalya, dış ilişkiler, Risorgimento 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
U.S.-ITALIAN RELATIONS, 1871-1920 
 
 
This study is an account of the relations between the United States and Italy 
from 1871 to 1920, and the story of two young nations aspiring to global power, and 
the relationship they made to contribute to the acquisition of power.  The late 
nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries witnessed numerous events that brought 
the United States and Italy into relations with each other, especially the mass Italian 
immigration to America beginning in the 1880s. This mass immigration precipitated 
other issues including problems of citizenship, military service, and naturalization, 
and the lynchings of Italian immigrants particularly in southern United States. Other 
issues that involved both countries were anarchism, Italian colonial activities in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the beginning of American overseas 
expansion, and World War I.  By analyzing the relationship between popular 
attitudes and policy-making in both countries, this dissertation will trace the 
intersections of cultural and diplomatic history in Italian and American foreign 
relations.   
 
 
 
 1
  
1.1 Argument and Its Context 
 
 There are only a few works about Italian foreign policy concerning history 
before World War I. Exceptions are the works of Federico Chabod and R. J. B. 
Bosworth.  Chabod’s work, Italian Foreign Policy was first published in 1951.1  It 
covers the period between 1870 and 1896.  Chabod thought that foreign policy is 
based not only on “pure diplomacy,” but also on the ideologies, the social 
conditions, and the internal developments of a country.  In addition to that, Chabod 
focused on the importance of the individuals that shaped Italy’s foreign policy. He 
stated in his work “the deeds of a single statesman always make a difference to the 
course of events.”2  Chabod also emphasized one aspect’s continuity in Italian 
foreign policy.  According to him, there was a “growing nationalistic sentiment” 
going back to Mazzianism that “grounded itself solely in the power, prestige, and 
greatness of Italy alone.”3
 In Italy, the Least of the Great Powers, R. J. B. Bosworth also emphasized 
the lasting effects of the Italian sense of national greatness, but he made a distinction 
between the essence and style of Italian foreign policy.4  Bosworth focused on the 
period between 1902 and 1915 and emphasized that fascism did not represent 
change in the ideas about Italy’s greatness and establishing the third Rome. Only the 
style of Fascist Italy was different from the style of the liberal period.  “The foreign 
policy of Liberal Italy was more covert, more hesitant, more verbally restrained than 
of fascist Italy, but it was not different in kind; instead, from the Risorgimento to the 
                                                 
 1 Federico Chabod, Italian Foreign Policy: The Statecraft of the Founders, William McCuaig, trans., 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).  
 2 Ibid., xiiv. 
 3 Ibid., 66. 
 4 R. J. B. Bosworth, Italy, the Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy Before the First 
World War (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
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fall of fascism, Italy pursued the foreign policy of the least of the Great Powers.”  
The motto was always the same: “to be strong and to seem strong.” 5
 The analyses made by Chabod and Bosworth are accurate to a great   extent. 
There was continuity in Italian foreign relations, and particular policy-makers like 
Agostino Depretis and Giovanni Giolitti influenced the development of domestic 
and diplomatic affairs. Hence this dissertation will attempt to reflect the Italian sense 
of greatness that continuously increased throughout the late nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries.  
Older historical works about U.S.-Italian relations concentrate on two major 
stages: The Risorgimento period and the post-World War I era.  H. Nelson Gay, an 
early twentieth century expert of Italian culture and history, wrote about the early 
stages of Italo-American relations and the consequences of World War I.6  Howard 
R. Marraro devoted his work to the diplomatic relations between the United States 
and Italy during the Risorgimento.  Marraro’s works like Diplomatic Relations 
between the United States and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, L’unificazione 
Italiana Vista dai Diplomatici Statunitensi [The Unification of Italy from the Eyes of 
the American Diplomats], Relazioni fra l’Italia e gli Stati Uniti [Relations between 
Italy and the United States] and American Opinion on the Unification of Italy, 1846-
1861 uncover most of the aspects of the American public and diplomatic opinion 
about the Italian unification as well the diplomatic correspondence of chief 
American officials such as George Perkins Marsh, the first U.S. minister to Rome. 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 419. 
6 H. Nelson Gay, Le Relazioni fra l’Italia e gli Stati Uniti, 1847-1871 [The Relations between Italy 
and the United States, 1847-1871] (Roma: Nuova Antologia, 1907); La Miopia del Congresso di 
Parigi, L’Ingiustizia dei Mandati Coloniali [The Myopia of the Congress of Paris, the Injustice of the 
Colonial Mandates] (Milano: Tip. Popolo d’Italia, 1927). 
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More recent dissertations written about U.S.-Italian relations focus on the 
period after the 1920s. These are Carl James Francese’s “United States Policy 
toward Italy on Arms Limitation and War Debts, 1929-1933” (University of 
Houston, 1982), Eric Steven Edelman’s “Incremental Involvement: Italy and the 
United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1948” (Yale University, 1981), John Lamberton 
Harper’s “The United States and Italian Economy, 1945-1948” (Johns Hopkins 
University, 1981), Emory Timothy Smith’s “The United States, Italy and NATO: 
American Policy toward Italy, 1948-1952” ( Kent State University, 1981) and David 
F. Schmitz, “United States Foreign Policy toward Fascist Italy, 1922-1940” (Rutgers 
University, 1985). Published works appearing recently are Daniela Rossini’s Il Mito 
Americano nell’Italia della Grande Guerra [The American Myth in Italy in the 
Great War], and Christopher M. Sterba’s Good Americans7. Italian fascism, World 
War II, and America’s Cold War policy towards Italy have all found their place in 
historical analysis. 
 In describing American foreign policy, Michael H. Hunt’s ideological 
approach is going to be useful in this dissertation.  In Ideology and U.S. Foreign 
Policy8 Hunt examines and rejects two preceding approaches to American foreign 
policy.  In The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, William Appleman Williams 
stressed the importance of an economic national interest in American foreign policy 
based on expansionism, whereas George F. Kennan in American Diplomacy 
explained the driving force of American foreign policy as “the pursuit of national 
interest free from the vagaries of short-sighted legislators, moralizing critics, and an 
                                                 
7 Daniela Rossini, Il Mito Americano nell’Italia della Grande Guerra, (Roma: Laterza & Figli Spa, 
2000); Christopher M. Sterba, Good Americans: Italian and Jewish Immigrants during the First 
World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
8 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).  
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ignorant public.”9 By referring to United States foreign policy, Kennan stated that 
the responsibility of the governments is to conduct diplomacy, and moral 
considerations in foreign relations are related to the governments, not to individuals 
or entire people.10   
As Hunt indicates, there is a strong relation between policy making and 
ideology, and “foreign policy ideologies are sets of beliefs and values, sometimes 
only poorly and partially articulated, that make international relations intelligible 
and decision making possible,”11 Ideologies help historians to understand diplomatic 
relations more easily and clearly.  The practices of the policy makers reflect both 
their ideologies and the general public opinion about the world affairs. 
From this perspective, culture, as well as ideology, becomes an important 
aspect in foreign policy.  As Hunt indicates, “ideology cannot be understood apart 
from cultural context, relationships of power, and the creation, transmission, and 
interpretation of meaning.”12  The culture widely shared and absorbed by the society 
from which the policy makers come shapes their ideologies.  In short, ideology has a 
distinct relation with culture, and that also should attract the attention of diplomatic 
historians. 
According to Hunt, there are three ideologies that shaped American foreign 
policy: the quest for national greatness, the attitudes toward foreigners in terms of a 
racial hierarchy, and a general pessimism about foreign revolutions.13  The idea of 
national greatness was related to Thomas Paine’s idea about the “power to begin the 
                                                 
9 Ronald Steel, “Birth of an Empire,” Reviews in American History 16(1988), 151.  
10 George F. Kennan, “Morality and Foreign Policy,” 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19851201faessay8456/george-f-kennan/morality-and-foreign-
policy.html, Jan5, 2007.  
11 Michael H. Hunt, “A Round Table: Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations: 
Ideology,” The Journal of American History, 77(1990) 108. 
 12 Ibid., 110. 
 13 John D. Martz, “Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy,” The Journal of Politics 50 (1988) 539.  
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world again,”14 and goes back to the establishment of the United States.  Hunt 
explains U.S. expansionism by revealing a dominant “Anglo-Saxonism” in 
American foreign policy, by which the United States was regarded as “a greater 
England with a noble destiny.”  With the arrival of immigrants, the racial differences 
became clearer and a hierarchy among the European nationalities appeared.  At the 
top, there were Americans and the English. The Irish and the Germans, who “lost 
their love for liberty” came after.  At the third level there were the Spaniards and 
Italians who “lacked vigor; they were sentimental, undisciplined and superstitious, 
and consequently they were of small account in international affairs.”15  Lastly, 
American opinions about revolutions were related to the American interest in the 
political and social changes abroad, especially how dangerous and violent they were 
likely to be. In brief, “American policy makers measured the worth of other peoples 
and nations against a racial hierarchy. They displayed hostility toward revolutions 
that diverged from the American norm, especially those on the left. Finally, they 
were convinced that national greatness depended on making the world safe for 
liberty.” 16
Principally, this dissertation will examine Hunt’s ideas about national 
greatness and racial hierarchy. Each chapter will approach the development of the 
United States and Italian foreign policies from these two perspectives, and will 
emphasize their influence and continuity in Italo-American relations. Both nations 
were seeking greatness, which impacted their foreign policies and the way Italian 
immigrants to the United States were treated in both countries. It will also show that 
American ideologies about national greatness and racial superiority generally 
                                                 
 14 Hunt, Ideology, 20. 
 15 Ibid., 17. 
 16 Ibid., 171. 
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clashed with Italian opinions about nationalism, italianitá and ethnic supremacy as 
well the designs about world hegemony. Cultural and social expressions of nativism 
and prejudice impacted United States and Italian foreign policies. The main idea of 
the dissertation is to point out that American and Italian foreign policies developed 
according to the dominant American and Italian national ideologies, and they did not 
display drastic changes throughout the indicated time period. 
It will be noted that the dissertation does not study the Vatican’s approach to 
Italo-American relations in the era. Firstly, Italy was an independent country from 
the Holy See, which during Italian unification was deprived of its former secular 
powers. There was a solid rivalry and suspiciousness between the monarchy and the 
Vatican, and many Italians had strong anticlerical feelings in the late nineteenth and 
the early twentieth centuries. In this period, Italian anticlericalism lived its most 
intense phase because of the emergent liberal, republican, nationalist, and socialist 
movements in the peninsula.  Mazzinians and the Italian socialists hated each other, 
but the Church, regarded as the greatest enemy of the newly emerged country of the 
Italians, was largely isolated from policy making and did not play a major role in the 
relationship between the two countries. The Italian immigrants in the United States 
practiced a type of Catholicism known as the Virgin Mary cult. They regarded 
themselves as Catholics, but they did not obey the orders of the Catholic Church 
since it symbolized oppression and tyranny for the poor and illiterate Italian. 
Nevertheless, Catholicism became a significant aspect preserving the italianitá of 
the immigrants, as an outcome of Italian nationalism’s development. 
 
 
 
 7
  
1.2 Sources 
 
 The primary sources for U.S.-Italian foreign relations are rich and give the 
opportunity to analyze both American and Italian attitudes.  The major source about 
the American perspective is The United States Foreign Relations correspondence 
(FRUS). This correspondence includes the translation of the Italian documents sent 
to the United States and the records of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Also, the 
papers of the United States presidents like Woodrow Wilson are useful in 
comprehending the relations between Italy and the United States.  Additionally, the 
FBI files about the Italian American anarchist Carlo Tresca are noteworthy in 
comprehending the American attitude about anarchism.                              
 Italian diplomatic sources like I Libri Verdi [The Green Books] issued by the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on specific occasions-like honoring a diplomatic 
success, or representing the aspects of an international crisis-constitute a significant 
source for explaining Italo-American relations. The records of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ Historical Diplomatic Archive present a wide range of information 
about the Italian diplomatic presence in the United States, the Commissariato 
dell’Emigrazione (Commissary of Emigration), and the Italian Office of 
Immigration and Protection at Ellis Island.17  In addition, the pamphlets about 
                                                 
17 Cinzia Maria Aicardi e [and] Alessandra Cavatella, I Fondi Archivistici della Legazione Sarda e 
della Rappresentanze Diplomatiche Italiane negli U.S.A. (1848-1901) [The Archival Sources of the 
Sardinian Legation and Italian Diplomatic Representation in U.S.A. (1848-1901)] (Roma: Istituto 
Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1988); Patrizia Catani e [and] Roberto Zuccolini, I Fondi Archivistici 
dei Consolati in Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, New Orleans e San Francisco Conservati presso 
L’Archivio Storico Diplomatico [The Archival Sources of the Consulates in Chicago, Cleveland, 
Denver, New Orleans and San Francisco Conserved in the Historical Diplomatic Archive] (Roma: 
Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1990); Laura Pilotti, L’Ufficio di Informazioni e Protezione 
dell’Emigrazione Italiana di Ellis Island [The Italian Office of Information and Protection on the 
Ellis Island] (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1993). 
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immigration laws and regulations published by the Commissariato dell’Emigrazione 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs specify the Italian attitude about immigration.18   
  Apart from the diplomatic sources about U.S.-Italian relations, there is also a 
broad variety of resources that clarify the different aspects about the subject.  Both 
American and Italian magazines and newspapers are important to understand the 
conditions and the atmosphere of the times.  In addition to the newspapers with large 
circulation like The New York Times, the influential Italian American newspapers 
like The Progresso Italo-Americano (Italian-American Progress) and La Fiaccola 
(The Torch), and the socialist and anarchist newspapers like L’Avvenire (The 
Future) and La Cronaca Sovversiva (The Subversive Chronicle) are significant to 
realize the consequences of certain incidents both in Italy and among the Italian 
immigrants in the United States. 
 Furthermore, the works composed by Italian writers about the United States, 
and by American writers about Italy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are 
beneficial. The accounts of the American and Italian travelers provide anecdotal 
impressions about the two countries.19  The revolutions of 1848 and their 
                                                 
18 Disposizioni sull’Emigrazione [Arrangements about Emigration], Legge 31 Gennaio 1901, n. 23 e 
sulle Tutela delle Rimesse e dei Risparmi degli Emigranti Italiani all’Estero, Legge 1° Febbraio1901, 
n.24 Annotato [Law 31 January, n. 23 about the Protection of the Remittance and the Savings of the 
Italian Emigrants Abroad, Law 1°February1901, n.24 Annotated] (Milano: Ditta Editrice Libraria 
Luigi di Giacomo Pirola, 1901); Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Commissariato dell’Emigrazione 
[Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commissary of Emigration], Leggi, Regolamenti, Norme 
Complementari della Legge sull’Emigration [Laws,Regulations, Complementary Rules of the Law of 
Emigration] (Roma: Cooperativa Tipografica Manuzio, 1910); Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 
Commissariato dell’Emigrazione [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commissary of Emigration], 
Istruzioni a chi Intende Emigrare per gli Stati Uniti [Instructions for whom Intend to Emigrate to the 
United States],(Roma: Stab. Tip. Società Cartiere Centrali, 1913).       
19 For detail, see Jenny Frenchot, Roads to Rome: The Antebellum Protestant Encounter with 
Catholicism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Klaus Lanzinger, Jason’s Voyage: The 
Search for the Old World in American Literature. A Study of Melville, Hawthorne, Henry James, and 
Thomas Wolfe (New York: Peter Lang, 1989); Giuseppe Massara, Viaggatori Italiani in America 
(1860-1970) [Italian Travelers in America (1860-1970)] (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 
1976); William L. Vance, America’s Rome: Catholic and Contemporary Rome (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989).  
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repercussions attracted the attention of many contemporary American intellectuals.20  
In addition, some late nineteenth-century books reveal the Italian attitude about 
American imperialism, and the Spanish-American War of 1898 in particular.21 
Finally, and more importantly, American history books written by Italian writers 
display the nineteenth-and the early twentieth-century Italian views about American 
history, politics, institutions and society.22
 
1.3   Dissertation Blueprint 
 
 The last part of this introduction outlines the chapters that constitute the 
dissertation.  The dissertation is divided into thematic chapters to display the 
features of the relations between the U.S. and Italy thoroughly.  The second chapter 
is about the preliminary period of U.S.-Italian relations between 1796 and 1870.  
                                                 
20 See Sara Antonelli, Daniele Fiorentino e [and] Giuseppe Monsagrati, a cura di [eds. al.], Gli 
Americani e la Repubblica Romana del 1849 [The Americans and the Roman Republic of 1849], 
(Roma: Gangemi Editore, 2003); Daniele Fiorentino e [and] Matteo Sanfilippo, a cura di [eds. al.], 
Gli Stati Uniti e L’Unità d’Italia [The United States and Italian Unification] (Roma: Gangemi 
Editore, 2004); Margaret Fuller, “These Sad but Glorious Days”: Dispatches from Europe, 1846-
1850, Larry J. Reynolds and Susan Belasco Smith eds, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991)     
21 Domenico Bonamico, Comandante [Commander], Il Conflitto Ispano-Americano [The Spanish-
American Conflict] (Roma: Rivista Marittima, 1898); Alfredo Feliciangeli, la Guerra Ispana-
Americana, 1898 [The Spanish-American War, 1898] (Roma: Enrico Voghera, 1898); Augusto 
Pierantoni, Cuba e il Conflitto Ispano-Americano [Cuba and the Spanish-American Conflict] (Roma: 
Stabilimento Tipografico della Tribuna, 1898); Timone (pseud.), Riflessioni sulla Guerra Marittima 
tra Spagna e Stati Uniti, in relazione alla Marina Nostra [Reflections about the Maritime War 
between Spain and the United States in Relation to our Navy] (Napoli: Stabilimento Tipografico R. 
Pesole, 1898); Ferruccio Vitale, La Politica Imperialista degli Stati Uniti [The Imperialist Policy of 
the United States] (Firenze: Ufficio della Rassegna Nazionale, 1901). 
22 Diego Angeli, La Repubblica Stellata [The Star Republic] Firenze: R. Bemporad & Figlio, Editori, 
1918); Umberto Biasoli, Piccola Storia degli Stati Uniti d’America [A Short History of the United 
United States of America], (Milano: Antonio Vallardi, 1917); Vito Garretto, Storia degli Stati Uniti 
d’America del Nord, 1492-1914 [History of the United States of America of North, 1492-1914] 
(Milano: Librico Hoepli, 1916); Rodolfo Giani, Storia degli Stati Uniti d’America [History of the 
United States of America] (Milano: Carrera, 1902); Luigi Rava, La Fortuna di Beniamino Franklin in 
Italia, Prefazione al Volume “Beniamino Franklin” di Lawrence Shaw Mayo [The Success of 
Benjamin Franklin in Italy, Preface to Lawrence Shaw Mayo’s “Benjamin Franklin”] (Firenze: R. 
Bemporad & Figlio, Editori); Gedeone de Vincentiis, L’America del Nord [North America] (Napoli: 
Luigi Pierro Tip.-Editore, 1905).    
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Commencing with the accounts of the late eighteenth- century travelers, this chapter 
focuses on the incidents like the 1848 revolutions, the creation and fall of the Roman 
Republic, the Risorgimento, and the American Civil War in the diplomatic relations 
between the two countries.   
 Chapter 3 is about immigration, the related issue of naturalization, and the 
problem of military service. After indicating the different implications of 
immigration for the United States and Italy, this chapter discusses naturalization as a 
diplomatic problem between the two countries. Naturalization, which was regarded 
by the United States as a standard consequence of immigration, emerged as a huge 
risk for the Italians since it represented the loss of a significant number of Italian 
subjects.  Since American and Italian officials had conflicting opinions about 
immigration, the outcome was a problem in Italo-American relations, especially 
after the mass immigration of the 1880s. This problem turned out to be most 
perceptible during World War I when the two countries argued about the 
compulsory military service of Italian Americans in their mother country. 
 Chapter 4 is about American and Italian stereotypes.  As an outcome of the 
miscellaneous information about Italy among Americans, Italian stereotypes were 
often depicted as an organ grinder, or a vicious Mafia member, but sometimes they 
turned out to be republican heroes who saved their country like Guiseppe Garibaldi.  
This dualism in American images of Italians owed to the conflict between 
Americans’ racial prejudice in the late nineteenth century, and the effect of the 
Italian Risorgimento on the American public.  On the other hand, the American 
images among Italians generally were heroes and saviors from George Washington 
to Woodrow Wilson, resembling ancient Roman personages.  In brief, Chapter 4 
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explains the importance of cultural images in shaping ideologies, and consequently 
foreign policies.      
 Chapter 5 focuses on the lynching of Italian immigrants, including Italian 
Americans who had gained U.S. citizenship, by “native” Americans, especially in 
southern states.  This chapter explains lynching as an outcome of American racial 
attitudes and Italian immigrants’ settlement patterns.  In addition, it demonstrates 
that the two countries could not comprehend the basis of each other’s legal 
institutions like American federalism and the Italian Civil Code; each lynching 
incident in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries brought these 
institutions into collision. The Italian immigrants, who chose to live within their 
“colonies”, and sometimes under the protection of their own illegal organizations 
like the Mafia, did not assimilate. Thus, they were victimized by vigilantism, the 
ultimate safeguard of the American racial order at the time.   
 Chapter 6 is about anarchism.  It concentrates on the definition of anarchism 
in United States and Italy, and highlights anarchist leaders like Carlo Tresca and 
Luigi Galleani who lived in America, and had a significant effect on the American 
working class. Anarchism emerged as diplomatic problem especially after the 
assassinations of the Italian King Umberto I in 1900 by Gaetano Bresci (an Italian 
immigrant in America) and President William McKinley in 1901 by Leon Czolgosz 
(a Polish immigrant), which initiated a fierce discussion about anarchism on both 
sides of the Atlantic. The problem about immigrant anarchists turned out to be one 
of the most important and urgent issues in the agenda of American politicians. 
Anarchism, which had its background in Europe (communist anarchism, socialist 
anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism), and the United States to a certain extent 
(individual anarchism that focused on the individuals’ non-violent, passive 
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resistance to the system), turned out to be a common danger for the two countries’ 
political systems.  The consequences of the problems about immigration and the 
negative Italian stereotype revealed themselves again in relation to the international 
problem of anarchism.  
 Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrate the features of American imperialism and 
Italian colonialism respectively. Firstly, the definition of expansionism from the 
Italian and American perspectives is given. The motives that directed Italy and the 
United States to expansionism are discussed. Additionally, Italy’s aspiration of 
establishing “agricultural colonies” on the American continent is described in 
Chapter 7 as another problematic outcome of the Italian perception of emigration 
and colonization.  Lastly, the two countries’ opinions about their policies of 
colonialism and imperialism are explored in this part.  
 Chapter 9 focuses on World War I and its consequences in U.S.-Italian 
relations.  It demonstrates the different American and Italian ideologies in entering 
the war, the role of Woodrow Wilson in the war for the two countries, the meaning 
of “irredentism” for the Italian and American governments, and the American and 
Italian opinions about each other’s armies. The Paris Peace Conference appears to be 
the vital point in the deterioration of Italo-American relations; the different 
expectations by the end of the war and during the conference became the reasons for 
the Italian frustration about the United States and Wilson in particular by 1919. This 
final chapter serves as a conclusion that symbolizes the termination of a significant 
era in U.S.-Italian relations. The cordial friendship which had started after the 1848 
revolution came to an end with the Treaty of Versailles, and Italian frustrations 
about America were transformed first into fury and then resentment. The rise of 
fascism in Italy after 1922 was related to the immense Italian frustration and sense 
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of isolation in response to the United States’ attitude during the Peace Conference. 
Mussolini’s fascism initiated a new period in Italo-American relations that was 
going to last until the end of the Second World War. During that era, the two 
countries’ divergent ideologies and policies clashed, and U.S.-Italian cordiality was 
not recover until the Cold War. 
 In brief, this dissertation seeks to concentrate on the neglected and crucial 
period of U.S-Italian relations from the establishment of the united Kingdom of Italy 
in the early 1870s to the end of World War I.  By study of the cultural and 
diplomatic histories of the two countries, their different ideologies, perspectives and 
practices are going to be revealed in the subsequent chapters. Each part will focus on 
an essential theme that uncovers these differences and disputes between the United 
States and Italy. While exposing the two countries’ emerging differences, the 
dissertation is going to argue that the basis of these differences was anchored in the 
greatest similarity between the United States and the united Kingdom of Italy; each 
countries’ longing for national greatness.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE ITALIAN PENINSULA: 
THE PRELIMINARY ERA 
 
By 1871, the kingdom of Italy brought together nearly the whole Italian 
peninsula under a single flag, and the United States left behind a civil war that 
united the country and its institutions. This chapter will seek to concentrate on the 
initial, often telescopic U.S.-Italian relations before the Risorgimento, which would 
frame the future relations between the two countries.  In pursuing that, the accounts 
of individual travelers from both countries, as well as the diplomatic correspondence 
between Italy and the United States are going to be utilized.       
                              
2.1 Italy before the Unification: 1796-1846 
 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Italian peninsula was under 
French control.  The Treaty of Vienna, concluded in 1815 after the final defeat of 
Napoleon at Waterloo, restored the map of Italy to a state similar to that of 1748.1  
As the Austrian Chancellor, Prince Klemens Wenzel Lothar Metternich stated, Italy 
was only a geographical expression in the early nineteenth century.  Nevertheless, 
                                                 
1 Derek Beales, The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 
1971) 39. 
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the most important consequence of Napoleon’s rule in Italy “was to establish in 
men’s minds the idea that Italy could become a unitary state.”2   
During this period, the Italian elite became interested in America.  In 1821, 
the poet Vittorio Alfieri wrote his L’America Libera [Free America], which 
consisted of five odes after the surrender of the English at Yorktown.  In 1791, 
Count Paolo Andreani from Milan brought a copy of L’America Libera as a present 
to the United States President George Washington.  He became a member of the 
American Philosophical Society, moved to Louisiana, and stayed in America long 
enough to write to Thomas Jefferson in 1808 from New Orleans.  Another Milanese 
count, Luigi Castiglioni wrote the first Italian travel book about America under the 
title, Viaggio negli Stati Uniti dell’America Settentrionale fatto negli 1785, 1786, 
1787 [Journey made in Northern United States of America in 1785, 1786, 1787]. 
Castiglioni also became a member of the American Philosophical Society.3  These 
writers composed their works on a romantic basis. America was a mysterious land 
where people made a revolution against an empire, and united their country.       
Benjamin Franklin appears to be one of the prominent figures of the 
eighteenth-century Italo-American cultural and intellectual contact.  He regularly 
corresponded with Padre Beccaria and other Italian scientists like the mathematician 
and physicist, Paolo Frisi, and the translations of his Information to Those who 
would Remove to America were published in Padova and Cremona in 1785.4  
Nonetheless, the most well known Italo-American companionship in the eighteenth 
century was the one of Thomas Jefferson and his Florentine neighbor in Virginia, 
                                                 
2 John Gooch, The Unification of Italy (London: Routledge, 1989) 3. 
3 For detail, see Giuseppe Massara, Viaggatori Italiani in America (1860-1970) [Italian Travelers in 
America (1860-1970)] (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1976), 11-13. 
4 Ibid., 12. 
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Filippo Mazzei.5 For Monticello’s garden, Jefferson asked for help from Mazzei 
who brought him orange trees, vaga loggia peach, the angelica apricot, the baccon di 
re plum, and the Poppe di Venere [Breast of Venus] peach from Italy. In return, 
Jefferson sent birds, seeds, and plants of Virginia to the Grand Duke of Tuscany 
with Mazzei.6          
Pursuant to the Treaty of Vienna, Italy from 1815 to 1846 was divided into 
seven sovereign states: the Kingdom of Piedmont, the Kingdom of Lombardy-
Venetia, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the Duchy of Modena, the Kingdom of 
Parma-Piacenza, the Papal States, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.  Austrian 
archdukes ruled Modena and Tuscany. Parma, which had been under Spanish rule, 
became an Austrian dukedom in 1815.  An Austrian viceroy in Milan governed the 
Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia. The Papal States, under the rule of the Pope, 
consisted of Lazio, Umbria, the Marches, and the Romagna.  The Kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies was under the control of the Spanish Bourbon, King Ferdinand IV. San 
Marino and Monaco were other small Italian states.  In short, “this was Metternich’s 
Italy-a country of small states dependent on Austria’s good-will and so organized as 
to be a bulwark against any revival of revolutionary tendencies.”7  The Kingdom of 
Piedmont, which consisted of the Piedmont region in northern Italy and the island of 
Sardinia, turned out to be the most significant threat to Metternich’s Italy. By the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the Dukes of Savoy became the kings of the 
united Kingdom of Italy. 
                                                 
5 For detail, see Howard R. Marraro, “The Four Versions of Jefferson’s Letters to Mazzei,” The 
William and Mary College Quarterly Historical Magazine 22 (1942), 18-29; “Jefferson’s Letters 
Concerning the Settlement of Mazzei’s Virginia Estate,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 30 
(1943), 235-42; “Unpublished Mazzei Letters to Jefferson,” The William and Mary Quarterly 1 
(1944), 374-396.    
6 William Howard Adams, Jefferson’s Monticello (New York: Albeville Press, 1983), 182-183.   
7 Edgar Holt, The Making of Italy, 1815-1870 (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 43. 
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The first official correspondence between the United States and the Kingdom 
of Sardinia occurred on January 28, 1818 when Vittorio Adolfo Sasserno became 
the first American consul in Nice where he resided until the end of 1849. Gaspare 
Deabbate became the first representative of the Sardinian Kingdom in the United 
States on 18 May 1820, during James Monroe’s presidency.8  Robert Wickliffe, Jr. 
of Kentucky served as the American representative in Turin between 1843 and 1848.  
He supported the construction of a railroad from Turin to Genoa, and believed that 
when its Milan branch was terminated, American commerce with the port of Genoa 
would expand since more American commercial goods could be transported to 
Lombardy.9
The Italian travelers who went to the United States in the 1800s regarded 
America as a land and frontier of liberty.  Their vague comprehension of the 
continent was often a combination of “an anarchist instinct or a romantic 
restlessness, of unforeseeable emotional components-fear and unconscious 
enthusiasm, the fascination of the unexplored regions, the wild land that could be 
never discovered or dominated entirely, and the taste of the primitive.”10  Some of 
the most prominent Italian travelers of the early nineteenth century were Eusebio 
Valli, a doctor who died in America during his vaccination experiments; Orazio de 
Attellis, an ex-official of Napoleon in Russia who wrote in four languages; Carlo 
Vidua, a professional traveler; Giacomo Costantino Beltrami, the discoverer of the 
unknown springs of the Mississippi; Francesco Arese, a friend of Louis Napoleon 
and an exile in America; Leonette Cipriani, a patriot and adventurer who went to the 
                                                 
8 Howard R. Marraro, Relazioni fra l’Italia e gli Stati Uniti [Relations between Italy and the United 
States] (Roma: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1954), 58. 
9 Ibid. 62. 
10 Massara, Viaggiatori Italiani, 17. 
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United States for three times, and finally, Antonio Caccia, one of the participants in 
the California Gold Rush.11
Meanwhile, the experience of American travelers in Italy during the early 
1800s was analogous to the one of the voyagers in Rome during ancient times.  
Different from the Italian travelers in America, American tourists, particularly New 
England intellectuals and artists, chose the peninsula as their destination for “the 
legendary cultural treasures of the Old World and a lost heritage.”12  As well as that, 
traveling to other places helped the American tourists and Italian travelers to grasp 
their national characteristics. “Travel itself was both a cultural activity necessary to 
the continued formulation of national identity and a spiritual enterprise.”13  While 
exploring the remnants of Ancient Rome, American travelers tried to find their self-
identity which was unique, but also attached to its glorious past in the Old World.  
The discovery of “pre-Cavourian Italy by pre-Civil War Americans was part of 
something larger and deeper in the shaping of a new American conscience: it 
partook of a phase and a stage toward the molding of American self-consciousness 
as a civilization.”14  Aside from its magnificent past, Italy was admired for its 
natural beauties, its cultural and intellectual heritage.  It became “Dear Italy,” a 
place “where ‘a wind, ever soft, from the blue heaven blows, and the groves are of 
laurel and myrtle and rose.’”15  Italy was an eternal country, and as James Fenimore 
Cooper stated in 1830, “If New Yorkers thought only of the future, all Romans had 
to be shown ‘ruminating’ upon the past. Romans proudly traced their ancestry back 
                                                 
11 For detail and some other names, see Ibid. 17-19. 
12 Klaus Lanzinger, Jason’s Voyage: The Search for the Old World in American Literature. A Study 
of Melville, Hawthorne, Henry James, and Thomas Wolfe (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), 1.  
13 Jenny Franchot, Roads to Rome: The Antebellum Protestant Encounter with Catholicism, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 16. 
14 A. William Salomone, “The Nineteenth-Century Discovery of Italy: An Essay in American 
Cultural History Prolegomena to a Historiographical Problem,” The American Historical Review 73 
(1968), 1372.  
15 “Critical Notes: The Italian Sketch-Book,” The New England Magazine 9 (1835), 142. 
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to dwellers on the Palatine, while New Yorkers scarcely knew their own 
grandmothers, or ‘to what nation they properly belonged.’”16  In brief, the first half 
of the nineteenth century witnessed the American intellectuals’ pursuit of a mythic 
past in the Old World and Italy was one of the significant focal points of that search. 
For Italians, America was an uncivilized land of opportunity.  
 
2.2 The Italian Revolutions of 1848 and American Responses 
 
  On June 17, 1846 Giovanni Mastai Ferretti became Pope Pius IX and 
immediately began to undertake liberal acts that affected the entire Italian peninsula; 
“it was the first time in many centuries that words of democracy had fallen from 
pontifical lips.”17  Amnesty for political prisoners and the end of censorship created 
pressure for the governments of Piedmont and Tuscany to make similar concessions 
and support grew for the idea of a confederation of Italian states presided over by the 
Pope.18  However, the Pope frustrated the Roman people and liberal reformers 
elsewhere.  In a short time, he returned to the conservative practices of his 
predecessors.   
American opinion about the Pope was mixed. In 1847, Margaret Fuller 
arrived in Italy as the correspondent of The New York Daily Tribune to report the 
events during the Italian revolution.  Fuller, by the end of the same year, sensed that 
the Pope “meant only to improve, not to reform, and should keep things in status 
                                                 
16 William L. Vance, America’s Rome: Catholic and Contemporary Rome (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989), 115. 
17 Howard R. Marraro, American Opinion on the Unification of Italy, 1846-1861 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1932), 4.  
18 Roger Price, The Revolutions of 1848 (New Jersey: Humanities Press International Inc., 1989), 31. 
 21
quo, safe locked with the keys of St. Peter.”19  Fuller remained long enough in 
Rome to witness the flight of the pope from Rome and the establishment of the 
Roman Republic. The American public was divided into two camps over the 
establishment of an American mission to Rome, “the Protestants which took sides 
with the revolutionists [in Rome], and the Catholics who rallied to support the 
Pope.”20  While these types of divisions often dominated American opinion about 
Italy in the early period of U.S-Italian relations, most Americans in the period came 
to believe Italian republicanism was flawed and futile. 
In 1848, the first European insurrection started not in Rome but Sicily and 
spread to other parts of Italy and throughout the continent as well.  The quarantotto 
was “a necessary stage in the development of national consciousness,”21 but could 
not unite the Italian people under a single flag because the revolutions were not well 
coordinated and had different objectives.22  The American public supported the 
1848 Italian revolutions, but, for the U.S. government, “European stability was more 
important than European liberty.”23  The revolutions in general could end up with a 
political and social chaos, and that could be dangerous for the status quo in the Old 
World. Also, the establishment of an Italian republic similar to the United States did 
not seem very likely in the near future. The U.S. government did not have 
confidence in the Italians’ ability to make revolutions.  John Rowan, the American 
minister in Naples stated, “The Italian people, unable to comprehend the principle 
                                                 
19 Rome, December 17, 1847, Margaret Fuller, “These Sad but Glorious Days”: Dispatches from 
Europe, 1846-1850, Larry J. Reynolds and Susan Belasco Smith eds, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1991), 176.  
20 American Opinion, 309. 
21 Denis Mack Smith, “The Revolutions f 1848-1849 in Italy,” R. J. W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge 
von Strandmann, eds, The Revolutions in Europe, 1848-1849: From Reform to Reaction (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 79. 
22 Ibid., 55. 
23 Timothy M. Roberts and Daniel W. Howe, “The U.S. and the Revolutions of 1848,” Evans, The 
Revolutions in Europe, 172. 
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which binds our country, in a union of peace, power & prosperity seem unsuited to 
the reception of Democratic Institutions.”24  Thus, the primary relation between the 
United States and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies remained commercial, and 
American officials’ principal objective was to have commercial relations with Sicily 
comparable to those of France and Britain.  During the revolution, that objective did 
not change; Americans “were strictly neutral, not meddling in [Sicilians’] affairs in 
any way whatever, and by doing so [gained] the respect of both parties which neither 
England nor France [could] boast of.”25  Until World War I, American neutrality in 
diplomatic relations won it favor in Italy. 
The escape of the Habsburg minister Clemens von Metternich to England, 
after the revolution in Vienna on March 8, 1848, triggered the revolutions in the 
Lombardo-Venetian area.  The “Five Glorious Days” in Milan between March 18 
and 23 resulted in the expulsion of the Austrian troops under the command of 
General Josef Radetzky.  Count Gabriele Cassati, the leader of the moderates in 
Milan, asked for the help of the King of Piedmont, Charles Albert, who was 
enthusiastic to enter Milan. Carlo Cattaneo, the leader of the Milanese republicans, 
was uncertain about Milan’s future under Piedmont’s control.  He formed a war 
council separate from Cassati, and asked for France’s help.  But Giuseppe Mazzini, 
the champion of Italian republican self-determination, arrived in Milan, and 
“undermined him by emphasizing the need to gain independence first, whereas 
Cattaneo saw the first requisites as the establishment of a republic and 
democracy.”26  The plebiscite about the annexation of the city of Milan to the 
                                                 
24 John Rowan to James Buchanan, Naples, March 3, 1849, Howard R. Marraro, Diplomatic 
Relations between the United States and the Two Sicilies, Vol 1: 1816-1850 (New York: S. F. Vanni, 
1951-52), 670. 
25 Francis X. Holbrook and John Nikol, “Reporting the Sicilian Revolution of 1848-1849,” American 
Neptune 43 (1983), 175-6.  
26 Gooch, The Unification, 13-14. 
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Kingdom of Piedmont resulted with Charles Albert’s victory, although it did not 
prevail for a long time.  On August 6, 1848 Austrian troops entered Milan, and on 
August 9, Charles Albert signed an armistice with the Austrians. Internal divisions 
hurt the Italians’ attempt at independence.   
Meanwhile, Daniele Manin organized the revolution in Venice.  On March 
28, 1848, President Manin sent an address to the United States in which he stated: 
“The ocean divides us, but we are not divided by the bounds of sympathy ... We 
have much to learn from you; and, though your elders in civilization, we blush not to 
acknowledge it.”27 At the American consulate, “the American Consul, William A. 
Sparks, appeared, bearing in one hand the flag of the United States and in the other 
the Italian tricolor with the winged lion.”28 Revolutionary euphoria tested the 
American commitment to neutrality.                 
The Austrian defeat of the King of Piedmont at the battle of Novara on 
March 23, 1849 had mixed repercussions in the United States.  The American press 
supported the Italians’ war against Austria from the beginning, but there were 
different views in the newspapers after Charles Albert’s defeat.  For instance, the 
Cincinnati Morning Chronicle reported, “Charles Albert had fought for the 
Kingdom of Upper Italy, and not for the Italian independence.”29  But there were 
also supporters of the King of Piedmont. The editor of the New Orleans Daily 
Picayune said, “we must look for a resolution of the questions of liberty and 
progress in Europe. Their defeat would have the most disastrous effects, not only on 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 37. 
28 Marraro, American Opinion, 36. 
29 Ibid., 42.  
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Italy but on the world.”30  Americans viewed early Italian independence-seeking as 
either too provincial or too universal.   
  The establishment of the Roman Republic was the incident that attracted the 
greatest attention of the United States.  No nation of the world, including the United 
States, recognized the Roman Republic, but its establishment divided the American 
public.31  The tension between the republicans and the clergy in Rome started with 
Pius IX’s Allocution of April 29, 1848 in which he “stated flatly his opposition to 
the ‘extremist’ movements that were everywhere challenging authority, his refusal to 
declare war on the [Austrian] Empire, his disavowal of any intentions to lead a 
unification movement in Italy.”32  The declaration of the Pope caused a great 
upheaval and shock among the republicans.  After the assassination of Count 
Pellegrino Rossi, the Pope’s chief minister, on November 15, Pius IX “was forced to 
appoint as Premier, Giuseppe Galletti, a Mazzinian democrat.”33  In a short time, the 
Pope lost control of the city and fled to Gaeta, and “patriots flooded into Rome, 
among them, Giuseppe Garibaldi.”34  By the end of December, an assembly in 
Rome declared the city a republic on February 9, 1849.  
However, it did not take a long time for the Austrians and the French to 
restore the Pope.  The Romans defended the city for a month, but on July 2, 1850 
French troops entered Rome.  Giuseppe Garibaldi left the city on that night to 
continue his fight. One year later, he went to New York.  Giuseppe Mazzini 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 For American views about Italian republicanism, see Paola Gemme, Domesticating Foreign 
Struggles: the Italian Risorgimento and Antebellum American Identity (Athens, GA & London: 
Georgia University Press, 2005). 
32 George Fasel, Europe in Upheaval: The Revolutions of 1848 (Chicago: Rand McNally & 
Company, 1970), 91.  
33 Ibid., 92. 
34 Gooch, The Unification, 17. 
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meanwhile had slipped out Civita Vecchia on July 12 in disguise and using an 
American passport.35        
In the United States, the Catholic clergy and laity condemned the Roman 
republicans whereas Protestants supported them wholeheartedly, if temporarily.  A 
controversy between Archbishop John Hughes and Horace Greeley, the editor of 
The New York Daily Tribune, about American Catholics sending gold to Pius IX 
occupied American newspapers for a certain period of time.  There was also debate 
about the United States’ official recognition of the Roman republic. For instance, 
Margaret Fuller urged the U.S. government to recognize the Roman republic. 
Secretary of State James Buchanan and Lewis Cass, Jr., American chargé d’affaires 
in Rome, “discouraged such recognition on the ground that the new government 
would be short lived.”36  The eventual return of Pius IX to Rome “was celebrated in 
New York City by a Te Deum at St. Patrick’s Cathedral.”37  
The last essential consequence of the 1848-1849 revolutions in the United 
States was the arrival of immigrants to America.  During the revolutions over half a 
million immigrants arrived from Europe,38 and that had a direct impact on the 
growth of anti-immigrant feelings, which later affected Italian-American relations.  
The coming of large numbers of the Irish and German immigrants beginning in the 
mid-nineteenth century inspired hatred among the native-born population, but Italian 
immigrants also met with hostility, as will be shown.  “Provided the immigrant 
adopt[ed] American ways he [was] readily accepted, but those who [did not] comply 
with American habits and standards of living [met] with no mercy.”39   
                                                 
35 Ibid., 18. 
36 Marraro, American Opinion, 100. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Arnold Whitridge, Men in Crisis: The Revolutions of 1848 (New York: Charles   Scribner’s Sons, 
1949), 293. 
39 Ibid., 295. 
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2.3 The Unification of Italy 
 
In 1849, “the old regimes [in Italy] were again restored, and although some 
people had tasted liberty and learned to fight on the barricades, the bitterness of civil 
war and defeat secured the cause of patriotism.”40  The only Italian state that 
preserved its constitutional government was the Kingdom of Piedmont,41 and, as a 
consequence, that state became the major decisive factor in the Italian unification.  
The period between 1850 and 1861 was the time when the government of Piedmont 
under Victor Emanuel II took every opportunity to support the unification of the 
peninsula under its control.  It entered the Crimean War on the side of France and 
Britain, thus, in 1856, the Kingdom of Piedmont “earned the right to sit down with 
the great powers of the peacemaking congress in Paris.”42  France became 
Piedmont’s ally in its struggle against Austria on the condition that Nice and Savoy 
would become French territories.  After a war with the Austrian Empire in 1859, 
Piedmont conquered Umbria and the Marches.  In November 1860, Garibaldi 
resigned the dictatorship of Sicily and Naples, and “he left Victor Emanuel II 
acknowledged as constitutional monarch in all those territories.”43       
In 1861, Italy became a unified kingdom under the reign of Victor Emanuel 
II.  Piedmont’s constitution of 1848 was maintained.  It was “strongly monarchical; 
the king was head of the state, and had his own share in its legislative, juridical and 
executive functions.”44  Rome became the capital of the country in 1870 after Louis 
Napoleon’s withdrawal of the French troops from the city because of the Franco-
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Prussian war.  As Denis Mack Smith states, “whatever the expense, Italy was at last 
substantially united and complete.”45  By the end of the nineteenth century Italy was 
one of the most populous European countries. 
                     
The main goal of the leaders of the Risorgimento was to secure Venice and 
Rome. In 1861, Count Camillo Cavour, the prime minister of the Kingdom of Italy, 
stated, “Ho detto, o signori, e affermo ancora una volta che Roma, Roma sola deve 
essere la capitale d’Italia.”46  Thus, Italy moved toward Bismarck’s Prussia, fought 
against Austria for Venice and Trentino, and established friendly relations with 
Britain and France.   
Italy also developed relations with the United States.  Italians perceived the 
United States as a commercial partner, but sometimes a competitor.  In cotton 
manufacturing, Italians wished to compete with the United States, but their plans 
during the American Civil War did not succeed.47  The Civil War only worsened 
Italy’s economic conditions.48  Cavour’s fundamental ambition was to have a united 
Italy, and, for that reason, Italy was going to be the ally of the most beneficial 
countries. Cavour’s choice was France, and that was known among the members of 
the American diplomatic circle.  John Moncure Daniel of Virginia served as the 
American consul in Turin during Cavour’s period in office. He was a typical 
Southern aristocrat, perhaps predisposed to oppose any threat to rights of property. 
His views about Cavour were harsh and critical.  For instance, when Cavour wanted 
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to pass a law to confiscate church property, Daniel thought that it was “monstrous,” 
even though Daniel was hardly a defender of Catholicism. In 1853, he stated that the 
Italian Premier was “an able man, but did not impress [him] as being either bold or 
sincere. Hence his ministry [was] cautious and timid in small and great things.”49         
Nevertheless, American opinion about Cavour was generally positive and 
supportive.  In 1859, the American Radical Republican Charles Sumner described 
Cavour as the international personage of the moment “who [was] acting as a 
transcendent part in the world’s history.”50  In 1871, the American Committee for 
the celebration of the unification of Italy, presided over by Theodore Roosevelt, the 
father of the future United States president, praised Cavour’s ideas, especially a 
“free Church in a free State” that rendered the Italian institutions very similar to 
those of the United States.51
  The second half of the nineteenth century was an era when American 
travelers experienced a different Italy. Previously, American intellectuals perceived 
the Italian peninsula as a scene from ancient times. The idealized account of Italy 
now was converted into a more realistic and critical version. Apart from the history 
and the remains of an ancient culture, the late nineteenth-century travelers noticed 
dirt, poverty, ignorance, and disorder in Italy.  From this perspective, this period is 
an important stage in the formation of the negative Italian stereotypes in American 
mind.  An excellent example for that is the depiction of Civita Vecchia and its 
people by Mark Twain in The Innocents Abroad, which was published in 1869: 
This Civita Vecchia is the finest nest of dirt, venim[sic], and 
ignorance we have found yet, except that African perdition 
they call Tangier, which is just like it ... [The people] are 
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indolent, as a general thing, and yet have few pastimes. They 
work two or three hours at a time, but not hard, and then they 
knock off and catch flies ... They are very uncleanly-these 
people-in face, in person, and dress. When they see anybody 
with a clean shirt on, it arouses their scorn. The women wash 
clothes, half the day, at the public tanks in the streets, but 
they are probably somebody else’s ... Their education is at a 
very low stage. One portion of the men go into the military, 
another into the priesthood, and the rest into the shoemaking 
business.52
 
The details given above by Twain about the residents of Civita Vecchia 
anticipated the future depiction of Italian immigrants in America. Their idleness, 
occupations, and even their skin color are the same characteristics of the future 
“dago” image in the United States, and the consequences of that depiction were 
going to dominate an important part of U.S.-Italian relations in the late nineteenth 
and the early twentieth centuries.  
   
 
2.4 Garibaldi, “Washington of Italy” 
 
Nevertheless, the Italian revolutionary Giuseppe Garibaldi, the most famous 
exile on American soil, overall enjoyed high esteem in the United States.  Theodore 
Dwight, in the preface of his translation of Garibaldi’s autobiography, said that the 
book showed the general’s “pure and noble heart, a character eminently humane and 
disinterested.”53  Margaret Fuller praised the general and his troops who were 
“sparkling with genius and ennobled with the noble spirit, ready to dare, to do, to 
die.”54  Giuseppe Garibaldi was unquestionably a hero in the United States in the 
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second half of the nineteenth century.  The American public observed Garibaldi’s 
actions in the Italian peninsula carefully, and praised him wholeheartedly.     
When news was heard that Garibaldi was on his way to the United States in 
1850, a committee composed of the Italian immigrants in New York City began to 
make arrangements.  “It must be remembered that his heroic defense of the Roman 
republic against overwhelming force had been watched in America, except in 
Catholic circles, with keen and sympathetic interest, earning for Garibaldi 
unbounded admiration and esteem.”55  Garibaldi was welcomed with a public 
reception in New York.  Garibaldi’s residence in the United States lasted nine 
months, 1850-1851, and  four months, 1853-1854.56  He led a different life from the 
other Italian immigrants because of his status.  On his arrival, “two Americans, 
Robert B. Coleman and Charles A. Stetson, owners of the Astor House, 221 
Broadway, offered the hospitality of their hotel to General Garibaldi.”57  Then he 
moved to Clifton, Staten Island and worked in the wax factory of Antonio Meucci, 
who, by the Italian Americans, recognized as the inventor of telephone. While he 
was there, Garibaldi joined the Tompkinsville Masonic Lodge No, 401, to which 
Meucci also belonged.58
In November 1850 Garibaldi set off for Washington with a letter for 
appointment written by M. H. Grinnell of New York to the Secretary of State, 
Daniel Webster.  The letter asserted that:  
General Garibaldi visits Washington for the purpose of 
presenting to you, a communication signed by a large number 
of respectable merchants and other citizens, asking him for an 
appointment to some respectable place by which he[could] be 
able to support himself and family ... if our Government 
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would only evince a liberal hand toward the General, it would 
gratify a large number of his countrymen residents here, as 
well as those Americans who have become personally 
acquainted with him.59
There is no thorough information about the meeting of Garibaldi and 
Webster, but, as Howard Marraro also indicated, Grinnell’s request failed, and 
Garibaldi did not receive any support from the American government.  
However, Garibaldi’s brief presence in the United States attracted the 
attention of the Italian leaders. In a letter to Massima D’Azeglio, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, the Sardinian minister in Washington, Luigi Mossi described the public 
welcome for the general, wrote that Garibaldi had presented in New York a letter of 
recommendation from Mazzini, and added that he was “informed that recently the 
clubs of the Giovine Italia established in New York [had] been very active.”60  
Whereas the American public welcomed Garibaldi as an Italian hero of liberty, the 
Kingdom of Piedmont was concerned about the spread of Mazzinian republicanism 
on the American continent. The minister of the Two Sicilies at Paris, Baron 
Antonini, discussed with the American minister at Paris, William Cabel Rives, “the 
rumor that Garibaldi was raising men in America to send against the Two Sicilies 
with American money and ships,” and he notified Rives that Garibaldi and his men 
“would be treated as pirates.”61
However, in his address to the people of Italy at a celebration at Cooper 
Institute on December 18, 1860, Mr. Eli P. Norton expressed that the American 
citizens were on Garibaldi’s side and could not “forget the countrymen of 
Columbus.”62  The resolutions proposed in the same meeting stated:   
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... we believe that Garibaldi, by his simplicity and 
purity of character, his lofty elevation above the 
selfishness of a conqueror, his marvelous successes 
and his great wisdom, stands near our Washington, 
as a Divine instrument in the cause of free 
government.63
 
This statement is significant in the sense that the American public 
recognized Garibaldi as a hero-perhaps the most prominent one-of the Italian nation 
who was “once an exile on [American] soil.”64
Giuseppe Garibaldi admired Abraham Lincoln, and Lincoln in turn asked 
for the general’s assistance, offering him a commission in the Union army. 
Garibaldi refused Lincoln’s offer because “he felt that he could be useful only if he 
were given the supreme command of all the Northern forces, with the right, if 
conditions should prove propitious, to claim the freedom of the slaves.”65  In spite 
of his audacious response, Garibaldi remained a popular figure during the Civil 
War.  There was a U.S. army guard, which invited Italian, Hungarian, German and 
French immigrants to participate in the service of their “adopted country.”  A 
regiment of 250 “able-bodied men” was “formed under the name of the Garibaldi 
Guard, and encamped near Washington” (see page 39).66  Giuseppe Garibaldi’s 
depiction as an ideal immigrant revealed itself during the course of the Civil War. 
He supported President Lincoln as the “great pilot of freedom.”67  This illustrated 
the attitude of the majority of the Italians about the conflict, except for the Holy 
See, which sympathized with the Confederacy.     
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The general also became the most beloved hero of the Italian immigrants in 
the United States.  In the eyes of Italian Americans, Garibaldi shared their 
difficulties; he worked in a wax factory, and suffered financial hardships.  Garibaldi 
was an ideal heroic figure in various ways. Like George Washington, he was a 
soldier, like Christopher Columbus he was an Italian, like Italian Americans he was 
a workingman.  Garibaldi had a definite impact on U.S.-Italian relations; he was the 
first positive transatlantic Italian stereotype on the American mind.  
 
2.5 Mazzini and a transatlantic Risorgimento 
 
Like Garibaldi, Giuseppe Mazzini was a well-known figure in the United 
States.  His most dedicated supporter possibly was Margaret Fuller, who called 
Mazzini, “Man of Italy. Thy bride is unworthy of thee.”68  That was an interesting 
praise for the individual and scorn for the country. The organization based on his 
republican doctrines and equality of men, Giovine Italia (Young Italy), found many 
supporters in Europe and in the United States.  By 1834, Young Europe was ready 
“to help every person rising against its government,”69 and Young America began 
its activities soon thereafter, “with special interest in co-operation with European 
republican movements.”70  June 6, 1841 was the official date of the beginning of 
the activities of Young Italy’s New York congregation.71  Mazzini made a “secret 
alliance” with some Protestant associations in the United States, which were- 
ironically-connected to nativism, to get economic and moral support to Giovine 
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Italia. Mazzini stated “the sole purpose of this ‘secret alliance’ was to overthrow 
the temporal power of the Pope and win recognition of the right of Italy to unity, 
liberty, and independence.”72   
Mazzini was acquainted with two American ministers when he served in the 
assembly of the short-lived Roman Republic: Nicholas Brown and Lewis Cass, Jr.  
Mazzini preferred Brown who “openly proclaimed sympathy for the Roman 
Republic ... [to] Cass, [who had] sincere sympathy for the Italian cause [but] 
necessarily concealed [such sympathy] under the formalities of diplomatic 
correctness.”73  Cass was not authorized to recognize the Roman republic, and 
Mazzini could not excuse that act.  
Nevertheless, after the French occupation of Rome, Lewis Cass, Jr. issued 
an American passport to Mazzini, and wrote a letter of introduction and 
recommendation to H. S. Paisley, the American consul at Genoa in which he 
presented Mazzini as “a man of great integrity of character, and of most extensive 
intellectual acquirements [whose] whole life ha[d] been devoted to the cause of 
liberty and independence.”74
Mazzini never went to the United States, spending most of his lifetime in 
exile in England, and he never became a popular hero like Garibaldi. “Opposition to 
Mazzini and Italian republicanism increased in America following the attempted 
assassination of Louis Napoleon by the Italian revolutionists headed by Felice 
Orsini.”75  The Morning Courier and New York Enquirer reported that the assassins 
were “headed by the ‘wretch’ Mazzini.”76 Orsini, an Italian revolutionary and a 
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former member of Giovine Italia, attempted to assassinate Napoleon III, the 
emperor of France, in 1858 because he “conceived of the Emperor as a traitor to the 
Italian cause to which in his youth he had sworn support.”77  Moreover, the death of 
the emperor would perhaps accelerate the re-establishment of the French republic.  
Orsini failed in his attempt and was executed, and “[Camillo] Cavour used Orsini’s 
attempt as a means of discrediting Mazzini.”78  Mazzini could not prove that he was 
innocent, and “no one knew that Cavour ... had actually been subsidizing Orsini and 
Pieri [the other assassin] from his secret service funds.”79  Cavour was aware that 
an apparent connection between Mazzini and the assassins would cause annoyance 
among Mazzini’s republican supporters all around the world.          
Additionally, there were other reasons for the anti-Mazzinian feeling in the 
United States.  Firstly, Mazzini’s absolute objective in establishing a united Italy 
was to accomplish the foundation of the United States of Europe, a European 
Risorgimento.  The “free and constitutional states” would bring a unified Europe 
into being.  According to Mazzini, “To Italy belong[ed] the high office of solemnly 
proclaiming European emancipation.”80  Italy had the divine mission of 
establishing the third Rome, the Rome of the People, which would “unite, in a faith 
that [would] make Thought and Action one, Europe, America and every part of the 
terrestrial globe.”81 In brief, Mazzini’s master plan incorporated the United States 
in unification. But it was a plan that Americans would not accept.  Even the 
viability of Mazzini’s program about the Italian unification was questioned since 
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“Mazzini was a visionary,”82 and the Mazzinians “became monomaniacs by living 
in exile and brooding over one idea.”83    
Secondly, Mazzini opposed federalism in Italy. He wrote, “the school of 
social duty must, logically and essentially, favor a single central authority.”84  
Mazzini believed that federalism could be appropriate for countries like the United 
States that covered a vast geographical area, but, for European countries, its results 
would be unsuccessful.  Mazzini pointed to Switzerland, which he considered a 
weak federal state.  It “was a federation of twenty-two partially autonomous 
cantons, and hence unable to withstand political pressure from Paris or Vienna.”85  
Mazzini did not know much about democratic republican federalism, which was 
different from the Swiss model.86  He did not believe that separate states could be 
united under a strong central government and they could represent themselves 
equally.     
Nevertheless, Mazzini had a high regard for Abraham Lincoln and praised 
the United States since the country stood “higher and nearer to the Ideal than any 
nation actually existing.”87 Americans were “in the onward march of mankind ... in 
the great battle which is being fought throughout the world between right and 
wrong, justice and arbitrary rule, equality and privilege, duty and egotism, republic 
and monarchy, truth and lies.”88  But, he also stated before the Civil War that the 
southern states would secede from the Union since the United States appeared too 
large to be governed.89  Additionally, there was slavery in the United States, and 
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that proved the fact that “republican institutions were no guarantee of good 
government.”90  Ironically, Mazzini supported first abolitionism and then the 
Confederacy in the United States since he believed that both secessionist 
movements could be used to divide the nation.91 Mazzini’s “lack of commitment to 
the policies of the kingdom of Italy might have left room enough for idealism and a 
general idea of individual liberties, of which the right of the states to secession was 
part.”92  
Nonetheless, Mazzini’s hesitations about the United States vanished after 
the Civil War.  He considered America a model for the other nations of the world 
for “universal liberation.”  In a letter he stated: 
Through this almost fabulous amount of energies, 
unknown to our old rotten monarchies, which you 
have displayed; the constant devotedness of your 
men and women; ... and mainly—do not forget it—
the canceling of the only black spot, Slavery, which 
was sullying your glorious republican flag. ... All 
the numerous and ever increasing republican 
element in Europe have discovered in you their 
representative. You have become a leading nation.93  
 
Mazzini was passionate about global republicanism; whether Italy or 
America would lead the movement was less important to him.  Mazzini continued 
to be the hero of a certain group in the United States.  He became a role model for 
some Progressives in America like Jane Addams and William Roscoe Thayer, and 
for the socialist, George D. Herron.94  In 1918, President Woodrow Wilson “ [said] 
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that perhaps only Lincoln or Gladstone had such clarity of insight into the essence 
of liberalism.”95   
   
 2.6 Italy, Rome, and the American Civil War 
 
Howard Marraro studied the diplomatic relations between the Union and 
Italy during the Civil War, but showed only the “positive” elements of the relation 
between the Union and Italy, and between the Union and the Papacy.  But the period 
between 1848 and 1865 was not as uncomplicated as Marraro described.  Firstly, 
there was the problem of the sympathy of the Mazzinians and the Italian clergy for 
the Confederacy.  The former supported the Confederacy because of the idea of 
confederalism, whereas the latter encouraged the Secessionists since the United 
States government had supported the 1848 Revolutions. 
The difficulties of the Italian Risorgimento also have to be taken into 
account. One of the main reasons for the failure of the 1848 revolutions in the 
peninsula was the lack of a national feeling and unity.  “The Risorgimento, during 
which many Italians continued to fight as part of the Austrian army, had been a 
succession of civil wars.”96  The Italian revolutionaries did not all come from the 
same ideological and social backgrounds.  “The Risorgimento seems to have been 
more a story of struggles and bitter rivalries between social classes, whose political 
expression happened to be defined by geography, than a uniform and a single 
minded “step in human progress [as Marraro argued].”97  As a natural outcome of 
that, those different social classes and the different members of the ruling class, like 
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Garibaldi and Mazzini, did not share the same views about certain incidents like the 
American Civil War.  Garibaldi was the son of “a man of modest means who owned 
a small cargo boat,”98 whereas Mazzini’s father “was professor of pathology at 
Genoa University and as a physician once attended Queen Victoria’s father.”99  
Mazzini took a degree in law, and Garibaldi became an adventurer.   
Italy’s majority support for the Union became clear.  George P. Marsh wrote, 
“In no part of the continent was the sympathy with the government of the Union at 
the commencement of the rebellion so strong or so universal as in Italy.”100  This 
was especially important amid intrigues early in the war because of the possibility 
that Britain would intervene on the side of the Confederacy. 
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  41
  At the beginning of the war, the British government “was sympathetic to the 
South but wary of the danger of war with the North.”101  In 1863, Britain presented 
a proposal to Italy about the condition of American ships.  The Italian foreign 
relations minister informed Marsh about the suggestion of Britain that, “the Italian 
government should publish a declaration on the subject of the treatment of federate 
and confederate ships-of-war. ... a ship of the party should not be allowed to sail 
within less than twenty-four hours after a vessel of the other should have left the 
harbor.”102  The Italian government declined the British proposal, however, which 
would have meant the recognition of the Confederate ships.  Meanwhile, a Colonel 
Cattabene offered “to organize four battalions of experienced soldiers and to 
embark them for the United States, for service in the army of the Union.”103  That 
would have meant two thousand Italian soldiers in the Union army.  Although the 
U.S. government rejected the Italian colonel’s offer, the  Italian sympathy for the 
Union was evident. 
The Vatican’s relations with the United States were less friendly on the other 
hand, based on several controversies both during and after the Civil War.  Italy was 
not a completely united country until 1870, and Rome was under the control of the 
Pope.  Therefore, the United States had two representatives in Italy: one in Turin, 
and later with the capital’s transfer, in Florence, and one in Rome.  On November 
29, 1862 R. M. Blatchford presented himself to the Pope as the United States consul.  
Pius IX welcomed Blatchford kindly.  Initially, the Vatican declared its neutrality in 
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the Civil War. The papal secretary, Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, told the American 
consul the Pope’s “strictly neutralist official policy”104:  
                 If I had the honor to be an American citizen I would do 
                 everything in my power to preserve the strength of the 
                 nation undivided. ... would surrender for the moment 
                 every minor question of policy and interest for the 
                 preservation of the Union and of its political power.105  
 
Yet “[the] nearly neutralist attitude changed drastically after Lincoln’s 
Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 that freed all slaves held in rebellious states 
(considered a simple trick of war), in favor of the Confederacy,”106 and thereafter 
the Papacy may have communicated with the Confederacy directly.  On one 
occasion, the American consul asserted that there was a communication between 
Cardinal Antonelli, representing the Papal States, and Jefferson Davis, President of 
the Confederacy, through Bishop Lynch of Charleston, South Carolina, “a reputed 
confederate agent.”107  Cardinal Antonelli stated that Bishop Lynch was never  
“recognized ... as an accredited representative of Jefferson Davis.”  But Lynch, after 
the capture of Jefferson Davis, took refuge at the Legation of the United States in 
Rome and complained, “that the cause of the south was hopeless.”108  Additionally, 
in 1865, Rufus King, the American consul in Rome, referred to “a rumor which 
ha[d] been in circulation in Rome, that the Pope had [contacted] Jefferson Davis, in 
the sense of encouraging him to persevere in his work of rebellion, and giving him 
the benefit of a papal recognition.”109  King interviewed Cardinal Antonelli, who 
“without hesitation pronounced the report untrue,” but stated he himself had 
addressed a letter “general in terms and pacific in its spirit, to the southern 
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‘commissioners’ who had addressed a circular to all the courts of Europe.”110  The 
Pope was only exercising his “moral influence” to restore peace in the United States 
by communicating with the southern representatives.  Rufus King concluded his 
report, “Beyond this I do not think that the papal government will be in any more 
haste to interfere in our affairs than France and England.”111  
Finally, the emergence of John H. Surratt in Rome, an accomplice in the 
assassination of Abraham Lincoln, deserves attention.  Surratt’s “presence in 
Washington City on the day of the assassination was proven before the Military 
Commission by a single witness. ... He was clear in his statements, ... and it is 
scarcely possible that he could have been mistaken.”112  The witness, a Sergeant 
Dye, saw Surratt on April 14, 1865 in front of Ford’s Theater, looking into the 
president’s carriage with John Wilkes Booth, who later shot Lincoln.  Surratt 
escaped to Canada, but his mother was found guilty for aiding the assassination of 
the president, and was executed.113  
On April 23, 1866, Rufus King sent a message indicating that on the twenty-
first of the same month a private in the Papal army named Henri Beaumont de St. 
Marie, Canadian by birth, informed him that John Surratt was also serving in the 
Papal Zouaves.  St. Marie also stated “he had known Surratt in America; that he 
recognized him as soon as he saw him at Sezze; ... Surratt acknowledged his 
participation in the plot against Mr. Lincoln’s life, and declared that Jefferson Davis 
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had incited or was privy to it. ... Surratt seemed well provided with money.”114  
Surratt exclaimed to St. Marie, “Damn the Yankees; they have killed my mother; 
but I have done them as much harm as I could. We have killed Lincoln, the nigger’s 
friend.”115  St. Marie believed that “[Surratt was] protected by the clergy, and that 
the murder is the result of a deep-laid plot, not only against the life of President 
Lincoln, but against the existence of the republic, as we are aware that priesthood 
and royalty are and always have been opposed to liberty.”116   
  Surratt was arrested, but escaped.  George P. Marsh wrote to Visconti 
Venosta, the minister of foreign affairs of the kingdom of Italy, stating: 
... I am credibly informed, and confidently believe 
that John H. Surratt, a leading actor in the 
assassination of Abraham Lincoln, late president of 
the United States, who escaped from justice after 
that event, and has been recently serving as a 
zouave in the Papal army at Rome, is now at a 
hospital at Sora, ... an order for his arrest and 
committal to the military prison at Rome was issued 
... on the sixth of the present month. ... Surratt, who 
had enrolled himself by the name of John Watson, 
was arrested at Veroli on the following day ... on the 
eight of the month he escaped from his keepers ...117  
 
The escape infuriated Marsh.  Before his capture, Pius IX appeared to be 
willing to detain Surratt; Cardinal Antonelli “was greatly interested by it, and 
intimated that if the American government desired the surrender of the criminal 
there would probably be no difficulty in the way.”118  Nevertheless, Surratt 
managed to escape from a guard of six men.   
Surratt escaped to Alexandria from Naples, but American officers arrested 
him there.  According to Thomas Maley Harris’ account, “he was put in chains [in 
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Alexandria], placed on board the United States man-of-war ship "Swatara," and 
brought back to Washington, where he was held to answer for his crime.”119   In 
1867, Surratt was tried before a civilian court but in 1870 the government dropped 
charges against him. He continued his life as a teacher.  Undoubtedly, St. Marie’s 
account could not yield an accurate outcome about Surratt’s complicity in Lincoln’s 
assassination. But Surratt’s disguise in the Vatican guard was consistent with 
rumors of papal hostility for the Union. Rufus King, the last American minister in 
the Papal States departed from Rome in 1867 with the incorporation of the Papal 
lands into Italy, and the United States did not have a political representative in the 
Vatican for a period of seventy-two years. 
   
2.7 Rome, the Italian Capital 
 
The Italian capital was transferred from Turin to Florence in June 1865, and 
from Florence to Rome in September 1870.  The major reference about the 
American opinion on those transfers is George P. Marsh, and his accounts about the 
relocation of the capital city of the Italian kingdom. Marsh’s communication 
reveals the unexpected development about the capital’s movement. On February 13, 
1865, Marsh wrote: “... The departure of the King was extremely sudden. No 
previous notice of his intention to remove to Florence was given, nor, in fact, was 
that intention even generally suspected at Turin before it was carried into effect.”120  
U.S. officials interpreted the transfer of the capital to Tuscany as a manifestation of 
Italy’s progress toward unification, to which the United States gave its entire 
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support.  On June 5, 1865 the Legation of the United States was established in 
Florence. 
Marsh reported the discussions about Rome as the Italian capital in early 
September 1870. Marsh assumed that the seizure of Rome would not occur 
instantaneously.  That view, to a certain extent, was related to Marsh’s analysis of 
Italian policy making: 
The Italian government has long hesitated in the 
adoption of a decided policy, and in fact, it has been 
so constantly in the habit of blindly following of the 
dictation of the Emperor of France in the conduct of 
all its foreign relations, without attempting to mark 
out a policy for itself.121
 
Marsh did not rely on Italy’s independence in taking decisions about its 
future.  The United States encouraged the Kingdom of Italy towards unification, but 
assumed Italy’s historical dependence on France would continue. The king of Italy 
made decisions based on or taking into account only the will of foreign powers in 
the absence of will on the part of the Italian people, and Marsh’s account is a 
significant indication about America’s perspective about Italian policies in the late 
nineteenth century.   
However, contrary to Marsh’s unpromising reports about Rome, Italian 
troops entered the city on September 21, 1870.  Marsh described the situation in a 
confidential dispatch: “The Italian government, which in this matter appear[ed] to 
have acted from the beginning in obedience to popular dictation ... propose[d] a 
plebiscite on the question of annexation,”122 and the capital was rapidly removed to 
Rome in November. Despite their Catholic and politically subordinate background, 
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Italian unionists were capable of surprising American observers by acting 
democratically.  
               
              2.8 Conclusion 
 
  As Howard R. Marraro stated, “the history of the diplomatic relations 
between the various Italian states and the United States can be traced directly to the 
desire of the latter to increase its commercial intercourse with the Italian 
peninsula.”123  Before the unification, the United States had signed commercial 
treaties with different Italian states, and aimed to continue its relation with the 
united Kingdom of Italy. To this end, the United States supported Italy in its 
struggle for freedom and independence, but always kept its neutrality regarding 
Italy’s relations with France, Britain, and Austria.   
Another vital point about the early period of U.S.-Italian relations is the 
formation of stereotypes. While there was a mixed American perspective about 
Italians, nineteenth-century Italians overall had a positive view about Americans, 
revealed in the expressions of Garibaldi, and Mazzini, particularly after the Civil 
War.  “Though America was not the country which actually accomplished most for 
Italian freedom and unity, it was the country where the passion for that cause was, 
beyond all comparison, strongest and most disinterested.”124   
The Italian Risorgimento was not a period of progress but rather an era of 
disorder when different authorities developed conflicting strategies.  This chapter 
has considered some of these dominant groups in Italy as a way to demonstrate 
early relations between Italy and America, the origins of the contradictory Italian 
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stereotypes in American society, and Italy’s difficulty in developing a foreign 
policy.  In brief, the period between 1846 and 1870 is a curious but important stage 
in Italian-American relations when the two countries commenced to realize each 
other’s social, political, and economic conditions of each other and mutually 
endeavored to shape their diplomatic policies. 
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Table 1 - Region and Country or Area of Birth of the Foreign-Born Population, 
With Geographic Detail Shown in Decennial Census Publications of 1850 to 
19301  
 
Southern 
and 
Eastern 
Europe 
5,918,982 5,670,927 4,500,932 1,674,648 728,851 248,620 93,824 32,312 9,672 
Southern 
Europe 2,133,092 1,939,600 1,544,149 539,968 216,387 66,249 30,416 21,726 8,152 
Greece 174,526 175,976 101,282 8,515 1,887 776 390 328 86 
Italy 1,790,429 1,610,113 1,343,125 484,027 182,580 44,230 17,157 11,677 3,679 
Portugal 108,775 103,976 77,634 40,376 25,735 15,650 8,973 5,477 1,274 
Azores 35,611 33,995 18,274 9,768 9,739 7,512 4,431 1,361 (NA) 
Portugal 73,164 69,981 59,360 30,608 15,996 8,138 4,542 4,116 1,274 
Spain 59,362 49,535 22,108 7,050 6,185 5,121 3,764 4,244 3,113 
Other 
South 
Europe 
(NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) 472    132 (NA) (NA) 
 1930 1920 1910 1900 1890 1880 1870 1860 1850 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/tab04.html, February 7, 2007. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
IMMIGRATION, NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP 
 
 
 
                According to the former Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime 
Minister Giulio Andreotti, the Italian immigration in the world “created a consistent 
network of ties between Italy and the host countries, which caused Italy to take a 
great and continuing interest in the state of those countries and in their mutual 
relations.”2 Commencing with the 1880s, one of those host countries that received 
the highest rate of Italian immigrants was the United States, and thus the 
relationship between the United States and Italy entered a remarkable stage in the 
late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. The influx of Italians to the 
American shore not only demonstrated the social, cultural and economic 
distinctions between the newly united Italy and the United States, it also revealed 
the diverse, and sometimes conflicting Italian and American ideas and laws about 
the issue of citizenship.  
                 The early relationship between the United States and Italy began well but 
gradually grew worse. Because the influx of Italian immigrants, especially to big 
cities in the United States, fostered anti-Italian feelings. Between 1821 and 1904, 
1,786,217 Italian immigrants arrived in the United States.3  By the end of the 
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second wave of immigration in 1920 that number reached 4,000,000.4 In the 
process, the Italian gained a stereotype as an illiterate, uncivilized and depraved 
offender who could not adapt himself to American life and institutions.   
                By offering the immigrants citizenship through naturalization, the United 
States, in principle, aimed to create new Americans. U.S. citizenship implied not 
only an attachment to the new community, but abandonment of former citizenship 
and responsibilities. However, during the time period between the mass immigration 
to America in the late nineteenth century and the end of World War I, Italy 
considered emigration as a “safety-valve” for its deprived economy. In the eyes of 
Italian politicians, the ultimate consequence of emigration was financial benefit as 
well as intensification of italianitá of the Italians abroad. Italian officials also 
anticipated that most emigrants would be “birds of passage,” and would return to 
their home country eventually as economically and socially advanced Italian 
subjects5, and thus help overcome domestic problems of poverty and ignorance. 
Italian authorities accomplished their plan about returnees and remittances; the rate 
of Italian return migration between 1905 and 1915 is striking. In this period, nearly 
two million Italian immigrants returned to Italy, and two thirds of these people were 
from the United States6  Thus, Italian and American ideologies and laws of 
citizenship clashed particularly in the first two decades of the twentieth century. 
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                3.1 Changing Times, Changing Immigrants: Italians in Nineteenth-Century 
America 
 
                America has been the land of immigrants since the sixteenth century.  The 
revolutionaries who rebelled against Britain, and established the United States of 
America were the sons of the immigrants who had been living in the thirteen 
colonies.  But “unlike the immigrants of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
who had been overwhelmingly English-speaking Protestants, an increasing number 
of nineteenth-and early twentieth-century immigrants were Roman Catholics, 
Eastern Orthodox, and Jews.”7  Those people were not Anglo-Saxon, and they did 
not even have the ability to speak in English.  The “new” immigrants--sometimes 
referred to as the scum of Europe--were generally peasants and unskilled workers 
coming from the poorest regions of the European continent. Their main aim was to 
earn money, which they did not have the opportunity to possess in their native 
countries.      
                As a natural outcome, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
witnessed the conflict between the “native Americans” and the “new” immigrants.  
In that period, American cultural pluralism, which was introduced by Horace Kallen 
in the 1910s as an ideal, was questioned, immigrants were labeled as ignorant 
criminals, and the tension between the old stock and the newcomers sometimes 
resulted in violence: 
The wires are hot with fast-crowding news of our own Judge 
Lynch and his exploits, of native riots, midnight mobs, wild 
outbursts of 
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murderous frenzy, that are tokens of a state of anarchy 
brought about by our own people, as serious, it would seem, 
as any agitator could plan for ... Poverty, vice, crime, dirt, 
ignorance, superstition, political  
corruptibility, anarchical tendency, and, more serious than all, 
a constant change for the worse in all of these respects in the 
character of  immigration [are familiar] as it pours in upon us 
decade after decade.8
 
                From the “native” American perspective, the single male immigrant from 
Southern Italy and Sicily was among the poorest and filthiest newcomers. He was an 
ignorant and superstitious criminal who threatened American laws and principles.  
This depiction of the Italian immigrant, which became prominent after the mass 
migration from Europe, was a significant sign for the challenges in the U.S-Italian 
relations between the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. This “new 
immigrant” undermined Americans’ earlier praise for northern Italians who unified 
the country. Thus, this chapter will focus on the “new” Italian immigration to the 
United States and its characteristics, Italian reasons and perspectives and American 
opinions about the migration from the Mezzogiorno, and the difficulties that occurred 
between the two countries as a consequence of Italian mass immigration.  The United 
States’ and Italy’s different policies about the same problems, and their outcomes in 
Italo-American relations will be demonstrated.  
 
 3.2  Send them to la Merica!: Italian “birds of passage” 
 
                  Italian migration was not limited with the mass migration after 1880s; Italians 
have always been a migratory people.  Long before that period, Italians had migrated 
to other places in Europe to earn money, explorers like Christopher Columbus, 
Amerigo Vespucci, and John Cabot discovered new lands for foreign monarchs, and 
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artists and mercenaries traveled all around the world.  They also migrated to South 
America—particularly to Argentina—in the nineteenth century. Before the mass 
exodus of Italians began in the 1880s, 64,361 Italians had immigrated to America 
after 1850.  They had settled in some twenty states and established colonies.9  Italian 
emigrants before the late nineteenth century came mostly from the northern part of 
the peninsula.  Apart from being artisans, artists, merchants, and skilled workers, their 
physical appearances were similar to “native” Americans. “Northern Italians have 
tended to be slightly taller and with a higher proportion of people with lighter 
complexion, hair, and eyes.”10  Significantly, many of these early Italian immigrants 
had little trouble in assimilating in America.  
                In Building Little Italy: Philadelphia’s Italians Before Mass Migration 
Richard N. Juliani describes the Italian immigrants in the city before the mass 
immigration.  They were generally from Genoa and Tuscany.  In 1860, 34 of the 
Italians in Philadelphia were tradesmen, 27 were figurinai (plaster figure makers), 
24 were businessmen, and 60 were musicians and organ grinders.11  Despite 
regional differences, the Italian community also had its own church, voluntary 
associations like Società di Unione e Fratellenza Italiana (Society of Italian Unity 
and Brotherhood), and newspapers that represented Italian national consciousness.  
However, the Italian immigrants did not have any problem in cultural transformation 
and acculturation.  “Most Italians were quietly adjusted to Philadelphia,”12 and 
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“many Italian families shared buildings with members of other ethnic groups, 
particularly, the Irish.”13         
                The problem for both Italian immigrants and the old stock in the United 
States started with the mass migration from Europe.  Between 1880 and 1924, 4.5 
million Italians came to America.14  The majority were southern Italians who were 
different from northern Italian immigrants in many aspects: they were illiterate, 
superstitious and poor.  Even their physical appearance was different from the 
“lighter-skinned” northerners.  These people came from south of Rome, and a 
variety of motives urged them to immigrate to America: 
 
A number of conditions in Italy are associated with the 
initiation and maintenance of this immigration, including 
cheap transatlantic transportation, government policies, 
general economic conditions, living standards, seasonal 
unemployment, avoidance of military conscription ... In the 
Italian South, with so many relatives in the U.S., America 
came to be [in Carlo Levi’s words] “an essential part of the 
daily life of the southern Italian village, a social and 
economic element mingled with their concepts of bread, 
work, family and sentiment of every kind, and at the same 
time a mystical sustenance and the basis of a magical 
religion.”15
 
                “There was nothing in Italy, nothing in Italy. That’s why we came. To find 
work, because Italy didn’t have no work.  Mama used to say, ‘America is rich.’”16  
Generally, Italian immigrants came to the United States because of financial 
insufficiencies.  As historian Antonio Genovese stated, “during the early 1800s 59 
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out of 60 families in the south did not even own enough land to be buried in.”17  
Different from the “old” immigrants, southern Italians were not coming from typical 
European urban centers.  Most southern regions were barren, “the few visitors who 
ventured off the beaten track discovered that romantic Naples and glittering Palermo 
were exceptions.”18  People were living in isolated places disconnected from cities. 
In addition, the Risorgimento government could not achieve its plans about land 
distribution, and put heavy taxes on agricultural products.  Industrialization had not 
yet come to southern Italy, and landowners continued to use peasants’ labor without 
making any modernization in agricultural techniques.  The intense population 
growth in Italy during the late nineteenth century deteriorated the situation of the 
contadini, and emigration appeared to be the best solution to financial difficulties.  
In brief, “had there been no jobs for them abroad, few Italians would have ventured 
forth from their villages.”19          
                Working in America was attractive because the Italian government did not 
make the necessary economic reforms for the development of the south, and the 
“backward” south continued to be inferior to the industrial and urban north. With the 
Risorgimento, Italy accomplished a political union, but could not achieve a national 
unity.  “Reality corresponded with a regional Italy, not a national Italy: Italians lived 
separated from region to region for several reasons that went beyond the 
straightforward internal divisions of the country.”20  One of the most geographically, 
politically, and socially separated places, as pointed out before, was southern Italy. 
Thus, the division in Italy persisted.  Consequently, southern Italians became more 
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“distrustful of the power of the state.”21  Rather than being united with the rest of the 
country, they favored unification within themselves; they preferred campanilismo to 
italianità, and many realized a regional identity in America, contrary to the aims of 
both the Italian and United States governments.         
 
3.3  Americans and the Italian immigrants 
 
                “Italian American identity was pivotally formed under circumstances of 
injustice based on American racism.”22  Nearly 40 years before the mass 
immigration in the late nineteenth century, in his Practical System of Modern 
Geography (1841), J. Olney stated that “the Italians [were] ‘affable and polite’ and 
excel in the arts, ‘but they [were] effeminate, superstitious, slavish, and 
revengeful.’”23  For most of the Americans, those newcomers were resistant to 
assimilation and becoming American. 
                “Lack of political unity, government by foreign nations, and a rigid 
provincialism made the southern Italian peasant quite unique.”24   This uniqueness 
also separated the Italian immigrants from American culture and living. They came 
to the United States in huge numbers, and their physical appearances as well as their 
customs and traditions were unusual for the Americans: 
There are now over twenty thousand Italians scattered among 
the population in New York ... It is no uncommon thing to 
see at noon some swarthy Italian engaged on a building in 
process of erection, resting and dining from his tin kettle, 
while his brown-skinned wife sits by his side, brave in her 
gold earrings and beads, with a red flower in her hair, all of 
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which at home were kept for feasts days. But here in America 
increased wages make every day a feast day in the matter of  
food and raiment.25
 
                Secondly, in the Americans’ eyes, Italian immigrants from the Mezzogiorno 
were not really eager to be Americanized like their northern brothers. As mentioned 
before, the Italian government’s effort to maintain their Italian identity prevented 
their assimilation. Also, the influence of southern regionalism and isolationism 
urged them to unite in their own ethnic communities, “the Italian colonies in large 
cities [which were] becoming a perfect nuisance.”26  Generally, the Italian 
immigrants did not assemble in only one Italian community, but rather established 
numerous communities around their own paesani [peasant] groups.  For example, in 
Chicago, “because of the sentiment of campanilismo, there emerged not one ‘Little 
Italy’ but some seventeen larger and smaller colonies scattered about the city.”27  
This type of isolated and traditionalist communities, in which the Italian immigrants 
continue to live the way they had done in their own country, worried Americans 
who “feared that the Italians would never become assimilated and that the immigrant 
culture would perpetuate itself.”28
                Jacob Riis, in How the Other Half Lives (1890), one of the most significant 
works about the tenements of late nineteenth-century urban America, described the 
Italian ghettos thoroughly. In the chapter, “The Italian in New York,” Riis pointed 
out the characteristics of the Italian immigrant, and how he lived in his own 
community without any change: 
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Certainly a picturesque, if not very tidy, element has been 
added to the population in the “assisted” Italian immigrant 
who claims so large a share of public attention, partly 
because he keeps coming at such a tremendous rate ... The 
Italian comes in at the bottom, and in the generation that 
came  over the sea he stays there. In the slums he is 
welcomed as a tenant who “makes less trouble” than the 
contentious Irishman or the order-loving German, that is to 
say: is content to live in a pig-sty and submits to robbery at 
the hands of the rent-collector without murmur.29
       
                The Italian made less trouble than the Irish, and was content to live where he 
lived, but he was at the bottom. Riis used the word “swarthy” for the Italian.  He 
also stated that the Italian was not able to learn English.  Riis’ opinions are vital to 
comprehend the public sentiment during the mass immigration.  “In [Riis’s] 
hierarchy, the Italian is far inferior to the northern European Teuton, but also below 
his fellow ‘new immigrant’ Polish Jew.”30  
                 Campanilismo [ parochialism] persisted in its influence in the education of 
the Italian immigrants’ children.  For instance, in the afternoon and night schools in 
New York, established by the Protestant Children’s Aid Society, the students who 
were generally Ligurians “repudiate[d] indignantly all kinship with the Neapolitans 
or Calabrians, whom they refuse[d] to recognize as Italians.”31  That strong feeling 
of regionalism was an obstacle for the Americanization of the “new” Italian 
immigrants. 
                The negative Italian stereotype was sometimes the Italian organ-grinder child 
who began to work on the streets in the early nineteenth-century. There was also a 
more negative Italian stereotype, the padrone, who brought those little children to 
the United States to work as street musicians, and who treated them badly.  For the 
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American public, the padrone symbolized tyranny, and for the government an 
enemy to the legal system. The U. S. government attempted to curtail the power of 
padrones [with] the Foran Act, passed in 1885 to prohibit the importation and 
migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in 
the United States.32  The padrone system came to an end by the 1920s. The second-
generation Italian immigrants did not need any bosses to control their business 
activities.  
                Some Americans continued to be hopeful about the future of the Italian 
immigrants on the condition that they accepted to be Americanized and became 
“like [their] brother immigrants, a permanent settler in [the United States].”33 
However, the Italian immigrants returned to their home country in greater proportion 
than other groups. The main obstacle to the permanent settlement of the Italian in 
the United States was seen as the Italian government, and a U.S. Commissioner of 
Immigration with these words criticized its emigration policy:             
United Italy, only a little more than a quarter of a century in 
existence could not as yet succeed in securing safety, peace, 
and welfare to her subjects. Unsettled in her finances, under 
the bane of a violent conflict with her church, with the 
pretensions of a great power, but without means to bear the 
burdens of her ambition, she furnished the basis of a large 
emigration. Her government, absolutely unable to offset the 
disturbances of the political and financial welfare of her 
subjects, refrained from opposing such emigration, and has 
even seemingly  favored it.34   
 
               The struggle between Americans and the Italian immigrants about becoming 
American and remaining Italian continued for a long period of time.  The Italian 
maintained his ethnic identity in the United States.  The idea of going back to Italy 
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was also a prominent aspect in that decision.  In contrast, the native-born American, 
who wanted to preserve the order and the “whiteness” of the United States, wanted 
the “dago” to become an American, or to leave the country.  The picture below is a 
revealing symbol of the ongoing conflict between the Italian immigrant and the 
“native” American in the second decade of the twentieth century.  In the photo, two 
“white” boy scouts are asking the two Italian boys to join the boy scouts.  Apart from 
their physical differences, the Italian boys’ clothes are significant.  They still wear the 
typical contadini caps and trousers, and listen to the boy scouts skeptically.  The 
scornful expression on the boy’s face at the right-hand corner signifies the Italian 
immigrants’ perspective about Americans and pressure to assimilate.   
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              Figure 3.1 Two boy scouts talking to two Italian immigrant boys35
               Source: Chicago Daily News, ca. February 16, 1915, Library of Congress Prints and 
Photographs Division, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/, March 28, 2007. 
 
 
 
             3.4 American Concept of Citizenship & Military Service 
 
                United States citizenship has three bases. The first is jus soli (the right of 
soil) according to which neither nationality of the parents nor their eligibility for 
citizenship is decisive for their children’s citizenship. Most people in the United 
States gain citizenship by being born on American soil, and they claim jus soli, the 
common-law right of the land.  Meanwhile, the people born to American parents in 
foreign countries may claim jus sanguinis, the right of blood.36 According to the 
principle of jus sanguinis, a person does need not be to be born in a country to be its 
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citizen; citizenship may be obtained through the parents if either one or both of them 
are U.S. citizens. In the cases where both parents are American citizens, the child 
automatically acquires citizenship if one of the parents resided in the United States 
for some time prior to the child’s birth. But until 1934 the law did not allow U.S. 
citizenship’s transmission by mothers.37   The third and the final way of becoming 
an American citizen is by naturalization. In its simple definition, naturalization 
means admittance to citizenship, and it is an important type of assimilation based on 
the process of changing national allegiance,38 requiring an absolute abandonment of 
the former nationality of the immigrant.  
                As Rogers Smith asserts, American citizenship has a legally confused, 
puzzling, politically charged and contested status, and American laws frequently 
disqualified most people to become U.S. citizens because of their ethnic origin or 
gender.39 The history of citizenship laws reflects the complicated and conflicting 
nature of the subject in the United States. The Constitution did not offer a clear 
definition of U.S. citizenship, or define the relationship between state and national 
citizenship; states had much power to make decisions about individuals’ 
citizenship.40 The concept of national citizenship materialized only after the last of 
the nine required states ratified the U.S. Constitution in 1788.41 The Naturalization 
Act in 1790 was the first law that bestowed citizenship through naturalization only 
to “white” people who had resided for two years in the United States. By design, the 
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children of naturalized “white” persons also gained the right to become 
Americans.42  The Act of January 29, 1795 brought new and stricter terms to 
become U.S. citizens: five years of residence, a formal declaration of intention done 
three years before the admission of citizenship, and the renunciation of formal 
allegiance in swearing allegiance to the United States.43  In 1798, the Alien and 
Sedition Acts implied that “certain aliens [and some naturalized immigrants] could 
never be fully Americanized, and that, therefore, a kind of two-tier system of 
citizenship was desirable.”44 The Act of June 18, 1798 presented more severe 
naturalization requirements like fourteen years of residence, registration of aliens, 
and exclusion of alien enemies from naturalization. The 1798 Act was repealed after 
four years, and the principles of the 1795 Law were restored with the new act in 
1802.45   
                The Naturalization Act of 1802 arranged the naturalization procedure of 
immigrants and most of the essential points of this act (five years of residency, a 
declaration of intention, and an oath of allegiance that renounces all other 
allegiances) are still applied today. In the post Civil War era, with the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 and the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that define the 
boundaries of U.S. citizenship, jus soli became the key principle for the ascription of 
American citizenship, and national citizenship gained legal meaning.46  In the 
1880s, Congress enacted laws that would bring immigration under direct federal 
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control and allow the federal government to exercise its authority to restrict the entry 
of people thought to be undesirable.47 By the early twentieth century, due to the 
immense increase in immigration and naturalization of aliens, the Act of 1802 
turned out to be inadequate to overcome the problem of fraudulent naturalization. In 
1905 President Theodore Roosevelt appointed a commission to investigate the 
insufficiencies related to the statute of naturalization, and on June 29, 1906 Congress 
enacted a new naturalization act. The head tax increased to four dollars with the 
Immigration Act of 1907, the U.S. Immigration Commission (also known as the 
Dillingham Commission) composed a forty-two-volume report on the evils of 
immigration in 1911, and Congress passed bills for literacy tests in 1913, 1915 and 
1917, although all were vetoed by Presidents William Howard Taft and Woodrow 
Wilson.48  
                 Dual citizenship emerged as a problem in the United States as early as the 
second half of the nineteenth century as a consequence of the increase in 
immigration. The combination of the United States’ jus soli rule with other 
countries’ jus sanguinis laws creates plural citizenship.49 That was a major difficulty 
in assimilating the new immigrants since dual citizenship meant dual allegiance. The 
Expatriation Act of 1868 declared the right of expatriation to be an inherent right of 
all people, and it also provided the naturalized citizens traveling abroad with the 
same protection of persons and property that is accorded to native-born citizens in 
like situations, so the President gained the authority to give extended protection to 
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the naturalized citizens abroad.50 Citizenship of naturalized immigrants was 
canceled if they resided in their native or any other country permanently within five 
years after naturalization, but they were also “permitted to prove the good faith of 
their application for citizenship, by returning to the United States and taking other 
prescribed steps.”51 The United States persuaded most of the European countries 
about the right of immigrants to expatriate themselves and to choose American 
citizenship. For instance, in 1868, with the negotiations of the Bancroft Treaty by 
which Germany accepted the principle of expatriation of its own nationals, the 
United States aspired to reduce international conflicts related to its naturalized 
citizens.52  With the Rio Treaty of 1906, the right of abandoning a nationality and 
obtaining another was recognized reciprocally. In addition, an extended period of 
residence in the mother country would mean the renunciation of the adopted 
citizenship.53
                The Expatriation Act of March 2, 1907 was “the first general statute 
providing for loss of U.S. nationality.”54 The law stated that “an American 
expatriate[d] himself by obtaining naturalization in a foreign country or taking an 
oath of allegiance thereto.”55 The passage of this act was another outcome of the 
cultural, political, and economic consequences of the influx of non-Northern 
European immigrants to the United States.56 The Act of 1906 was first tested by the 
decision of MacKenzie v. Hare in 1915 in which the Supreme Court supported the 
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law that authorized the expatriation of an American woman married to a foreigner. 
According to the Court, this decision was “based on an ‘ancient principle of  
[American] jurisprudence’ in which the husband was regarded as ‘dominant’ over 
the wife.”57 Mrs. MacKenzie had the right to recover her U.S. citizenship when she 
decided to dissolve marital ties with her foreign husband. Apart from generating 
multiple citizenship prerequisites based on gender, the significant point in 
MacKenzie v. Hare decision is the fact that “voluntary renunciation of citizenship 
proclaimed in the 1868 Expatriation Act was interpreted ... to include voluntary 
performance of an expatriating act without regard to whether the citizen actually 
intended or desired to lose his U.S. nationality.”58 As one of the consequences of the 
women’s suffrage movement, the Cable Act of 1922 terminated this practice, but 
MacKenzie v. Hare is a case that illustrates the conflicted nature of American 
citizenship.             
                Through awarding or denying citizenship to soldiers, military service is an 
essential component of nation building. Thus, eligibility for U.S. military service 
also became an indispensable requirement in the naturalization process. Before the 
Expatriation Act of 1868, the Enrollment Act of March 3, 1865 stated that military 
deserters were considered to have voluntarily renounced their U.S. citizenship and 
their rights to become citizens.59 There was a racial hierarchy in the U.S. Armed 
Forces, but foreign-born soldiers occasionally constituted a majority of the enlisted 
categories both before and after the Civil War, and “half of the enlisted men in the 
late-nineteenth century Navy were immigrants.”60 However, the resentment for the 
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newly arrived immigrants in the American society revealed itself also in the Army. 
Retired officers took part in nativist organizations like “The Guardians of Liberty,” 
an anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant organization which aspired to protect the 
essence and cultural unity of the United States. 
The Spanish-American War of 1898 was a milestone for the American armed 
forces. After the war, the American officials as well as the society, decided that the 
Army and the Navy had to be modernized and strengthened. The decade after the 
Spanish-American War witnessed the renewal of the Navy by prominent people like 
President Theodore Roosevelt, naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan and Senator 
Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. These leaders supported a “Big Navy” policy, 
and secured the necessary financial resources and legislation for the expansion 
program.61 The army also passed through an organizational transformation. Starting 
with the new century, the Secretary of War Elihu Root brought new developments to 
the Army.62 The General Board of the Navy was established in 1900, the General 
Staff of the Army, the Joint Army and Navy Board and the Army War College were 
founded in 1903.    
On the eve of World War I, American opinions about mobilization began to 
change as a consequence of the United States’ need for more conscripts. The ideas 
of General Leonard Wood, an army physician and Theodore Roosevelt’s friend, 
were influential. Wood supported universal military training and Americanization, 
and implied that a mass citizen army, rather than professionals and long-term 
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soldiers, could be trained in a short period of time.63 Another former army chief of 
staff Hugh Scott also supported the opinion that universal military training would 
not only be beneficial to the Americans, it would also be a moral and physical uplift 
for the Americanization of the immigrants, and this idea was also shared by 
Progressive reformers.64 “By 1916, the campaign for preparedness and 
Americanization through universal military training was receiving wide publicity,”65 
and the ethnic minorities in the United States became eligible for the U.S. armed 
forces.      
                With the Act of June 3, 1916, “every able-bodied male citizen of the United 
States and all other able bodied males who ha[d] declared their intention to become 
a citizen of the United States, who [were] between the ages of eighteen and forty-
five, [were] members of the unorganized  militia, [and] required to bear arms when 
necessary.”66  Thus, the allegiance of certain United States citizens, or would-be 
citizens, required possible military service and protection of their country against all 
enemies. The United States government gave particular importance to the 
commitment of the recently naturalized citizens to their new country. American 
courts rejected the immigrants’ claims of exemption from military service during 
World War I and denied thirty thousand petitions for naturalization for that cause.67 
The Selective Service Act of May 1917 made the declarant immigrants from 
friendly countries eligible for the military draft “since it was felt that they received 
the benefits of their adopted country and should, therefore, share the nation’s 
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burden.”68 Additionally, on May 9, 1918 Congress allowed foreigners in the U.S. 
military to become naturalized without signing a declaration of intention, without 
paying the naturalization fee, and without passing an English examination. The 
essential motive for the act was to show that “the draftees were already fulfilling the 
most fundamental of citizenship duties.”69  Between 1911 and 1920, 244,300 
soldiers became American citizens through military naturalization.70
 
3.5   Italian Concept of Citizenship & Military Service 
 
                In the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, when Italy’s 
population was the lowest among other major European countries as an outcome of 
emigration (or in some Italian nationalists’ words, wastage or “hemorrhage”),71 
Italian citizenship was based strictly on jus sanguinis, the right of blood, or blood 
relationship. Thus, the children of the Italian immigrants born in the United States 
automatically became Italian subjects. The jus sanguinis principle of Italian 
citizenship was defined in the Italian Civil Code.  In the Civil Code, the Italian 
Kingdom recognized the naturalization of its subjects in foreign countries and 
renunciation of Italian citizenship, but with a qualification. While Article 11 of the 
Italian Civil Code provided for an Italian subject to expatriate himself if he had 
acquired citizenship in a foreign country, Article 12 stipulated that the loss of 
Italian citizenship did not imply an exemption from past obligations, especially 
military service, “nor from the penalties imposed on those who bear arms against 
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their country.”72 The new nationality of a former Italian male subject did not 
liberate him from his military duties in the Italian armed forces since he was born 
an Italian. Italy recognized a father’s naturalization as an exemption from the 
military for his son, but the sons of former Italian subjects had the responsibility to 
serve in the Italian army if their fathers were not naturalized before their birth. 
Thus, Italy regarded those children as its subjects since citizenship was based on the 
idea of inheritance rather than place of birth.  
                According to the U.S. laws of citizenship, birth on American soil was 
sufficient for a person to be American. And an American-born child, whose parents 
were not American citizens, had the right to choose the citizenship he desired after 
the age of eighteen. But Italy held that the children of any subject, no matter where 
these children were born, take the status of the parent.73 That situation provoked the 
controversy between Italy and the United States over naturalization and the 
definition of citizenship. In the Italian Parliament’s sitting on December 18th, 1899, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Emilio Visconti-Venosta described the problem between 
Italy and the United States with these words: 
Practically, from the Italian point of view, the question 
presents itself as follows: our Civil Code establishes at 
Article 4 that the son of a father who is an Italian citizen is 
himself an Italian citizen, and at Article 11 it declares that, 
whoever has obtained naturalization in a foreign country 
loses his Italian citizenship. Therefore, the Italian subject 
who has fixed his residence in the United States finds himself 
confronted by this alternative: either to remain faithful to his 
nationality of origin and renounce those political and 
administrative rights which, in the great centres of 
emigration, would be the most efficient means of influence 
and protection of his interests; or else to accept the 
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nationality of the country he resides in, losing de jure and de 
facto his Italian citizenship.74   
 
               And the Italian government continued to consider its emigrants, many naturalized 
Americans, liable for military service in Italy. This approach has not changed a lot 
with the passing time, and the Italian Citizenship Law of June 13, 1912 repealed all 
the previous laws, but like them it still contained the condition that loss of 
nationality did not work exemption from military service. As Ambassador Thomas 
Page indicated, that situation instigated “much dissatisfaction among [America’s] 
naturalized citizens of Italian birth who return[ed] to Italy on visits or for business 
purposes, and [was] liable to cause friction.”75 In addition, with the law of 1912, 
“renewing Italian citizenship cost nothing, and it could be accomplished by 
returning to reside in Italy for two years.”76
                As indicated before, emigration turned out to be a major domestic problem 
for Italy by the early twentieth century. The reason for the Italian policy-makers’ 
insistence on preserving the citizenship of Italian emigrants abroad was related to 
the strategy of establishing firm ties between the Italian Kingdom and its subjects to 
strengthen the feeling of italianità. The formation of a united Italian state 
commenced in 1861. The Risorgimento continued to be the most essential issue in 
the country’s agenda until the mid 1900s. The reason for this long period of 
unification was the lack of a national sentiment in the Italian peninsula. For ages, 
Italy was a divided country, and the spirit of campanilismo rather than nazionalismo 
reigned in the minds of the Italian people. The sentiment for unification was limited 
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to the Italian elites and intellectuals. There were political and economic advantages 
of the Risorgimento, but the people living in the different regions of the country 
were not responsive to the nationalist motives which would transform them into a 
united nation. For the northerners, the southerners were not Italian descendants, and 
the southerners could not even realize the meaning of being Italian. Nationalist 
feelings of the nineteenth century were influential in outlining the main arguments 
about the integration of the country, but Italian ideas about nationhood were 
complicated because they were also universalist and Europeanist.77 For instance, the 
goal of the renowned Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini was to establish the 
United States of Europe. In short, Italian officials until World War I could spark the 
feeling of nationalism in their country through economic reform or cultural 
propaganda, and thus they exercised alternative options to unite the Italian subjects. 
                Donna Gabaccia argues, “the main tie between Italy’s government and 
Italy’s citizens was through universal male military service,”78 but making the 
Italian males perform their military service was not very easy. This was mostly 
related to one of their national characteristics; “Italians, whether by commission or 
omission, were not a people of war.”79 One of the prominent Italian heroes on both 
sides of the Atlantic was Garibaldi, a soldier who fought for the unification of his 
country, but rather than being a member of the army of the King of Italy, Garibaldi 
was the soldier of the people, “Cato-like in the sternness of his criticism of the 
Establishment and his rejection of its ways.”80 He was not the prototypical example 
of an Italian soldier physically and mentally loyal to the king.  
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3.6 The Controversy   
 
                The conflict between the United States and other countries about the military 
service of the naturalized Americans has a long history. Great Britain’s 
impressments of formerly British but naturalized American seamen contributed to 
the War of 1812.81 In the late nineteenth century, immigrants from Russia and 
Austria-Hungary were regarded as draft evaders in their home countries.  While the 
issue of military service sparked sharpest disagreement between the United States 
and Italy during World War I, the United States State Department noted the issue 
even earlier, in 1901:  
Italian subjects between the ages of 20 and 39 years are 
liable for the performance of military duty under Italian 
law, except in the case of an only son, or where two 
brothers are so nearly of the same age that both would be 
serving at the same time, in which event only one is 
drafted, or when there are two sons of a widow, when only 
one is taken. Naturalization of an Italian subject in a 
foreign country without consent of the Italian government 
is no bar to liability to military service. ...There is no 
treaty between the United  States and Italy defining the 
status of former Italian subjects who have become 
American citizens.82
 
               The points indicated in the notice constituted the essence of the naturalization crisis 
between the United States and Italy. The United States did not have an 
extraterritoriality agreement with Italy. Former Italian subjects had to perform their 
service in the Italian military, and there was also the risk of being imprisoned for the 
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ones older than thirty-nine if they had not received a royal pardon. Consequently, 
the United States government warned its naturalized male Italian citizens between 
the ages of twenty and thirty-nine about their journeys to Italy since there would be 
no ground to protect them from compulsory military service. Italian men between 
the ages of twenty and twenty-eight were liable to serve in the active army, those 
between twenty-nine and thirty-one were liable to serve in the reserve army, and 
those between the ages of thirty-two and thirty-nine were liable to serve in the 
territorial reserve army.83  
                 Italy passed a new Emigration Act on January 30, 1901. Its enactment 
“signified cognizance on the part of the Italian government of the need to regulate 
and report on migration from its borders.”84 In order to have a more organized 
migration policy, the Commissariato dell’Emigrazione [Emigration Commissariat] 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established. One of its main tasks was to 
improve the situation of the Italian emigrants abroad. The Commissariat also 
published report-like bulletins (Bollettini dell’Emigrazione) about the nature, 
characteristics, and the future of Italian emigration, and the emigrants’ problems. 
With an amendment in February of the same year, the new emigration act “assigned 
to the Banco di Napoli (Bank of Naples) the responsibility of forwarding remittances 
from Italians living in other countries.”85 More importantly, between the period 
1902 and 1914 the Italians abroad were welcomed back to Italy. As Tittoni stated in 
1904, “if they return[ed], the mother country [would] never refuse to recognize them 
as her sons.”86     
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                 When Italian Americans returned to Italy, they were perceived as real 
Italians. Ironically, this meant they were obliged to perform their military service 
after their entrance in the kingdom. The conflict became visible at that instant; the 
American government could not prevent its naturalized citizens’ military service in 
the Italian army, and Italian officials upheld the articles of their Civil Code. 
American concern about the Italian immigrants and their status in the United States 
became clear in the diplomatic correspondence by 1907: 
                The volume of immigration from Italy to the United States has   
in recent years become so large that it forces itself upon the 
consideration of this Government. Many of the Italians who 
thus come to this country intend to remain and establish their 
homes in the United States ... [But] some of these naturalized 
citizens, drawn by a natural affection for their parent country, 
desire to revisit it and do revisit it, and their status is at present 
ill-defined and the cause of misunderstandings which, as this 
Government believes, could be removed improbable of 
recurrence by a conventional agreement defining their status 
and their rights.87        
 
                In 1894, Italy had refused to sign a naturalization treaty, but in 1907, the 
American ambassador, Lloyd C. Griscom, perceived a new willingness of the Italian 
foreign affairs minister, Tommaso Tittoni, to change the Civil Code: 
Mr. Tittoni received the suggestion [about a naturalization 
convention] most favorably and said that that hitherto the 
Government of Italy had been disposed to regard the Civil 
Code [requiring military service] as almost unalterable. 
He, on the contrary, believed that the national code of laws 
should be altered to meet changed conditions. He thought 
that an agreement between the United States and Italy 
would be a useful and necessary measure, and therefore he 
was entirely willing to begin negotiations, and would at 
once appoint a commission to study the matter and report 
to him.88
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               Tittoni appointed a committee that later submitted a report to him and to the 
Parliament about negotiations.  But, in the end, he expressed “the Italian 
Government’s regret at being compelled to decline [the United States’] offer to open 
negotiations for the conclusion of a naturalization treaty.”89 Rather than opening 
international negotiations about naturalization, Italians preferred to make alterations 
in their domestic laws.  The only new development was the law of March 20, 1907, 
which amended Article 12 of the Civil Code concerning the military service 
requirement of Italians abroad. According to the new regulation, a former Italian 
subject who returned to Italy after reaching thirty-two years of age was considered 
liable for the territorial reserve army like Italian residents, but not punishable for 
previous absence as long as he had gone to the United States before the age of 
sixteen. Italian subjects qualifying for exemption from military service could do so 
as long as they resided in a foreign country, although they still had to enlist in the 
territorial reserve army, in the presence of Italian diplomatic or consular 
authorities.90
                With the law of July 17, 1910 on Measures Regarding Emigration, Article 12 
was deleted from the Italian Civil Code,91 but new regulations about the emigrants’ 
obligations of military service were introduced. The law exempted Italian males 
born and residing abroad, or who had emigrated to a foreign country before 
completing their sixteenth year of age, regardless of their father’s citizenship, from 
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the Italian armed forces until the time of their return to the Italian kingdom. That 
exemption was not valid at times of “general mobilization.”92  If those Italian 
subjects born or residing abroad reentered Italy before completing their thirty-
second year of age, they had the obligation to present themselves immediately to the 
military districts to perform their military services.93 Individuals could enter Italy in 
“exceptional cases” for a period no longer than two months after obtaining 
permission from diplomatic and consular authorities, although, if they could prove 
that they were continuing a “regular course of studies,” the period of exemption 
from military service could be extended.94 In brief, the Italian government’s control 
over its emigrants remained in place with the ongoing and new laws and regulations. 
 
3.7   Immigration and Citizenship: The Case of Garibaldi 
 
               Giuseppe Garibaldi’s claim for American citizenship can be accepted as an 
illustrative case for Italian immigration and the problems about citizenship in 
relation to the Italian understanding of the issue. Garibaldi claimed American 
citizenship when he went to the United States without knowing the liability of being 
an American. After the defeat the Roman Republic in 1850, Garibaldi left for 
Tangiers, and subsequently for New York via Liverpool.  A large demonstration 
was planned for his arrival in the United States.  Garibaldi declined to be present in 
the proceeding due to illness, but in a letter he indicated his wish to become an 
American citizen: 
Though a public manifestation of this feeling might 
yield much gratification to me, an exile from my 
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native land, ...bI would rather avoid it, and be 
permitted, quietly and humbly,  to become a citizen 
of this great Republic of Freemen, to sail under its 
flag, to engage in business to earn my livelihood, 
and await a more favorable opportunity for the 
redemption of my country from foreign and 
domestic oppressors.95   
 
                Did Garibaldi really wish to become a U.S. citizen?  Perhaps, but only until 
Italy’s liberation.  Moreover, Garibaldi did not send the letter to the government 
officials, but to the Italian Committee of New York.  Obviously he did not realize 
the requirements of being an American citizen.  On April 2, 1851, he had obtained 
an American passport in New York but as mentioned before, he resided in the 
United States for nine months in 1850-1851, and for four months in 1853-1854. 
Evidently, Garibaldi filed only his declaration of intention of becoming a U.S. 
citizen, and obtained an American passport, but did not reside in the United States 
for an adequate time.96  Therefore, he could not be admitted to U.S. citizenship 
because “naturalization laws of the [United States] required of applicants 
renunciation of citizenship in any foreign country and residence in the United States 
for five years.”97  Additionally, George P. Marsh identified another problem about 
Garibaldi’s naturalization: 
... The question of General Garibaldi’s right to the 
privileges of American citizenship was again raised 
though informally ... I had always understood that 
Gen. Garibaldi had taken only the initiatory steps 
toward naturalization, and besides his repeated 
acceptance of the post of a deputy in Parliament 
seemed to me a renunciation of his claim to 
American citizenship even had his rights as such 
been perfected. By the fortieth article of the 
Sardinian Statute, ... now recognized as the organic 
law of the Kingdom of Italy, it is provided that ‘no 
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deputy can be admitted to the chamber, unless be a 
subject of the King, and enjoy civil and political   
rights.’98  
 
                In these lines, Marsh referred to another essential obstacle to Garibaldi’s 
naturalization: the laws of the kingdom of Italy, which would not give consent to 
another country’s citizen’s membership in the chamber.  Urbano Ratazzi, Italy’s 
prime minister, was eager to send Garibaldi to the United States since Garibaldi 
was a troublemaker.  In the end, Garibaldi was released from prison on parole, but 
could not become American. Garibaldi’s unofficial appeal for U.S. citizenship is 
perhaps significant as the first naturalization problem of an Italian citizen in the 
United States. 
                One final detail about the issue of naturalization for Garibaldi is hidden in a 
note that he had sent “to the Ambassador of His Britannic Majesty at Florence” from 
the Citadel of Alexandria when he was arrested “for infraction of the compact with 
France”99 by organizing volunteers to conquer Rome. That was before his march on 
the Papal States and before he requested the protection of the American government: 
Having the honor of being a British subject—I demand your 
high protection—in view of the unjust act 
committed against my person by the Italian 
government. ... I was arrested by armed force—
conducted to this citadel—and lodged in a dirty 
apartment—where my health has already  
suffered.100
 
              A scholar of Garibaldi decided that “in his political ingenuity” Garibaldi seemed to 
“have forgotten—that in claiming American or British citizenship he was 
renouncing allegiance to Italy.”101 Evidently, he did not know the entire implication 
of citizenship, but wanted simply to benefit from it, and asked for other countries’ 
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assistance by merely claiming their citizenship. Garibaldi claimed United States 
citizenship without realizing its liabilities. Like the majority of the Italian 
immigrants in the United States, he wanted to become an American citizen to 
benefit from the rights and privileges of United States citizenship momentarily.  
 
3.8  “Good Americans” or “Good Italians”? 
 
                As a consequence of military preparedness, universal military training, and 
the intense Americanization program, the U.S. Army in World War I consisted of a 
multi-ethnic combination of soldiers. Nearly half a million immigrants from forty-
six different nationalities were drafted into the U.S. armed forces, and over 18 
percent of U.S. soldiers were foreign-born.102 Those immigrants, especially those 
coming from southern and eastern Europe, believed that the war would be an 
opportunity to make their homelands independent of the German, Austrian, and 
Ottoman empires, prove their loyalty to the United States, and make their ethnicity 
acceptable. “They … used the language of patriotism to achieve their own 
international goals and express ethnic pride.”103 As the United States became an 
ally of Italy in 1917, the Italian immigrants were among the ethnic groups in the 
U.S. Army who felt patriotism and ethnic pride simultaneously. The war reversed 
some of the negative stereotypes of Italians accumulated from the late nineteenth 
century.     
                A recent study of the experiences of Italian Americans in New Haven, 
Connecticut during World War I found that members of the New Haven colonia 
developed a way to show loyalty both to their adopted and native countries. For the 
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Italians in New Haven, serving in the American Army meant not only supporting 
Italian troops. Military service also allowed New Haven’s Italian Machine Gun 
Company to “follow a cherished volunteer militia tradition in New Haven.”104 The 
Italian immigrants of New Haven were the good new Americans who did not forget 
their past. They supported their mother country first by offering financial assistance 
to Italy through aid organizations, especially the Italian Red Cross, and later by 
serving in the American Army. Thus, these Italians in the United States, naturalized 
or not, perceived the war both as a hope for the independence of their homeland and 
a chance to prove their loyalty to their adopted country. 
               Meanwhile, in Italy, there were some changes concerning the Italian Armed Forces. 
Antonio Salandra was appointed as the new prime minister of Italy in 1913. 
Salandra was a nationalist, and commenced to make plans to enter World War I. 
But the most serious obstacle in entering the war was the poor condition of the 
Italian Army. It did not have enough equipment—including winter clothing—and 
munitions. The Salandra cabinet had to renovate the armed forces before entering 
the war. Italy’s neutrality, and its long and secret negotiations with the Triple 
Alliance and Entente powers came to an end after the Treaty of London signed on  
April 26, 1915 which offered Italy a vast territory including South Tyrol and 
Trentino the Istrian Peninsula, and a section of Dalmatia excluding Fiume. On 
October 19, Salandra introduced Sacra Egoismo [Sacred Egoism], which was 
“more or less Italian imperialism” and declared that Italy had to be a World Power, 
and “one of the prime movers of world politics.” 105  The war offered a golden 
opportunity for Italy to become a prestigious and powerful country, but in order to 
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achieve that, it had to have a strong army composed of loyal and patriotic Italian 
subjects. In World War I, 5.7 million men were enlisted, and this was a greater 
number than those who had the right to vote in 1913 elections.106  Nearly 600,000 
died and 500,000 were wounded, and financially the Italian government spent more 
than its expenditure from 1861 to 1913 on the war.107 Like the United States, Italy 
entered a period of full mobilization, preparedness and Italianization, but that was 
not an easy task for a country which managed to call up only about 24% of its 
available conscripts in 1913.108 The low percentage of the recruits was mainly 
related to the immense number of Italian immigrants in different countries. Without 
a doubt, Italy was in the need of its nationals abroad. 
 
3.9   American Duty to American Citizens  
   
                During World War I, most Italian immigrants preferred to stay in the United 
States, though the Italian government began urging emigrant men to return home 
for active duty service in May 1915. The cases of five individuals caught between 
Italian and American concepts and policies of citizenship show how, perhaps 
especially in war-time, the United States broadened its definition of U.S. citizenship 
to protect persons outside the United States. Three of these were priests. One was 
the Reverend Raymond Carrá, the pastor of St. Patrick’s Church in New Orleans. 
Another was the Reverend Dominic A. Cassetta, an Episcopal clergyman of Long 
Island and Curate of St. Augustin’s Chapel, Trinity Parish in New York City. The 
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last one was the Reverend Gustave G. Danchise, a Presbyterian clergyman in New 
York.109  
                Reverend Carrá, born in Vicari, arrived in the United States when he was ten 
years old in 1890. He resided in Louisiana continually for twenty-four years and 
became a naturalized American citizen, then returned to Italy at the age of thirty-
four in 1914. But when he arrived to visit his relatives for three months, he was 
detained for military service in the territorial army of the Italian kingdom.110 
Reverend Cassetta, born on May 30, 1878, at Auleta, in the province of Salerno, 
went to the United States when he was five years old. His father Aniello Cassetta 
became naturalized when his son was thirteen. The reverend returned to Italy for 
academic purposes in 1916, and was apprehended in Naples with his wife and child, 
though he possessed an American passport. Reverend Danchise was a naturalized 
American citizen of Italian birth. When he returned to Italy due to ill health, he was 
held for military service under notice by the Mayor of Sarzana, in the province of 
Genoa.111   
                 Ambassador Thomas Nelson Page requested from the Italian officials the 
return of these American citizens to the United States as soon as possible. Page 
considered that the detention “especially of the class represented by the priests and 
clergymen and married men, because of Italy’s military regulations, ha[d] done 
more to arouse an uncertainty of feeling in the minds of [American] people.”112  
Italy’s responses about the three clergymen illustrate the Italian approach to the 
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problem of naturalization and military service despite the United States’ requests 
for their release. According to the conscription lists for the year of Carra’s birth in 
1880, Reverend Carrá was a renitente, a person who had refused to perform his 
military duties. But since he left Italy at the age of ten and returned at the age of 
thirty-four, he could gain relief from military service after presenting himself to the 
Consiglio di Leva (Council of Recruitment). Subsequently, he would be allowed to 
go back to the United States following the legalization of “his status before the 
military authorities of the Kingdom.”113
                Since Reverend Cassetta (or Cascetta as stated in later accounts), like Carrá, 
had passed the age of thirty-two, he was released by the Italian authorities in a 
similar manner. He was also enrolled in the third category, the territorial army of 
Italy, but he had the right to turn back to his adopted country.114 Nevertheless, the 
official at the foreign office, Marquis Luigi Borsarelli di Rifreddo, reminded 
Ambassador Page that Article 12 of the Italian Civil Code was in force when 
Cassetta acquired American citizenship and “when he should ha[ve] been in Italy 
performing his duties as a soldier.”115   
                Reverend Danchise apparently was less fortunate. According to the official 
records of the Italian Ministry of War, he had not responded to the call of 
enlistment in Sarzana for the years 1892, 1893 or 1894. At the time of the U.S. 
government’s request about his return to America, his status under the conscription 
laws of the Italian Kingdom was not known, and thus, he could not be allowed to 
return to the United States with respect to his application.116 In sum, the Italian 
government maintained its right to the military service of these Italian-born 
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Americans, though ultimately two of the three individuals were released. This 
policy was enforced despite the naturalization of all three individuals as U.S. 
citizens. American rights of citizenship carried little weight in the Old World.     
                But coincidental with Italian immigrants’ readiness and capacity to serve in 
U.S. military forces, this compulsion of Italian Americans by the Italian government 
to military service prompted U.S. policy makers to more vigorously enforce an 
expansive concept of U.S. citizenship. The case of another individual illustrates this 
point. The military service case of Frank (Francesco) Ghiloni reveals the details of 
the critical divergence between the United States’ and Italy’s policies about 
citizenship and naturalization. Ghiloni was born in Marlborough, Massachusetts, on 
August 4th, 1885, and his father was naturalized on February 12, 1886. Thus, Ghiloni 
was born an Italian subject according to Article 12 of the Italian Civil Code. When he 
was two years old, he went to Italy, and returned to the United States after ten years, 
in May 1897. In June 1914, he again went to Italy temporarily for health reasons, and 
was impressed in the Italian army.117 As he had in the case of the three priests, 
American ambassador Thomas Nelson Page asked for the return of Ghiloni to the 
United States, but the Italian Ministry of War decided that it was impossible to 
exempt Ghiloni from liability to military service since his father was naturalized as an 
American citizen after his son’s birth. 118 The state department insisted on Ghiloni’s 
release by the Italian authorities since he “was born a citizen under the law of [the 
United States] ... and ha[d] evidently made a practical election of American 
nationality.”119 Italians repeated their decision about Ghiloni and stated that he could 
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not be exempted from military service in Italy under Article 12 of the Civil Code 
which was still in force when he was first called to military service.120  
                In the end, a third country solved the problem about Frank Ghiloni’s military 
service in the Italian army. In September 1914, the American Embassy in Rome 
received a letter from Ghiloni’s brother Alfred R. Ghiloni stating that his brother was 
“in poor health and believed to be suffering from gall stone.”121 That kind of an 
illness justified a medical examination by military authorities for Ghiloni’s exemption 
from service,122 but the Italian authorities, one more time, definitely refused to 
release him, and stated that he would receive the necessary medical treatment from 
army surgeons.123 But another letter from Alfred Ghiloni, dated December 25, 1915, 
indicated that the Austrian army took Frank Ghiloni prisoner on October 21 in 
Mauthausen, Austria.124  According to the Central Information Bureau of the Red 
Cross, Ghiloni was wounded and taken prisoner in October 1915, and was transferred 
to Mauthausen in November.125 The United States requested the release of Ghiloni 
from the Austria-Hungarian officials since he was impressed in the Italian army 
involuntarily and he was a U.S. citizen by birth. In the end, the Austria-Hungarian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to release Ghiloni under the conditions that he 
would make a sworn affidavit that he would not bear arms against the Central 
Powers, would not leave American territory during World War I, and he would not be 
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compelled to do military service by the Entente powers.126  Consequently, Frank 
Ghiloni was released on June 19, 1916 and returned to the United States via 
Scandinavia.127 But Italy did not make any attempt for his release despite the seventh 
article of the Italian law on Citizenship of 1912, which stated that an Italian born and 
residing in a foreign nation could abandon his Italian citizenship when he became of 
age.128 Frank Ghiloni benefited more from being a prisoner-of-war of the Central 
Powers than he did being an Italian American citizen, in terms of his repatriation to 
America.   
                The case of Ugo da Prato is another significant indication of the problems 
between Italy and the United States about citizenship and naturalization in the 
1910s.129 With the da Prato case, the U.S. government adopted a more forceful tone, 
since Italy refused both to alter its laws about citizenship and to attend an 
international meeting about naturalization. The case is also noteworthy since it 
attracted the attention of “one of the most vicious anti-Italians in Congress,”130 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. Additionally, it revealed the growing 
problem of naturalization and expatriation between the United States and Germany 
after 1914 in spite of the Bancroft Treaty signed in 1868. 
                Mario Ugo da Prato was born in Boston, Massachusetts on August 25, 
1895.131 His father Antonio da Prato was born at Barga in the Italian province of 
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Lucca in 1859, migrated to America, and was naturalized in Boston on March 19, 
1892, three years before the birth of his son. Thus, Ugo da Prato was born an 
American citizen according to the principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis in tandem, 
and, according to Ambassador Page, “even under the Royal Italian Government’s 
interpretation of the law of dual nationality, [he had] to be clearly exempt from 
military service as a native-born American citizen.”132 However, he was called 
upon for military duty by the authorities of the military district of Lucca in 1914 
while he was residing in Italy, studying architecture at the art school at Lucca. 
                 Italian authorities accepted that Ugo da Prato did not have the obligation to 
perform his military duty in the active Italian Army since his father was naturalized 
before his birth. But one detail about da Prato’s entrance in Italy caused the case to 
be problematic.  Antonio da Prato came to Italy with his son in 1911 to do business 
with the Panama Exposition.133 The da Pratos’ continuous residence in Italy from 
that year reconstructed their Italian citizenship, because according to the law of June 
13, 1912, they repatriated themselves after two years of residence. The Italian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sidney Sonnino, presented this information to American 
authorities: 
The Ministry of War has been obliged to find that Mr. 
Antonio da Prato, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 9, Number 3 of the law of June 13, 1912, numbered 
555, has reacquired Italian citizenship, because of his having 
returned to the land of his nativity and resided therein for 
more than two years ... For these reasons, young Mario Ugo 
da Prato is found to be an Italian citizen, amenable to military 
service; that his name cannot be removed from the recruiting 
lists of the Kingdom; and that he must soon respond to the 
call of the colors and serve as a soldier in the Italian army.134
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               American officials responded by referring to their own laws and regulations about 
expatriation. In a dispatch to Ambassador Page, Secretary of State ad Interim 
Robert Lansing brought up Section 2 of the American Expatriation Act of March 2, 
1907, which, while admitting that a residence of two years of a naturalized 
American in his native country would imply the loss of his citizenship, asserted, 
“such presumption [could be] overcome on the presentation of satisfactory evidence 
to a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States under such rules and 
regulations as the Department of State may prescribe.”135 Specifically, if a 
naturalized American could present evidence that demonstrated that he had gone to 
his homeland for commercial reasons and intended to turn back to his adopted 
country, by the circular instruction of May 14, 1908, his American citizenship 
would be retained.136  Again, the restored Italian citizenship of Ugo da Prato 
clashed with the American laws of expatriation.  
                Ironically, given anti-Italian sentiments described earlier, American public 
opinion expressed general dissatisfaction about the da Prato apprehension, and 
called the Italian government to consent to his return to the United States. That 
course would be favorable to commercial intercourse between Italy and the United 
States.137 The case became well known when The New York Times published the 
state department’s extensive correspondence between Robert Lansing and Senator 
Henry Cabot Lodge on the subject of dual nationality.138 The Times declared the da 
Prato case was unquestionably very important for the United States since “it 
outline[d] a policy of [the U.S.] Government toward many foreigners claiming 
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American citizenship.”139 Public and diplomatic pressure had an effect. Ugo da 
Prato was released by the Italian authorities on August 24, 1915 on the condition 
that he would leave Italy within two months, since “da Prato intend[ed] to 
reestablish his residence abroad.”140  
                 In the process that resulted with da Prato’s release there are some major 
aspects which should be noted. The first point is Henry Cabot Lodge’s 
involvement. In general, Lodge was known for his anti-immigrant attitudes. He 
“justified imperialism abroad and immigration restriction at home in terms of 
Anglo-Saxon superiority,”141 and “longed for a pure Anglo-Saxon America.”142 
After the New Orleans lynching in 1891143, Lodge referred to Italians as criminals 
and paupers who infected the United States with diseases like cholera.144 He also 
declared Italy was not one of the United States’ best sources of immigration, unlike 
Scandinavia,145 and argued that the quality of American citizenship had to be 
protected by “an intelligent restriction” that comprised “consular inspection in the 
country of departure” and “some such fair and restrictive test as that of ability to 
read and write.” 146  Lodge, with his fellow Harvard alumni friends in the 
Immigration Restriction League, aimed to reduce the immigration of “inferior” 
races like Italians, Russians, Hungarians, Greeks, and Asiatics by applying the 
literacy test.147
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                But twenty-three years after that statement, Lodge decided to protect the 
rights of Ugo da Prato. Lodge wrote to the Secretary of State ad Interim, Robert 
Lansing on June 5, 1915, sending certified copies of the court record of Antonio da 
Prato’s naturalization and the birth certificate of his son. Lodge also pointed out the 
jus soli principle of American citizenship by referring to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and advised taking the strongest action against Article 12 of the Italian 
Civil Code, otherwise the American officials would “find [themselves] in a very 
awkward position with [their] large body of naturalized citizens.”148       
                Lansing replied to Lodge referring to the details of the Italian Civil Code, 
and the principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis.149 He stated that the American 
ambassador in Rome was directed to call the attention of the Italian government for 
the immediate release of Ugo da Prato, and stated that “dual nationality [was] not a 
theory or doctrine promulgated by the department, but [was] the unavoidable result 
of the conflicting laws of different countries.”150          
                 Lodge responded in an annoyed manner stating that he was familiar with the 
doctrines of jus soli and jus sanguinis, but that the essential point for the United 
States was to abstain from “abat[ing] in any way its duty to those who under its own 
Constitution and Laws [were] American citizens.”151 Ugo da Prato was an American 
citizen, and he had to be treated as an American both in Italy and the United States. 
In domestic matters, Lodge was a fervent New England politician about immigration 
restriction and the protections of American values and life style against the 
                                                 
148 Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to the Counselor of the Department of State, Nahant, June 5, 1915, 
FRUS (1923), 558.   
149 The Secretary of State ad Interim to Senator Lodge, Department of State, Washington, June 9, 
1915, Ibid., 559-564; also see “Dual Nationality.” Supplement: Diplomatic Correspondence Between 
the United States and Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce, The 
American Journal of International Law 9 (Jun., 1915), 369-375. 
150 Ibid., 561. 
151 Senator Lodge to the Secretary of State ad Interim, Nahant, June 16, 1915, Ibid., 566.   
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unsophisticated newcomers. Boston, his birthplace, was also the birthplace of the 
Immigration Restriction League in 1894, which “shaped the racial premises which 
were permanently embodied in the national immigration legislation of 1917 and 
1924.”152 But when the immigrants were naturalized as American citizens, and then, 
when abroad, saw that citizenship violated, Lodge ardently defended the rights of his 
compatriots in the international arena, as a manifestation of his concern about the 
growth of American foreign policy which would serve domestic and especially 
international aims of the United States.153
 
3.10 Disagreement over Dual Citizenship and a Naturalization Treaty  
 
               An additional reason for Lodge’s zeal for the protection of the rights of 
naturalized Americans was Germany’s change in its citizenship law. The United 
States signed the Bancroft Treaty about citizenship and naturalization with the North 
German Confederation and with the German speaking states on February 22, 1868 
which stated: 
Art. 1. Citizens of the North German Confederation, who 
become naturalized citizens of the United States of America 
and shall have resided uninterruptedly within the United 
States five years, shall be held by the North German 
Confederation to be American citizens, and shall be treated as 
such ... 
Art. 2. A naturalized citizen of the one party on return to the 
territory of the other party remains liable to trial and 
punishment for an action punishable by the laws of his 
original country and committed before his emigration; 
saving, always, the limitations established by the laws of his 
original country. 
                                                 
152 Barbara Miller Solomon, “The Intellectual Background of the Immigration Restriction Movement 
in New England,” The New England Quarterly 25 (1952),. 47. 
153 William C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).  
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Art. 4. If a German naturalized in America renews his 
residence in North Germany, without the intent to return to 
America, he shall be held to have renounced his 
naturalization of the United States.154     
 
               These conditions were also valid for a naturalized German citizen who was 
originally American.  
                The Bancroft Treaty was in effect until Germany enacted an Imperial and 
State Citizenship Law on July 23, 1913. That law allowed a former German subject 
to return to his German citizenship without going back to Germany, and permitted 
“a German about to become naturalized in a foreign country to retain, so far as 
Germany is concerned, his German, notwithstanding the acquisition of foreign 
citizenship.”155 Previously, ten years of residence abroad resulted in the loss of 
German nationality. But the new citizenship law of Germany invalidated the 
articles of the Bancroft Treaty by emphasizing the principle of jus sanguinis rather 
than jus soli, and provided the possibility of repatriation of its former subjects 
without their residing in Germany. Additionally, it legalized the doctrine of dual 
allegiance by offering German citizenship to its former subjects who had already 
gained another country’s citizenship. In 1913, in his Reichs und 
Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz [Empire and Laws of Citizenship], Delius, a German 
publicist, stated that the new law “aim[ed] to facilitate as far as possible the 
reinstatement of lost members of [German] population as citizens again.”156  With 
that new law, “the performance of services to the state rather than domicil[sic] 
within its territory”157 became the basis for German citizenship. German subjects 
abroad lost their citizenship when they entered the service of a foreign country 
                                                 
154 “The German Imperial and State Citizenship Law,” The American Journal of International Law 9 
(Oct., 1915), 942.  
155 Ibid., 939. 
156 Flournoy, “Observations,” 478. 
157 Ibid., 479. 
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without the permission of the German government, and when they had “actually 
deserted from the army or failed to obtain a decision as to their military liability at 
the proper time.”158 The right of expatriation was also provided to German subjects 
with that law except for the ones who were liable for the performance of military 
service.159 Finally, the new citizenship law of Germany allowed a German subject, 
who was in the process of naturalization in another country, to retain his German 
citizenship with the written consent of the competent authorities.160  
                Germany’s encouragement of dual citizenship disturbed Henry Cabot Lodge 
since he thought that the United States was “the champion against the doctrine of the 
abandonment of indefeasible allegiance,”161 and therefore, against dual citizenship. 
Lodge’s concern was accurate. As stated earlier, starting with the late nineteenth 
century, the United States wanted to organize an international naturalization 
convention in which it could persuade Italy to sign a naturalization treaty. The 
United States had already signed naturalization treaties with Germany (although that 
treaty was no longer valid), Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, 
Norway, Sweden and Portugal to resolve the conflicting claims upon naturalized 
citizens.162  However, the United States could not settle the question of citizenship 
with Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which accepted the principle of jus sanguinis 
like Italy. 
                The United States aspired to sign a naturalization treaty with Italy similar to 
the Bancroft Treaty since it opposed dual allegiance. If a person chose to be 
American, he had to refuse his former nationality, and had to reside in the United 
States permanently. According to U.S. officials, the requirement for adopted 
                                                 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid., 481. 
160 “The German Imperial and State Citizenship Law,” 941.  
161 Senator Lodge to the Secretary of State, Nahant, June 5, 1915, FRUS (1923), 557. 
162 “Dual Citizenship,” The American Journal of International Law 9 (Oct., 1915), 947-948.  
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citizenship was residence in the adopted country. Therefore, if the naturalized 
citizens preferred to go back to their native countries, they would lose their United 
States citizenship. The second point in the proposed treaty was connected to the first 
one; if a naturalized American returned to his original country permanently, he 
would be punished for his past crimes. These were the conditions that the United 
States government requested from the Italians. Former Italian subjects should 
become American through naturalization, but they would have the opportunity of 
repatriation in Italy, and they would be responsible for their past crimes if they 
returned to Italy for good. U.S. officials also asserted that they did not have “any 
desire to intervene in behalf of any Italian who ha[d] remained in the United States 
only long enough to secure naturalization and then ha[d] returned to Italy in the hope 
of there residing as an American citizen, exempt from the operation of Italian 
military law.”163 In brief, the abandonment of indefeasible allegiance would damage 
the prestige of the United States in international affairs, and would bring the 
American attempt for an international naturalization convention with Italy to an end.  
                Despite this last provision and several American requests, the Italians refused 
to join a convention. Germany’s new citizenship law attracted the attention of the 
Italian foreign affairs minister, Sidney Sonnino, at a time when the U.S. government 
requested that the Italian government sign a naturalization treaty. American officials 
argued to the Italians that most of the European countries, including Germany, had 
signed similar treaties in the nineteenth century alluding to the Bancroft Treaty of 
1868. But in response to American demands, when Ambassador Page paid a visit to 
the minister to discuss the issue and to suggest an international naturalization 
convention, Sonnino asked about the United States’ latest experience with 
                                                 
163 The Secretary of State, Elihu Root to Ambassador White, Department of State, Washington, 
February 11, 1907, FRUS (1915), 391.  
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Germany.164  The Italians also declined to sign a treaty because it would require 
significant modifications in their domestic laws, and as a U.S. official acknowledged 
“like all other European countries with large emigrant population overseas,” Italy 
needed “every available man for military service and [was] therefore disinclined to 
take any action tending to loosen the tie of nationality which binds her citizens 
abroad to the country of their origin.”165 Traditional European concepts of 
citizenship, combined with the exigencies of war mobilization, prevented the 
Americans from seeing their concept of citizenship become transatlantic.  
                Accordingly, the complaints of the Italian American citizens about military 
service persisted throughout World War I. After the American entrance to the war, 
the problems of the Italian soldiers continued because of their service in the U.S. 
Army; they were listed as deserters in the Italian Army. With the General Order No. 
33 on April 6, 1918, the War Department requested information about the Italian 
soldiers from the commanding officers. Then, a list of the naturalized and alien 
Italian soldiers in the U.S. Army was presented to the Italian government to allow 
them exemption from military service in Italy.166
 
3.11 Conclusion 
 
                For the United States and Italy, World War I culminated a military 
restructuring that reflected the two countries’ ambition for national consolidation 
through projection of power. The renovation of the American Army and Navy in the 
late nineteenth century accelerated, and the United States began to project its 
                                                 
164 Ambassador Page to the Secretary of State, American Embassy, Rome, August 4, 1915, Ibid.,573. 
165 Ibid., 419. 
166 For detail, see Ford, Americans All!, 128. 
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strength with large armed forces not only in the western hemisphere, but also all 
around the world. Meanwhile, the United States showed determination to protect the 
rights of its citizens regardless of their ethnic origins or physical location. Likewise, 
where the Italian Army’s responsibility had been limited to peninsular concerns, 
now the Kingdom of Italy’s craving for colonies and the initiation of the Great War 
required mobilization of nearly 5.7 million Italians for action around the 
Mediterranean. Remote emigration of Italian subjects came to seem unhelpful to 
such a regime in pursuit of Great Power status. Thus U.S. officials defended their 
naturalized citizens zealously on the basis of jus soli, even though, when the 
immigrants resided in the United States, they were subjected to ethnic discrimination 
and even violence. In the meantime Italy maintained its policy of jus sanguinis 
throughout the period, reflecting both evolving government aspirations for emigrants 
and the necessities of Old World military readiness. The United States and Italy 
passed through the early 1900s with disagreement about their policies with reference 
to the concepts of citizenship and military service in both countries.  
                 The potential crisis between the United States and the Kingdom of Italy 
about military service came to an end however in 1918 when the United States 
signed treaties with its European allies, including the Kingdom of Italy, after a series 
of military service conventions. The reciprocal military service agreement between 
Italy and the United States was signed in Washington, on August 24, 1918.167 With 
this treaty, both countries stated that Italian citizens in the United States and 
American citizens in Italy could either go back to their country for military service 
or serve in the armed forces of the country in which they were living for the better 
                                                 
167 Its ratifications were exchanged at Washington and Rome on November 14, 1918 and it was 
proclaimed on November 18, 1918. For detail see, Treaty Series No. 637, “Convention Between the 
United States and Italy Providing for Reciprocal Military Service, Signed at Washington, August 24, 
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prosecution of World War I.168 Additionally, the agreement proscribed the loss of 
nationality of the people who performed their military service in the other country’s 
army. The treaty of 1918 remained in effect until December 1941 when Italy 
declared war on the United States. The military service treaties of 1918 effectively 
established a kind of Atlantic citizenship for men of Allied nations, though that 
citizenship was fraught with risk of nativist violence and death or injury through 
military obligation. Italian migration exerted pressure on the Italian government to 
liberalize its military conscription laws, and exerted pressure on the American 
government to afford a non-Northern European immigrant group protection of U.S. 
federal law. But through that pressure, Italian migration effectively enhanced both 
governments’ capacity to wage war and each country’s international status as an 
aspiring Great Power. 
                                                 
168 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
         MYTH OR REALITY?: AMERICAN AND ITALIAN 
 
 STEREOTYPES 
 
 
Stereotypes are essential components of social as well as racial interaction.  
“Basically, a stereotype is an exaggerated belief, oversimplification, or uncritical 
judgment about a category ... Although stereotypes are most often exaggerations or 
distortions of reality, they are often accepted by people as fact.”1  Stereotyping, “the 
application of these stereotypes when we interact with people from a given social 
group,” 2 usually constitutes the basis of racial discrimination and prejudice against 
one ethnic group or country by another, though it may constitute exaggerated 
positive or idealistic judgments as well. National stereotypes create the sense of 
Otherness, while defining the characteristics of the other racial clique, or nation. 
Italian and American stereotypes were fundamental elements of U.S.-Italian 
relations. This chapter will seek to elucidate the extent to which stereotypes, 
prejudice, and racial discrimination influenced U.S.-Italian relations in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 
                                                 
1 William B. Helmreich, The Things They Say behind Your Back: Stereotypes and the Myths Behind 
Them (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1982), 2. 
2 Charles Stangor, “Volume Overview,” Charles Stangor, ed., Stereotypes and Prejudice: Essential 
Readings (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, 2000), 1.  
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4.1 The Definitions: Stereotypes, prototypes, prejudice, and “mythopoeic” 
images 
 
  The term “stereotype” was first coined by the American journalist Walter 
Lippmann in his 1922 book Public Opinion.  Lippmann was interested in how 
individuals reacted to people from various cultures and ethnic groups, and he 
considered stereotypes as the “pictures in our heads.”3  Those pictures are 
generalizations and oversimplifications which are functional to cope with the 
complexities of social life.  Lippmann himself emphasized that stereotypes are 
outcomes of flawed ideas which create erroneous viewpoints.4    
For Lippmann, there are two sources for those flawed pictures; stereotypes 
either are shaped in people’s minds autonomously, or they are imposed by the 
culture that they live in.  He stated, “in the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the 
outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to 
perceive that we have picked out [the pictures] in the form stereotyped for us by our 
culture.”5  This brings forth another characteristic of stereotypes; they are the faulty 
products of a cultural group.  Stereotypes are the labels that are utilized to depict the 
Otherness of another group, and they “also allow us to justify our behavior toward a 
group that we already dislike or are mistreating. In other words, they enable us to 
rationalize our actions.”6   
                                                 
3 Lippman quoted in Ibid., 6. 
4 John F. Dovidio, eds al., “Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination: Another Look,” C. Neil 
Macrae, Charles Stangor and Miles Hewstone, eds, Stereotypes and Stereotyping (New York: The 
Guilford Press, 1996), 279. Also see Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: 
European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998 which is 
about white identity in the United States and the definition of race.   
5 Lippmann quoted in Perry R. Hinton, Stereotypes, Cognition and Culture (East Sussex: Psychology 
Press, 2000), 9.  
6 William B. Helmreich, The Things They Say, 4. 
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Since the main purpose of this dissertation is to explore the essentials of 
Italian-American relations, this chapter will chiefly concentrate on racial and ethnic 
stereotypes within American and Italian societies.  From the definitions offered in 
this part, it can be stated that there were Italian stereotypes in American society, and 
a certain degree of prejudice was felt toward the Italian American community as a 
result of the overgeneralizations formed by the American public. American images 
of Italians early on were mythical, but later became racist.  Meanwhile, there were 
American stereotypes in Italy, but the nature of Italian prejudice about Americans 
was different from the American biases about Italians. This chapter will assert the 
details of the formation of divergent stereotypes in the two countries and their 
consequences in U.S.-Italian relations.  
   After the mass immigration to the United States in the late nineteenth 
century, Italian immigrants experienced “discrimination.”7  Negative actions 
toward an ethnic group reveal variations from the least to the most destructive one: 
antilocution, avoidance, discrimination, physical attack, and extermination.8  
Antilocution is the form of passive action that comprises only the feeling of being 
different, but involves no physical assault designed for the stereotyped group or 
individual, while extermination is the most severe type of ethnic conflict between 
the aggressor and the victim.   
However, along with its negative characteristic, ethnic prejudice may 
sometimes be positive.9  The pro condition was basically valid for the American 
stereotypes that Italians held by the beginning of the twentieth century.  Italians 
created positive bias about Americans, and depicted some major figures in 
                                                 
7 Stangor, “Volume Overview,” Charles Stangor, ed., Stereotypes and Prejudice, 11. 
8 Gordon W. Allport, “The Nature of Prejudice,” Charles Stangor, ed., Stereotypes and Prejudice: 
Essential Readings, (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, 2000) 25-6. 
9 Allport, “The Nature of Prejudice,” Charles Stangor, ed., Stereotypes and Prejudice, 22.  
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American history according to those positive biases. The positively biased 
stereotypes always carry the risk of becoming generalizations like the negative 
ones.  That was pertinent in the situation of the American positive stereotypes in 
Italy; Italians created “a mythopoeic image – a constructed myth of the [American] 
within [Italian] culture,”10 and visualized the United States as an idyllic land which 
was ruled by heroic leaders like George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and 
Woodrow Wilson. 
 
4. 2 Christopher Columbus: Transformation of an Italian Hero into an 
American Myth 
 
During the nineteenth century, Americans praised Christopher Columbus as a 
national hero and one of the uniting figures of their country. In the late nineteenth 
century, especially starting with the mass immigration to the United States, 
American society needed myths to justify the hopes and dreams of the newcomers as 
well as its native-born members. In this respect, Michael Kammen’s Mystic Chords 
of Memory explains the relationship between mythmaking and national identity. 
Kammen quotes Ralph Ellison: “That which we remember is, more often than not, 
that which we would like to have been; or that which we hope to be. ... our history 
[is] ever a tall tale told by inattentive idealists.”11  Focusing on this idea, Kammen 
refers to the mythic heroes in American history and indicates that their human 
characteristics were transformed into “idealized virtues.”12
                                                 
10 Ibid.,150.  
11 Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American 
Culture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 2.  
12 Ibid., 28.  
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Kammen emphasizes the centrality of founding fathers of the Revolutionary 
period to American myth making in the nineteenth century. But he neglects a 
remarkable national icon in the nineteenth century: Christopher Columbus. The 
United States government greeted the nineteenth century from its new capital, the 
District of Columbia, which was named in honor of Christopher Columbus. 
Columbus’s popularity became widespread with Washington Irving’s The Life and 
Voyages of Christopher Columbus, first printed in 1828, and “the Anglicized image 
of Columbus received an official literary validation with [its] publication.”  Irving’s 
biography assisted the development of the Columbian myth; a new American hero 
appeared. “By the time of the Civil War, [the] vision of Columbus was so well 
grounded in American culture that man and legend had become one.”13
In general, the founding fathers of the United States of America like 
Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson 
share the same characteristics. They were Anglo-Americans, lived roughly in the 
same period, and came from the same religious origin. But Christopher Columbus 
came from a different origin, a different time and a different part of the world, and 
therefore would not seem a likely candidate to be a national icon in the United 
States. But he was, at least in the nineteenth century. “When the newly formed 
United States began the process of constructing a national identity and culture, the 
memory of Christopher Columbus was resurrected as a symbol of the virtues of 
rugged individualism, stoic determination and a ruthless pioneer spirit which the 
young republic sought to instill in its citizens.”14  
                                                 
13 Amy Uhry Abrams, “Visions of Columbus: The ‘Discovery’ Legend in Antebellum American 
Paintings and Prints,” American Art Journal 25 (1993), 77, 83, 96.  
14 Barbara Ransby, “Columbus and the Making of Historical Myth.” Race and Class 33(1992), 83.  
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Columbus was of course Italian. However, he sailed the ocean for Spanish 
monarchs, wrote his letters in Spanish, he also knew Portuguese. The multi-national 
background of his discovery of America was important for Columbus’s myth. 
Different ethnic groups had inhabited America since the first Indian-European 
encounter, so an American myth like Christopher Columbus had to fit that standard.  
Columbus was “the first European immigrant: the first of the Italians, Germans, 
Slavs, etc., who made up America, and from the many created the one: e pluribus 
unum.”15 With all these international features, Columbus would be a superb example 
for America.  
  The distinction between the New and the Old World was very important in 
nineteenth-century America. Christopher Columbus was a Renaissance man who 
had illuminated the road to the New World. “The city-state of Genoa had no 
associations with the poor immigrants from other areas of the Italian peninsula, and 
thus the mariner’s birthplace could be comfortably subsumed into the rarefied 
atmosphere of Renaissance Italy.”16  All his calculations, the techniques that he used 
during his voyages, and his correspondence with the Florentine scientist Toscanelli 
supported that interpretation. Additionally, European contact with the American 
continent symbolized the beginning of a new era, in particular, the coming 
supremacy of the American nation in the world. An editorial column from The New 
York Times, praising the 1892 Columbian Exposition, stated: 
... the discovery of America is too remote and too great a 
thing for any of us really to take it in. It is an event not of 
national so much as of mundane importance. ... To celebrate 
the discovery of America is like celebrating the creation, or 
the evolution, of ADAM. It is not our festival, but the 
world’s. ... [What COLUMBUS gave to civilization] was the 
                                                 
15 Nancy Murray, “Columbus and the USA: from Mythology to Ideology,” Race and Class 33(1992), 
50.  
16 Ann Uhry Abrams, “Visions of Columbus.” 83.  
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close of the Middle Ages, of feudalism, of privilege, and the 
beginning of liberty, equality, and fraternity that at the end of 
the fifteenth century [Columbus] closed the door upon the 
medieval world and opened it upon the modern world. ...... 
All over Europe now, 400 years afterward, ... European 
institutions are becoming “Americanized.” ...it is the gift that 
he bestowed upon Europe in finding a virgin soil in which 
there might take root and spring and flower the “American 
idea.” This is not a national only, but a universal 
benefaction...17
 
Columbus became a symbol of the commencement of the “Americanization” 
of the world, and thus an ancestor of American globalization. “He at any rate arrived 
at the continent without assistance from any source but his own strength of mind, 
and to him, ... belongs the discovery of a New World.”18 An archetypal self-made 
immigrant and model of Anglo-Saxonism, Columbus began to be identified with the 
American Dream, his name associated with those of the founding fathers of the 
United States of America.   
Another example about Columbus’ mythological portrayal can be given from 
a history textbook.  In the nineteenth-century United States the national education 
system overall sought to guarantee the preservation of American ideals. By the 
1830s, school leaders had a certain American ideology in mind, which “centered on 
republicanism, Protestantism, and capitalism, three sources of social belief that were 
intertwined and mutually supporting.”20  As a natural outcome, national heroes who 
had founded the country had to match these standards. The schoolbook The True 
Story of Christopher Columbus called the Great Admiral, was “offered and 
inscribed to the boys and girls of America as the opening volume in a series 
especially designed for their reading, and to be called ‘Children’s Lives of Great 
                                                 
17 The New York Times, October 8, 1892.  
18 Charles Edward Lester, Americus Vespicius, 103.  
20 Carl F. Kaestle, Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools and American Society, 1780-1860 (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 76.  
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Men’.”21 The writer, Elbridge S. Brooks, previously had authored works on George 
Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Ulysses S. Grant, Benjamin Franklin, and the 
American War of Independence. The book appeared in 1892, the 400th anniversary 
of Columbus’s landing.   
The most remarkable aspect about the book is Brooks’s complete account of 
Christopher Columbus. He described the navigator’s life, his physical features - 
“fresh-looking face, a clear eye and golden hair” - his relationship with different 
European monarchs, and his voyages; according to Brooks there were Irish as well 
as English sailors among the crew.  Brooks deliberately illustrated the navigator as a 
Northern European rather than a sailor from Genoa. Columbus, different from the 
Italian people in general, according to Brooks was fair-haired like the white 
Europeans. Thus all these aspects, according to Brooks, proved that Columbus’s 
arrival was an achievement of white Europeans as well as the Catholic Spanish 
monarchs.    
Despite his alleged introduction of slavery to the Americas, Columbus 
eventually opened the way to the establishment of the United States of America. 
“His life was full of mistakes, but those mistakes have turned out to be, for us, 
glorious successes.”22  Brooks asserted that the English people were different from 
the Spanish, because they had fulfilled Columbus’s dream: 
English blood … following after—because Columbus had 
first shown the way—peopled, saved and upbuilt the whole 
magnificent northern land that Spain missed and lost. They 
have found in it more gold than ever Columbus dreamed of in 
his never-found Cathay; they have filled it with a nobler, 
braver, mightier, and more numerous people than ever 
Columbus imagined the whole mysterious land of the Indies 
contained; they have made the home of freedom, of peace, of 
                                                 
21 Elbridge S. Brooks, The True Story of Christopher Columbus called the Great Admiral (Boston: 
Lothrop, Lee & Shepherd Co., 1892), 1.  
22 Ibid., 30.  
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education, of intelligence and of progress, and have protected 
and bettered it until the whole world respects it for its 
strength, honors it for its patriotism, admires it for its energy, 
and marvels at it for its prosperity.23
 
This quotation gives a racial definition of the American Dream more 
exclusively than the extract from The New York Times. Around Columbus “the 
potent and self-celebratory myths which make up the national image and from which 
derive the ‘American Dream’ [had been crystallized].”24  The rising popularity of 
Christopher Columbus in nineteenth-century America reflected the development of 
the United States as a major power as well as the continuity of the American Dream 
which denoted life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. A country like America, 
which had begun to be more and more powerful, especially in the late 1800s, was in 
search of some national and mythical figures that would present its emerging 
importance to the rest of the world. 
In the transformation of Columbus into a national hero, the most critical 
obstacle was his religion. He was a Catholic, and Protestants often did not welcome 
Catholics in nineteenth-century America. How could an Italian Catholic be a 
national hero in America? The answer was again related to the circumstances in the 
nineteenth-century United States. The only thing necessary was to transform him 
into a figure that would not be against the American Protestant ideals. Accordingly, 
Columbus was identified with the religious figures of the Old Testament. Jewish 
apologists in the United States thus portrayed Columbus as a Moses of the Jewish 
immigrants.  In the Bible, Moses led Israelites to the promised land of Canaan; 
Columbus was alleged to have done the same for Jewish Americans, whose 
ancestors had been expelled from Spain by Queen Isabella as a consequence of the 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 51.  
24 Nancy Murray, “Columbus and the USA,” 50.   
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reconquista. Columbus was  “a man of Israel,”25  “the embodiment of an all-
inclusive Americanism, sheltering among others the likes of them.”26  Rev. Dr. 
Joseph Silverman’s sermon, “America, the Promised Land” is an example of 
Columbus’s religious mythification among Jewish Americans: 
Moses was the Columbus of Israel. Like Moses, Columbus 
never realized his dreams or ambitions and saw them from 
afar. The conquest of America and its annexation to Spain 
and the planting of the Roman religion on its soil were his 
dreams, not to be seen by him. It was not Columbus whom 
America chose especially to honor in this festival, but it was 
the establishment of a new world, where science, philosophy, 
and religion were revolutionized. The discovery destroyed 
many erroneous notions, superstitions, and traditions. ... 
America is the promised land of the Jew. This land has 
become our Canaan. ... America is the Messiah of mankind, 
the redeemer of the world. ... the first prayers offered in this 
celebration should be in the synagogue, and that the 
Columbian memorial arch to be erected in this city is the 
design of a young man of Israel.27
 
Another religious figure that Columbus was identified with during the 1892 
celebrations was Noah. After the flood, described in Genesis, Noah had come to the 
Old World when his ship settled on Mount Ararat. Similarly, Columbus discovered 
the New World. The resemblance between them was the also reason why “the 
names of these two great sailors and land discoverers [should] be coupled 
together!”28
  Additionally, “Columbus seemed as an apt choice to serve as the patron of 
the new American Catholic group, for as the first Catholic in America, he was the 
symbolic ancestor of all American Catholics, whatever their ethnic background.”29  
                                                 
25 The New York Times, October 9, 1892.  
26 Lilian Handlin, “Discovering Columbus.” 90.  
27 The New York Times, October 9, 1892.  
28 Ibid. October 8, 1892.  
29 Timothy J. Meagher, “ ‘Why Should We Care for a Little Trouble or a Walk through the Mud”: St. 
Patrick’s and Columbus Day Parades in Worcester, Massachusetts, 1845-1915,” The New England 
Quarterly 58 (1985), 23.  See also Matthew Dennis, Red, White and Blue Letter Days: An American 
Calendar, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002 which refers to the Columbus Day. 
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He became a uniting figure also for the immigrant Catholics in the New World. The 
Knights of Columbus, first established in 1882 in New Haven by American-born, 
middle class Irish men, regarded Columbus Day parades as important chances for 
the Catholic immigrants in the United States to unite, so the Knights endeavored to 
organize all the Catholic organizations and societies to participate in the parade to    
show Catholic solidarity with their Protestant neighbors.19
A final illustration of Columbus’s transformation into a mythic hero occurred 
at the Chicago’s Columbian Exposition of 1893. There are numerous studies that 
focus on the significance of expositions in American culture, architectural designs, 
technical innovations, and countries invited to make exhibitions.  For example, “the 
Chicago Fair would teach Americans about Columbus through a vast and colorful 
mosaic of visual devices.”30  In addition, the exposition also symbolized the 
dominant white culture in the 1890s that was linked to Columbus’s heroic image. 
  Similar to the ideas of the founder of the Italian communist party, Antonio 
Gramsci about racial hegemony and social structures, in Manliness and Civilization, 
Gail Bederman refers to the Columbian Exposition as an example of “civilization 
building a hegemonic male power of white supremacy” and “American civilization’s 
astonishing progress toward human perfection.”31  Columbus’s three white ships in 
front of the famous White City represented the dominant white culture in the 
nineteenth-century America whereas the Midway Plaisance was built for the inferior 
                                                 
 
30 Karal Ann Marling, “Writing History with Artifacts: Columbus at the 1893 Fair,” Public Historian 
14(1992), 15.  
31 Gramsci stated that social hierarchies are established not through coercive power, but through a 
process of consent and acquiescence. For more information see, Mark Browning, “Antonio Gramsci 
and Hegemony in the United States,” The Review of Communication 2.4 (2002), 384. See also, Gail 
Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: a Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 
1880-1917 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 31 and Robert W. Rydell,  All the 
World’s a Fair: Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876-1916, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984.   
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races. The White City covered 80 acres of land and was designed as a separate 
entertainment area and “the Columbian ships functioned in a manner analogous to 
the ethnological villages of native peoples-Russian, Japanese, Philippine, Turkish 
and so forth-that were the principal attractions of the Midway district at the Chicago 
Fair.”32 The villages were the constructions that mirrored the peculiarities, or the 
everyday life and customs of the countries which participated in the exposition. The 
Austrian Village was a reproduction of old Vienna, the Turkish Village had a 
mosque, a bazaar, a Bedouin camp, and a Persian tent within its boundaries, and the 
Venice-Murano Exhibit was a demonstration of Italian glassware.  
The Chicago Fair of 1893 was an idealized reflection of American society in 
the late 1800s. As Elbridge S. Brooks wrote, “The four hundred years of the New 
World’s life closed its chapter of happiness in the electric lights and brilliant 
sunshine of the marvelous White City by Lake Michigan.”33 Chicago was far from 
the ocean that Columbus had sailed. But there were special reasons for the city to be 
the host of the exposition. Chicago had suffered from a great fire a short time before 
the fair, and its reconstruction was a manifestation to justify the greatness of the 
American nation. A great country like the United States that managed to organize an 
event like the 400th anniversary of the discovery of the continent could also be the 
leader of the world in the coming century. With the World’s Columbian Exposition, 
“many Americans believed that Columbus’s voyage had initiated a chain of 
‘progress’ that would lead to the worldwide preeminence of the United States.”34
On the other side of the Atlantic, by the early nineteenth century, many 
Italians also believed that the discovery of Columbus had initiated advancement in 
                                                 
32 Marling, “Writing History with Artifacts,” 18.  
33 Brooks, The True Story of Christopher Columbus, 51.  
34 Abrams, “Visions of Columbus.” 96.  
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the history of Italy. In a bibliography of Columbus, published in Rome in 1809, it 
was stated, “because of the superhuman courage of Columbus, Europe and America 
were no longer strangers.”35 According to the writer, the first contact between the 
two worlds was not an expression of New World hegemony, but growing Italian 
influence. Columbus had illustrated the Italian name with his magnificent discovery 
which provoked jealousy in various nations of the world.36 Even before the 
Risorgimento, the Ligurian navigator was portrayed as a national hero who had 
changed the course of western civilization. 
The 400th anniversary of the discovery of the American continent had an 
enormous significance for a united Italy as well. A commission of Italian 
intellectuals compiled the sources about Columbus in a multi-volume work, La 
Raccolta Colombiana [The Columbian Collection] for the honor of the anniversary. 
Italy also participated in the celebrations both in New York City and Chicago. Italy, 
despite the repercussions of the diplomatic crisis after the 1891 New Orleans 
lynching, helped organize the celebration in 1892. The erection of the statue of 
Columbus at Columbus Circle in New York City was a manifestation of that. 
Italians, particularly the Italian community in New York, desired to illustrate the 
importance that they gave to their hero, Columbus, by presenting his statue as “a 
donor to honor the Italian name.”37 As Carlo Barsotti, the director of Il Progresso, 
asserted the Italian immigrants in America desired “the note of italianità to be heard 
                                                 
35 Giovanni Gerson di Cavaglià, Dissertazioni Epistolari Bibliografiche di Francesco Cancellieri 
Sepra: Cristoforo Colombo di Cuccaro nel Manferrato Discopritore dell’America [Epistolary 
Bibliographic Dissertations of Francesco Cancellieri Sepra: Christopher Columbus, Discoverer of 
America] (Rome: Francesco Bovrlié, 1809), 96.  
36 Ibid., 76, 1-2 and 96.  This idea can be related to Gramsci’s opinion about cultural hegemony and 
Italy’s quest for national greatness. As Gramsci indicated, cultures cannot be separated from the 
ideologies and social systems and vice versa. 
37 Carlo Barsotti, Il Progresso Italo-Americano di Nuova York, Il Primo Giornale Italiano negli Stati 
Uniti d’America [The The Italian-American Progress of New York, the First Italian Newspaper of the 
United States of America] (New York: Nicoletti Bros. Press, 1911), 76. 
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in the hymns sang by the Anglo-Saxon voices.”38  From this perspective, Columbus 
Day was a momentous occasion to prove the solidarity of the Italian immigrant in 
America. In brief, Italians – both in Italy and the United States – aimed to confirm 
the italianità of the discoverer of the American continent during the 1892 
celebrations. By that way, they had the opportunity to demonstrate both the 
greatness of Columbus as an Italian and the young Italy, descendant of “the antique 
ruler of the world.”39  Thus, Anglo-Americans and Italians both celebrated 
Columbus, but appropriated his achievements for different national and ethnocentric 
purposes.  
             
4.3 Giuseppe Garibaldi in America: A Transnational Italian Stereotype 
 
While Americans, native-born and immigrant, wholeheartedly embraced 
Columbus, they had more ambivalent sentiments about Giuseppe Garibaldi. 
Giuseppe Garibaldi has already been discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to his 
attempt to become a United States citizen during his brief stay in the country. 
Nevertheless, before the 1850s, Margaret Fuller, who witnessed the revolutions in 
Italy during her stay in Europe, was one of the first significant intellectuals that 
praised Garibaldi. Fuller portrayed Garibaldi as a leader whose “look was entirely 
that of a hero of the Middle Ages, - his face still young, for the excitements of his 
life, though so many, ha[d] all been youthful, and there [was] no fatigue upon his 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 69.  
39 Ibid.  
 114
  
brow or cheek.”40  In 1860 the anti-slavery newspaper The Liberator published a 
poem, “Brown and Garibaldi,” composed by Jane Ashby:    
We praise thee, Garibaldi! 
And in the roll of fame, 
Among her noblest heroes, 
Shall Europe place thy name. 
Among them-far above them:- 
Thou dost not fight for gain, 
For crown, or lands, or titles, 
Or empty glory vain. 
The arms that froes thy country, 
Italia’s noblest son, 
Has over all earth’s tyrants 
A lasting conquest won. 
We honor thee, true hero, 
More than great names of old; 
Those Greeks and Roman warriors, 
Whose tales so oft are told …  
And Brown, and Garibaldi, 
The champions of this age, 
Who led the van of freedom, 
Shall brighten History’s page … 41
 
The poem suggests the Italian general’s characteristics in the American 
mind. Ashby’s choice of John Brown was related to Brown’s raid at Harpers Ferry, 
Virginia in October 1859.  Before the incident, Brown was a public figure after he 
had rescued several slaves in Kansas and liberated them in Canada.  But the attack 
on the federal armory at Harpers Ferry brought Brown’s end. He was executed on 
December 2, 1859 for inciting slaves to insurrection.  From the poet’s point of view, 
Brown and Garibaldi shared a mission of liberating their people - in Garibaldi’s 
case, the Italian people - from the hands of tyranny and slavery. Reflecting 
abolitionist sentiments in antebellum America, Ashby desired to depict the heroes of 
freedom of her age by comparing them to an idealized Italian in American society. 
                                                 
40 Margaret Fuller, At Home and Abroad, Arthur B. Fuller, ed., (Boston: Crosby, Nichols, and 
Company, 1856), 414.  
41 Howard R. Marraro, Garibaldi in New York (New York History, April 1946), 35-36.  
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Garibaldi’s portrayal is also significant since it describes the American affection for 
Italians on the eve of the Risorgimento, and more importantly, before the mass 
immigration of the 1880s. 
On the other hand, the 1861 essay of Henry Theodore Tuckerman “Giuseppe 
Garibaldi,” presented a less romanticized version of Garibaldi:   
As compared with the majority of Italians, we remarked in 
this man’s being and aspect a great simplicity and directness 
… His calm manner, comparatively slow movement, and 
almost Saxon hair and beard, might have seemed 
characteristic of a northern rather than a southern European; 
yet his eye, voice, and air were essentially Italian. His 
nationality, however, was still more evident in the sudden 
though subdued, emotion apparent in his language and 
expression, when speaking or listening to what was said 
about his country.42
 
Tuckerman was a Bostonian, and a famous essayist who had lived in Italy. 
He was also the author of The Italian Sketch-Book in which he described the Italian 
landscape. He claimed an extensive knowledge of Italy and Italians, who, according 
to Tuckerman, were indirect, timid, superficial, exaggerated in manners, and 
nervous. Garibaldi shared some of these characteristics, but he also had the physical 
features of a northern European.   
Nevertheless, Garibaldi was depicted as a hero even after his defeat and the 
collapse of the Roman Republic. William Roscoe Thayer, who composed several 
biographies of the founding fathers like Benjamin Franklin and George Washington 
as well as a two-volume work about Count Camillo Cavour, in “Garibaldi’s Early 
Years,” portrayed the Italian general as “the most romantic figure ... an epic hero.”43 
Thayer described Garibaldi as a boy shutting himself in his room weeping after 
accidentally breaking a grasshopper’s leg.  While narrating the early years of 
                                                 
 42 Marraro, Garibaldi in New York, 19-20.  
 43 William R. Thayer, “Garibaldi’s Early Years,” The Atlantic Monthly, 62 (1888), 484.  
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Garibaldi, Thayer referred to his brief stay in Staten Island as a “page from the 
Odyssey of the Italian Ulysses.”44 The hero of Rome and Uruguay worked in a 
candle factory “without a Calypso to beguile his banishment, or a Penelope to 
welcome him home!”45   
  However, Giuseppe Garibaldi was not the idealized type of leader and hero 
for some other writers. During his visit to Sicily, Henry Adams criticized him. In his 
eyes, Garibaldi was a dictator—Italians, Adams believed, deserved to be ruled by 
one—and demonstrated the characteristics of an ordinary man who never should 
have been compared to George Washington:    
Garibaldi seems to discourage all formality, and though he 
has just now all the power of an Emperor, he will not even 
adopt the state of a General. Europeans are fond of calling 
him the Washington of Italy, principally because they know 
nothing about Washington. Catch Washington invading a 
foreign kingdom on his own hook, in a fireman’s shirt! ... He 
had his plain red shirt on, precisely like a fireman, and no 
mark of authority, his manner is, as you know of course, very 
kind and off-hand, without being vulgar and demagogic. He 
talked with each of us, and talked perfectly naturally; no 
stump oratory and no sham.46
 
Among Italians, Garibaldi was a national hero, a leader, and also an 
individual for the Italian immigrants who had shared their destiny in America. The 
Italian American writer E. D. R. Bianciardi, who had composed essays like “A 
Florentine family in the Fifteenth Century,” “The Haunts of Galileo,” and “Life in 
Old Siena,”47 conceivably offered the most realistic portrayal of the Italian general: 
His personal appearance [in 1855] is thus described by one 
who knew him well: ‘Garibaldi is of medium height, with 
broad, square shoulders, and strong limbs. His hair and bear 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 499.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Documents: Henry Adams and Garibaldi, 1860,” The American Historical Review 25 (1920), 246, 
247.  
 47 E. D. R. Bianciardi, “A Florentine Family in the Fifteenth Century,” The Atlantic Monthly 48 
(1881); “The Haunts of Galileo,” The Atlantic Monthly 54 (1884); “Life in Old Siena,” The Atlantic 
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are reddish, and slightly grizzled; his nose is straight; his eye 
is keen, yet mild. He walks with a firm and decided step, and 
his gestures, speech, and whole manner are those of a sailor. 
He converses with self-possession and simplicity, but is 
seldom garrulous; yet when he is speaking of Italy, or relating 
some daring exploit, he becomes animated and even 
eloquent.’48
 
Evidently Garibaldi was a hero for the Italians not for his superhuman 
qualities, but for his traits which made him a leader of the Italian unification and 
freedom. Rather than labeling him as an impressive hero descended from the 
classical or middle ages, or stereotyping him, Italians preferred to feel affection for 
the Italian general merely for the features that made him Giuseppe Garibaldi; a bold 
and natural patriot.  
Some of the nineteenth-century American representations of Garibaldi and 
the Italian people reveal that even before the mass immigration to the United States, 
Americans had prejudices about Italians and their character though they could make 
exceptions for transatlantic heroes. Giuseppe Garibaldi was an “in-between” 
stereotype that symbolized the transformation of American ideas about Italy from 
optimism to pessimism. After the revolutions in Italy and at the beginning of Italian 
unification, Americans expressed confidence in the Italian victory over tyranny. As a 
natural outcome, they encouraged and praised Italian republican figures like 
Garibaldi. But because of Italians’ insufficiency in their nation building, and the 
massive immigration from the southern part of the Italian peninsula in the late 
nineteenth century, the Italian stereotypes in the United States became darker, 
sinister, and more biased in early twentieth-century America. 
 
 
                                                 
48 E. D. R. Bianciardi, “The Personal History of Garibaldi,” The Century 24 (1882), 498.  
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4.4 Anarchists and Mobsters: The formation of Italian Stereotypes in the U.S. 
 
The Italian community has been one of the most illustrated ethnic stereotypes 
in the United States.  By the 1870s, Americans had two pictures about Italy. The 
first Italy was the brave friend of the United States, the country of Garibaldi and the 
other Italian exiles coming from the middle class.  The other was the poor, ignorant 
and decadent Italy from where the poor and the ignorant immigrants were beginning 
to arrive.  The negative Italian stereotype was sometimes the Italian organ-grinder 
child who began to live in the United States in the early nineteenth century. There 
was also the Italian stereotype of the padrone, who brought those little children to 
the United States to work as street musicians, and who treated them badly.  
American newspapers in the second half of the nineteenth century began to report 
those incidents. The representation of Italian Americans – mainly the one depicting 
men as ignorant members of the Mafia –initially emerged in the late nineteenth 
century and developed in the twentieth century with minor divergences. 
The characterization of immigrants for purposes of comic relief and dramatic 
entertainment on the stage represents an important aspect of stereotyping ethnic 
minorities within American society.49  As a consequence of “the ethnocentrism of 
the majority,” Americans entertained themselves by differentiating the diverse 
characteristics of the immigrants on stage.  
The first immigrant stereotypes appeared in minstrel shows in the nineteenth 
century. For instance, The Emigrant Train, or Go West of 1879 merged Irish, Dutch, 
and Italian immigrants and four blackface performers in one play.50  In other plays 
                                                 
49 For detail, see Carl Witke, “The Immigrant Theme on the American Stage,” The Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review 39 (1952), 211-232.  
50 Ibid., 225.  
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like the Italian Padrone, or, the Slaves of the Harp, the Italian stereotypes had the 
stage to themselves. Italians were among the most popular “bad foreign types,” and 
they frequently did the bloody work. Similar to white blackface performers, the 
actors who played Italian immigrant roles were not Italian. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, Italian dialect, “Mariuch” songs 
became extremely popular. The most prominent Mariuch song was Edward 
Morton’s “Mariuch Makea-dea-Hootch-a-ma-Cooch Down at Coney Isle” (1907). 
“Mariuch, She Taka da Steamboat” was another song. More significantly, the early 
twentieth-century song sheets portray how the American public perceived the 
Italians in their country. These sheets are outstanding representations of Italian 
immigrants who were later transformed into rigid stereotypes. 
  Figure 4.2 is the sheet of the song, “Scissors to Grind.”  This piece is an 
earlier example; it was composed in 1904, before Morton’s famous Mariuch song. 
The image, or the stereotype that was revealed in the picture is a scissor grinder. The 
features of the old and weary man – dark skin and moustache-resembles the 
characteristics of a southern Italian, and he is a representative illustration for the 
Italian immigrant on the streets of American cities. It is also interesting that the 
Italian appears on the same page as two black males—but bigger than them. 
Possibly this is an evidence of an “inbetween” racial image. 
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Figure 4.2 “Scissors to Grind” 
Source: http://scriptorium.lib.duke.edu/sheetmusic/b/b04/b0426/b0426-1-72dpi.jpeg, May 5, 
2005. 
 
 
 “Tony Verdi has a raggy hurdy gurdy” is a line from the 1917 song, “When 
Verdi Plays the Hurdy Gurdy.” The song was composed when Italy and the United 
States were allies in World War I, and the song sheet depicts a very well known 
Italian stereotype, the organ grinder. Similar to the Figure 4.2, Tony Verdi was 
portrayed as a typical southern Italian, presumably a Sicilian. His clothes and his 
physical features yield an unambiguous idea about the man’s nationality.  In 
addition, the name of the organ grinder is noteworthy; he was named after the 
famous composer, Giuseppe Verdi, who resided in the United States for a period of 
time. Even the use of this name is a manifestation of how the Italian stereotypes 
were overgeneralized.     
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              Figure 4.3 “When Verdi Plays the Hurdy Gurdy” 
              Source: http://scriptorium.lib.duke.edu/sheetmusic/a/a00/a0066/a0066-1-
72dpi.jpeg, May 5, 2005.   
    
   The development of the film industry in the late 1890s initiated the 
introduction of various ethnic stereotypes to American audiences. Silent cinema, 
which came into its own during and immediately after the First World War,51 
provided two negative portrayals of Italian male immigrants before Italy’s entrance 
to World War I in 1915: the mobsters and the anarchists.  
  The early twentieth- century Italian immigrant stereotypes on screen 
emerged as backward and superstitious villains. They also endangered the virtuous 
Anglo-American life and customs. “Because of Italians’ olive skin, the Americans 
thought they were racially different, too – somewhere ‘in-Between’ black and 
                                                 
51 Christopher P. Jacobs, “The Development of the Cinema: From Scientific Novelty to a New Art 
and Entertainment Industry,” Donald W. McCaffrey and Christopher P. Jacobs, Guide to the Silent 
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white—and attributed to them different emotional traits and sexual behavior.”52 So, 
in order to protect the status quo, young Italian men had to be punished, and their 
sisters and daughters had to be rescued from their sinister fathers and brothers. The 
first example for that kind of a depiction is the 1906 film The Black Hand, which 
had a Mafia theme, and it was also a prototype for the coming movies about Italian 
immigrants. In the final scene of The Black Hand, the wicked protagonist dies 
before he manages to achieve his evil plans; the audience is reassured that the bad 
foreigners in their country are always punished. 
David Wark Griffith, who utilized the multiracial environment of the United 
States in his movies, helped fellow Americans to synthesize old attitudes about race 
with new patterns of life and law.53 Before his famous The Birth of a Nation, 
Griffith directed 450 shorter films for the Biograph Company between 1908 and 
1913.  In most of these films, he used ethnic stereotypes to touch the fears of Anglo-
Americans, but he also used the stereotype as a vehicle for exposing despicable 
urban housing and social conditions, or more often, in telling a sentimental story.54  
In addition, Griffith presented positive ethnic figures like the virtuous Catholic 
Italian woman, Pippa. 
Griffith directed Pippa Passes, or the Song of Conscience in 1907. It was 
based on Robert Browning’s poem, “Pippa Passes,” but rather than narrating the 
story of Browning, Griffith preferred to portray Pippa as “a gamine of holiness, with 
a crucifix the only decoration of her tiny room. After dawn rises upon her (in a 
famous early lighting effect), she sets out with her lute and song: ‘God’s in his 
                                                 
52 Rosanne De Luca Braun, “Made in Hollywood: Italian Stereotypes in the Movies,” 
http://www.osia.org/public/pdf/Made_in_Hollywood.pdf, May 8, 2005.  
53 Jack Temple Kirby, “D. W. Griffith’s Racial Portraiture,” Phylon 39 (1978), 118.  
54 Ibid., 119.  
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heaven/All’s right with the world’.”55 After hearing Pippa’s song, a drunken man 
swears off the drink and an angry sculptor forgives his wife who has lied to him. 
With her song, Pippa also accomplishes to stop a man who tries to kill his lover’s 
husband, and after completing her tasks, she returns to her bed with the sunset.  
Pippa Passes was a success; it was the first film that The New York Times reviewed 
on October 10, 1909.   
In addition to Pippa Passes, in which he depicted a Virgin Mary like woman 
figure, Griffith directed a number of films that comprised conventional Italian 
stereotypes. The 1909 films At the Altar and The Cord of Life represented the well-
known Italian gangsters. At the Altar is about a furious rejected Italian suitor who 
hides a gun under the altar, and plans to use it just before the happy couple marries. 
The Cord of Life is about a “Sicilian profligate” whose “plan ‘dastardly in extreme,’ 
is to hang his victim’s infant out an apartment window by a cord, cut the cord at the 
point where the window sash holds it, and wait for someone to open the window.”56
Another 1909 film, In Little Italy, is again about the vengeance of a rejected 
suitor. The story occurs between a widow and two men in Little Italy. One of the 
suitors, who works in a barber shop, intends to kill his rival in order to marry the 
woman. In the end, the Irish police chief arrests the villain, and saves the day. 
Incidentally validating the presence of Irish immigrants in America, Griffith 
revealed the characteristics of an angry Sicilian. The film was presented in the 
Biograph Bulletin on December 23, 1909 with the statement: 
STORY OF A REJECTED SUITOR’S PERSISTENCE 
One of the most dominant traits in the Sicilian’s nature is 
indefatigability of purpose where a score is to be reckoned. 
No amount of hindrance or disappointments can shake his 
bulldog sedulity, for he will wait, days, weeks, and even 
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years to accomplish his plan and this Biograph story portrays 
this propensity most vividly, making it one of the most 
thrilling subjects yet released.57  
 
While directing a film about a sentimental story that ends happily, Griffith 
presented the racial characteristics of the group as well. By watching a film like In 
Little Italy, the American audience easily discovered the prescribed psychological 
traits of the Sicilians. D.W. Griffith continued to present the Italian immigrants’ 
private sphere by depicting their lives, customs and traditions. For instance, in 
Italian Blood, a father and a daughter are saved from Mafia threats, and the nuclear 
Italian family is saved. In brief, the Italian stereotypes that Griffith presented in his 
films served his melodramatic objectives, but the alleged Italian temper and their 
relationship with organized crime and anarchy alarmed the director. 
Yet the most prominent film about the Italian immigrants in the early 
twentieth century was Thomas Ince’s The Italian (or The Dago), released in 1915. In 
the end, the vicious villains are again punished, but what is striking about the film is 
the introduction of the bright world of the Venetian gondolier who later finds 
himself in the slums of a big American city. The contrast between Venice and New 
York inverts the American Dream, and emphasizes the notion that the immigrants 
could have had better lives if they did not come to the United States. The dual 
representation of the Italian immigrant of Griffith as again revealed in Ince’s movie. 
Italians had peculiarities that made them different from the Anglo-Americans, but 
they also suffered because of the depraved conditions of the city slums of America. 
However, the Italian immigrant was not always depicted as a pathetic victim 
or perpetrator of crimes against the Italian community. Particularly after the 
assassination of President McKinley in 1901, the fear of anarchism created a new 
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stereotype: the Italian anarchist. Italians had a leading role in the “Black Hand” 
motion pictures. The Black Hand is used to designate the Mafia, but the Black Hand 
movies were not only about kidnapping or blackmailing; they also depicted 
anarchist activities like murder or bombings. This kind of film reinforced negative 
images that overlapped with the sinister trappings of radical stereotypes.58 Films like 
A Bum and a Bomb (1912), Giovanni’s Gratitude (1913), The Wop (1913), The 
Bomb Throwers (1915) accumulated bomb tossers, laborers, radicals and anarchists. 
While films depicting Italians as anarchists disappeared after Italy’s entrance into 
World War I, Italian stereotypes continued to exist on the white screen throughout 
the whole twentieth century. From time to time, the Italian aristocrats were 
introduced, but they were typically ferocious bad characters. Similar to the plays at 
theaters, white artists played the Italian immigrants in the movies. The first Italian 
movie star in the United States, Rudolph Valentino, played exotic Oriental 
characters instead of swarthy Italians. In addition, “short, silent films and the 
exaggerated styles of acting appropriate to them probably made prevailing 
stereotypes even more vivid than before the time of the camera.”59 The products of 
the nickelodeon era fortified Italian male stereotypes in American society, and, like 
Pippa, depicted women as pious Virgin Mary figures who endeavored to purify the 
ignorant and immoral men.  
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4.5 American Heroes, Italian Dreams: Italians and American Stereotypes 
 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, Italians had positive prejudices 
about Americans in their mind.  They created a mythopoeic image of the American 
within their own culture, and gained positive biases about the United States as well 
as its inhabitants.  This was partly related to works composed by Italian writers 
about America and its history especially in the early 1900s. In his two-volume work 
first published in 1819, Storia della Guerra dell’Indipendenza degli Stati Uniti 
d’America [History of War of Independence of the United States of America], Carlo 
Botta presented all the aspects and details about the American War of Independence 
from Thomas Paine’s Common Sense to the accomplishment of independence, and 
provided information about George Washington and his role in the American 
victory.  He depicted Washington as a serious man who was accustomed to dangers 
and did not like them, and who was also respected by his soldiers.60  In a preface to 
his translation of Lawrence Shaw Mayo’s Benjamin Franklin, Luigi Rava, the 
Italian minister of instruction from 1906 to 1909, listed the complete works of 
Benjamin Franklin published in Italian language as well as the works composed 
about him.  These publications start with a 1797 translation of the Constitution of 
Pennsylvania for the Venetians and concluded with an 1877 edition of a monograph 
about Franklin written by Bartolomeo Aquarone.61  About Franklin, Rava stated that 
Italy was going to honor the great American apostle forever who loved working, 
                                                 
 60 Carlo Botta, Storia della Guerra dell’Indipendenza degli Stati Uniti d’America [History of War of 
Independence of theUnited States] Volume II, (Milano: per Borroni e Scotti, 1844), 409.  
61 Luigi Rava, La Fortuna di Beniamino Franklin in Italia [The Success of Benjamin Franklin in 
Italy] (Firenze: R. Bemporad & Figlio, Editori, ?). The date of the work is unknown but by looking at 
the chronological order of the books that Rava listed, the book was published in the late 1800s or the 
early 1900s.   
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science and liberty, and his memory would be kept alive in the hearts of the 
Italians.62  
By the early twentieth century, George Washington and Abraham Lincoln 
came into view as the most prominent heroes of the United States history. 
Washington was a genius and Lincoln had a splendid character; he was patient, 
honest, pertinacious in work, and a lover of justice.63  In L’America del Nord [North 
America], which was composed for the readers who wanted to reach “the top of 
prosperity,”64 the writer declared that Washington who had spared $65,000 of his 
private wealth for the American independence “was the father of the country.”65  In 
1915, Woodrow Wilson’s name began to be associated with Washington’s and 
Lincoln’s names. Washington and Lincoln were not great only for their personal 
qualities; they were also the men of the greatest wars. Washington was the hero of 
the greatest war of liberty that history had witnessed a model for the Italian wars of 
independence.66   Lincoln was the hero of the war of equality between men, and he 
accomplished the abolition of slavery. Could Wilson achieve to become the hero of 
the war or the fraternity among the nations?67 With the Italian entrance to the First 
World War, President Wilson with “his good soul ... [and] supreme principles of 
liberty and humanity,”68 became the greatest hope for the Italians as a leader that 
would give an end the war, and bring peace to all nations in the world. This belief 
                                                 
 62 Ibid., 56.  
 63 Rodolfo Giani, Storia degli Stati Uniti d’America [History of the United States of America] 
(Milano: Carnera, 1902), 191.  
64 Gedeone de Vincentiis, L’America del Nord [North America] (Napoli: Luigi Pierro Tip.—Editore, 
1905), 7.  
65 Ibid., 12.  
66 Francesco Ruffini, Il Presidente Wilson (President Wilson] (Milano: Fratelli Treves Editori, 1915), 
31.  
67 Ibid., 34.  
68 Umberto Biasoli, Piccola Storia degli Stati Uniti d’America [A Short History of the United States 
of America] (Milano: Antonio Vallardi, 1917), 80.  
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reflected both a mythopoeic image of America and the weakness of Italian national 
identity at the time. 
Apart from the Italians in Italy, the Italians in America also composed works 
about the United States, past and present.  For instance, Enrico Sartorio, whose 
Italian was poor because he had left Italy at a very early age,69 presented detailed 
information about Americans, their institutions, and their culture. While depicting 
Lincoln, Sartorio stated that Lincoln would take his hat off in front of a farmer since 
he respected the aristocracy of the honest people.70  Also, the American gentleman 
was simply an honest man71 different from the Europeans, and the American would 
find the essence of his happiness in the masses, in uncertainties, and in adventure,72 
while the Europeans preferred to enjoy their lives in retiring. For Sartorio, the 
United States had the mission of bringing civilization to the world, and the Italian 
immigrants in America, whom he called the mezzi Americani [half Americans], had 
to become American citizens, and had to unite with the national spirit for progress 
for the greatness of the adopted country.73
Meanwhile, for the Italian immigrant, the United States, or simply “Merica,” 
was an idyllic land where he could obtain all his needs and desires. For the 
southerners, most of whose relatives were working in the United States, “America 
came to be an essential part of the[ir] daily life, a social and economic element 
mingled with their concepts of bread, work, family and sentiment of every kind, and 
at the same time a mystical sustenance and the basis of a magical religion.”74  With 
                                                 
69 Enrico Sartorio, Americani di Oggigiorno [Today’s Americans], con prefazione di Francesco 
Ruffini [with the preface of Francesco Ruffini] (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1920), xiv.  
70 Ibid., 9.  
71 Ibid.   
72 Ibid., 29.  
73 Ibid. 
74 Ernest E. Rossi, “The Italian Myth of America,” Joseph V. Scelsa, Salvatore J. LaGumina and 
Lydio Tomasi, eds. Italian Americans in Transition: Proceedings of the XXI Annual Conference of 
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the effects of the government’s migration policy, cheap transportation, Italy’s 
economic situation and living standards, the deprived southerners migrated to 
America to attain prosperity. The accounts of these immigrants are essential since 
they depict their perceptions about the United States.  For example, Gino Gullace’s 
L’America ci Salverà dei Nostri Bisogni: Voce di Emigranti [America will Save our 
Needs: Immigrant Voices] describes the sentiments and attitudes of a number of 
immigrants like the Messinò family whose members commenced to migrate to 
America in the last year of the nineteenth century.  In his letter on July 25, 1899, 
Francesco Messinò informed his mother that she had to stay tranquil and believe that 
America was not only their salvation, but also all the Italians’ salvation who were 
working there, and he concluded: “Blessed Christopher Columbus who found 
[America].”75 The letter of his sisters, Marianna and Teresa to their cousins and 
aunt, who arrived in the United States in late 1900 portray the Italians’ first 
impressions about the Promised Land: “The impression of America for us was good 
because we have a clean house which is not like our poor house in Ferruzzano.”76  
In his letters to his parents between 1903 and 1904, another immigrant, G. Scala, 
told about the American people as well as the country.  He stated that the 
philanthropy in the United States was of the greatest degree, and the gentlemen were 
not only gentlemen for their richness, but also for their surprising character of 
demonstrating high respect and esteem to their dependents.77  All these immigrants 
mentioned above were informing their relatives that they were no more slaves in 
America, and they were working only for their own benefits.  By the beginning of 
                                                                                                                                         
the Italian American Historical Association held at the John D. Calandra Italian American Institute, 
The City of New York, the Graduate School and University Center, October 13-15, 1988 (New York: 
The American Italian Historical Association, 1990), 218.  
75 Gullace, L’America ci Salverà dei nostri Bisogni: Voce di Emigranti, unpublished dissertation, 50.  
76 Ibid., 56-57.  
77 Ibid., 74, 75.  
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the twentieth century as an outcome of the mass immigration from southern Europe, 
Italians began to collect information about the remote continent and the United 
States, and thus the Italian image of America began to change. 
                         
4.6 Conclusion   
      
Americans, who had direct contact with the poor and illiterate southern 
Italians, developed negative Italian stereotypes. The image of the Italian immigrant 
turned out to be an overgeneralization made about the Italian nation as a whole.  For 
Americans, Italians became idle, filthy, illiterate, appalling, criminal, and offensive 
people who occupied their streets as gangsters, padroni, and organ grinders. The 
more Italians they knew, the more they hated them.  In Italy, it was the opposite; the 
more Americans the Italians knew, the more they liked them. The immigrants’ 
descriptions about the United States and Americans as well as the portrayal of 
American heroes in books made the United States a preferred country, and 
Woodrow Wilson a highly esteemed leader in Italy. 
  The formation of the American stereotypes in Italy was a consequence of the 
increasing number of Italian immigrants in the United States, and Italian literary 
works about the United States. The interaction of the Italian immigrants with 
America enriched Italy’s knowledge about that country.  Despite the prejudice they 
experienced in America, Italian immigrants commenced to share the same dreams 
and aspirations with the older immigrants to the United States. In the United States, 
the Italian immigrant could not adapt himself to American culture, language and 
life-style so he chose to remain in isolation, but, in his heart and his mind, he shared 
the American Dream with the American people. Italians compared American heroes 
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to their heroes of the Risorgimento, and accepted the American War of 
Independence as a paradigm for their own country’s freedom.           
The effect of these stereotypes on policy-making both in Italy and the United 
States, was weakened by World War I.  The war forced the Italian government to 
betray the cumulative positive image of America as a heroic as well as lucrative 
destination for poor Italians. By recalling them for military service during time of 
war as discussed in Chapter 8, the Italian government effectively attempted to limit 
or prohibit its citizens’ access to the American Dream. In contrast, despite the racist 
image of Italians and among many Americans, officially the United States accepted, 
if it did not welcome, most Italian immigrants, and assimilated Italian males in the 
United States armed forces. Severe immigration restrictions affecting Italians did not 
arise until the 1920s, again because of military necessity. Although the effects of 
stereotypes were complicated by each country’s military expression of its national 
strength, stereotypes affected each country’s policies.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
     LYNCHING: A NEW PHASE IN U.S.-ITALIAN RELATIONS 
 
 
  On June 13, 2005, the Senate of the United States passed a resolution that 
apologized “to the victims of lynching and the descendants of those victims for the 
failure of the Senate to enact anti-lynching legislation.”1 In the resolution sponsored 
by Mary L. Landrieu of Louisiana and George Allen of Virginia, a hundred senators 
stated that lynching was a widely acknowledged practice and crime occurring 
throughout the United States until the 1950s, and that at least 4,742 people were 
reported lynched between 1882 and 1968. They also asserted that 99 percent of the 
perpetrators escaped punishment, two hundred anti-lynching bills were introduced in 
Congress, and seven presidents made appeals about lynching between 1890 and 
1952.2 Landrieu said, “now, when the United States is fighting a war against 
terrorism, was a good time to apologize for the past and remind [themselves] that 
terrorism existed in the United States in different ways.”3
This formal apology was basically issued for the African Americans who 
constituted the majority of the victims of mob violence in the United States. The 
senators declared that the recent publication of James Allen’s and Hilton Als’ 
Without Sanctuary: Lynching Photography of America, “helped bring greater 
                                                 
1 109th Congress, 1st Session, S. Res. 39, http://www.congress.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.RES.39: 
June 6, 2005. 
2 Ibid.  
3 Jim Abrams, “Senate to Issue Anti Lynching Apology,” http://www.startribune.com/ Last updated 
June 6, 2005. 
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 awareness and proper recognition of the victims of lynching.”4 The book is a 
significant source to understand the atrocious outcomes of mob violence in the 
history of the United States, and it includes numerous photographs of the lynched 
African Americans. But, among hundreds of pictures of those victims, there are two 
photographs that can escape the attention of the readers. The pictures of two Italian 
immigrants, Angelo Albano and Castenego Ficcarotta, who were lynched in Tampa, 
Florida on September 20, 1910 during a strike of cigar workers, reveal an important 
episode in the history of American ethnic violence. Italian immigrants in the United 
States habitually became victims of lynching in the late nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries, although the New Orleans lynching in 1891 has attracted the 
most attention of historians since it was the largest lynching in U.S. history (eleven 
people were lynched at a single moment)5. In reality, Italian immigrants were 
lynched in numbers second only to blacks. They were lynched not only in the 
southern states, but also in other parts of the country. 
This chapter will seek to elucidate the aspects of Italian lynchings in the late 
nineteenth- and the early twentieth–century United States. It will also comment on 
the definition of race, the features of race relations, and the social, political and 
economic conditions in the United States after the mass Italian immigration. In 
writing this chapter, classifications of Italian lynchings are based on W. Fitzhugh 
Brundage’s typology in Lynching in the New South.6 In his work, Brundage states 
that lynch mobs rarely tortured their white victims, and considered them as aberrant 
                                                 
4 109th Congress, 1st Session, S. Res. 39. 
5 There are two recent works about Italian lynchings in the United States. The first one is Patrizia 
Salvetti’s book, Corda e Sapone (Rome: Donzelli, 2003), which refers to most of the Italian 
lynchings in U.S. history. Heather Hartley’s documentary I Linciati (The Lynched Ones) appears to 
be a good visual reference about these incidents. 
6 For detail, see Katherine Stovel, “Local Sequential Patterns: The Structure of Lynching in the Deep 
South, 1882-1930,” Social Forces 79 (2001), 857-859. 
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 criminals since they did not assume that criminality was innate to the white race.7 
He also differentiates Italian immigrants from whites because of their ethnic origin, 
though he does not provide the aspects of this different position in detail. The Italian 
immigrants, especially southerners, were considered as in-between people 
possessing the characteristics of both blacks and whites. The features of Italian 
lynchings are more similar to the lynchings of African Americans than they are 
white-on-white lynchings. In that way, questions about Italians’ race and the Italian 
immigrants relations with “native” Americans can be answered. 
 
5.1 Lynching: an “American practice”: 
 
 
Lynching has been a neglected subject in American historiography; the 
writing of the history of lynching has been “disjointed and discontinuous,”8 but 
lynching is also an important topic because it seems a genuine American invention. 
Vigilantism is generally perceived as America’s unique contribution to the history of 
collective violence.9 The lynching era in the United States covers roughly the five 
decades between the end of Reconstruction and the beginning of the Great 
Depression.10  
                    Lynching is traditionally considered a southern phenomenon, but in 
reality it was a national fact. In 1905, James E. Cutler, one of the first historians of 
                                                 
7 W. Fitzhugh Brundage, Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880-1930 (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1993), 91, 92.  
8 For detail, see Robert P. Ingalls, “Lynching and Establishment Violence in Tampa, 1858-1935,” The 
Journal of Southern History 53 (1987), 613-644; Joel Williamson, “Wounds not Scars: Lynching, the 
National Conscience, and the American Historian,” The Journal of American History 83 (1997), 
1221-1253.  
9 Ingalls, “Lynching and Establishment Violence,” 614.  
10 Stewart E. Tolnay and E. M. Beck, A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 
1882-1930 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 17. 
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 lynching, described lynching as “America’s national crime.”11  The white majority 
across the country utilized mob violence and lynching to secure justice when they 
believed the laws to be insufficient. Eastern, western, and middle states used 
lynching as a modus operandi to perform vigilante justice. In 1895, a church 
minister, Washington Gladden, revealed his impressions about lynching in northern 
states: 
A neighbor of mine, a most brave and loyal and nobleman, 
who, is the colonel of the 14th regiment of the Ohio militia, is 
now on trial for his life because he ventured to face a mob 
and to protect a negro whose life the mob was seeking ... It is 
time that we in our Northern communities should stop this 
lawlessness. All this white cap business which is going on in 
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and other parts of the North is of the 
same piece; and while such things can occur in Northern 
communities we ought to hide our faces for shame.12
  
Another example is the lynching of a black man, William “Froggie” James.  
James was arrested for the murder of a white, 24-year-old salesclerk, Mary Phelley 
on November 8, 1909, in Cairo, Illinois. Cairo was “a town geographically northern, 
yet on one night it was a town mentally and spiritually as southern as Mississippi or 
Alabama.”13 Apparently, neither the victim nor the executioners were southerners,14 
but the incident resembled the numerous African American lynchings in the 
southern states.  
Lynching is traditionally considered as a form of white violence against 
blacks. African Americans were the largest group in the United States that suffered 
from lynching, but representatives of various groups, including whites, were also 
                                                 
11 Philip Dray, At the Hands of Persons Unknown: The Lynching of Black America (New York: The 
Modern Library, 2003), 17.  However, there is another theory which indicates that lynching came to 
America from Scotland. For detail, see David Hacker Fischer, Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways 
in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).   
12 Rev. Washington Gladden, D.D., “Address on Lynching,” The American Missionary, 49 (1895), 
406-407. 
13 Stacy Pratt McDermott, “‘An Outrageous Proceeding’: A Northern Lynching and the Enforcement 
of Anti-Lynching Legislation in Illinois, 1905-1910,” The Journal of Negro History 84 (1999), 61.  
14 Ibid., 66. 
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 lynched in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. For instance, in 
South Carolina, carpetbaggers from the North and native scalawags became the 
victims of mob violence.15  Meanwhile, the most famous example of white-on-white 
lynching in the South was the Leo Frank incident. Leo Frank, a “Yankee Jew,”16 
was lynched in Georgia on August 16, 1915 because of the rape and murder of a 14-
year-old girl, Mary Phagan, who was working in his factory.  For many years, 
lynching was also a way of extra-legal justice in the far West. Most of the victims 
were white, although a certain number of Native Americans, Asians, Mexicans, and 
African Americans were lynched.17  In Alaska and Wyoming the number of white 
lynchings was higher than black lynchings. In California, ten Chinese immigrants, 
fifteen Latinos, and ten Indians were lynched whereas only one victim was black. In 
addition, ethnic minorities were accused of crimes similar to the offences that blacks 
were held responsible for in other states like rape, theft, and murder.18   
 
5.2 Were Italians really “white”? 
 
 “Guineas,” “wops,” “dagoes,” and “dark whites.” These are some of the 
several nicknames with which Italian immigrants were associated in the late 
nineteenth-century United States. Italian immigrants in the United States had the 
right to be naturalized as American citizens, and thus, males gained the right to vote. 
                                                 
15 Tolnay, A Festival of Violence, 9. Carpetbaggers were the northerners who went to the southern 
states after the Civil War, and worked with southern Republicans, the scalawags. The term 
“carpetbagger” derives from the carpetbag luggage that these people carried. Both scalawags and 
carpetbaggers were hated by the southern Democrats during Reconstruction. 
16 Nancy MacLean, “The Leo Frank Case Reconsidered: Gender and Sexual Politics in the Making of 
Reactionary Populism,” The Journal of American History 78 (1991), 917.   
17 James Allen and Hilton Als, eds, al, Without Sanctuary: Lynching Photography in America (Santa 
Fe: Twin Palms Publishers, 2000), 13. 
18 For detail about the lynching statistics in the United States, see the ongoing “Project HAL: 
Historical American Lynching data Collection Project,” Elizabeth Hines, PhD, Eliza Steelwater, PhD, 
Principal Investigators, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, 
http://users.bestweb.net/~rg/lynchings, May 15, 2005. 
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 The place of Italian immigrants in the history of American lynchings is peculiar 
from this perspective. Blacks were largely disenfranchised by racist vigilantism and 
Jim Crow laws, and Italian immigrants were treated similarly. Italian mob victims 
“were second only to blacks in numbers of lynch victims in the years 1870 to 
1940,”19 and obviously the “native” Americans did not consider them “white”, but 
an “in-between” race which was above African and Asian Americans, but below 
“white” people.20 They were generally regarded as “white negroes.”21 Italian 
immigrants did not leave written records of their self perception as “white” or 
“black”; they were merely the “birds of passages” who aimed to go back to their 
motherland after earning enough money. 
Questions about the categories of Italian race were among the widely 
discussed issues in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Italy. Italians 
themselves tended to make a distinction between southern (meridionali) and 
northern Italians. For instance, in 1898, the Sicilian anthropologist Alfredo Niceforo 
stated that there were two different races in Italy, Northerners and Southerners. The 
meridionali were barbarians, “‘un popolo donna’” (a womanly people) in contrast to 
the more masculine northerners, and they could be transformed into modern men 
only after a process of civilization.22 Furthermore, the northern Italians perceived 
the Sicilians as “Turks” and “Africans” long before their migration to the United 
                                                 
19 Richard Gambino, Vendetta: The True Story of the Largest Lynching in U.S. History (Toronto: 
Guernica, 2000), 135.  
20 James R. Barrett and David Roediger, “Inbetween Peoples: Race, Nationality and the ‘New 
Immigrant’ Working Class,” Journal of American Ethnic History 16 (1997) on http://intl-
programs.uiowa.edu/projects/documents/INBETWEENPEOPLES.doc, August 17, 2005.    
21Clive Webb, “The Lynching of Sicilian Immigrants in the American South, 1886-1910,” American 
Nineteenth Century History 3 (2002), 57.    
22 Donna Gabaccia, “Race, Nation, Hyphen: Italian-Americans and American Multiculturalism in 
Comparative Perspective,” Jennifer Guglielmo and Salvatore Salerno ,eds. Are Italians White? How 
Race is Made in America (New York & London: Routledge, 2003), 53. 
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 States, and continued to call them as “little dark fellows” when they reached 
American shores.23          
The social, political and economic conditions of the Italians—mainly, 
Sicilians—in Louisiana are worth mentioning because of the New Orleans incident 
in 1891.  A report of an Italian official, Luigi Villiari, illustrates the significance of 
the peculiar relation between Italian immigrants and the natives of Louisiana in the 
early twentieth century. In 1906, Villiari discovered that a great number of the 
plantation owners in Louisiana did not regard the Italian immigrants as white 
people, and called them as “white-skinned negroes” who were better workers than 
the African Americans.24 Between 1880-1910, thousands of Sicilian immigrants 
went to Louisiana from Palermo to work in the sugarcane fields.25 “Italians, along 
with other immigrants, had been invited to Louisiana as early as 1865, when some 
planters were seeking ‘docile’ white to substitute for Negro laborers, and to enlarge 
the white electorate of the black parishes.”26  But apparently in 1890, the Italian 
immigrants in New Orleans were not recognized as a part of the white population by 
most of the “native” residents of the city.  The main reason for that repudiation was 
related to the ethnic and cultural differences of the Italians.  In general, they had 
come to Louisiana from Sicily, the part of Italy which was even alien to other 
Italians. Sicilians routinely chose to live in isolation to preserve their way of living 
in their “Little Palermos”, and the Americans did not favor that.  Moreover, the 
Italian immigrant community gained economic privileges in New Orleans through 
cooperation with the blacks.  There was no racial hostility between the two groups, 
                                                 
23 James R. Barrett, “Inbetween Peoples,” 16. 
24 Ibid., 19. 
25 Vincenza Scarpaci, “Walking the Color Line, Italian Immigrants in Rural Louisiana, 1880-1910” in 
Are Italians White?, 61.   
26 George E. Cunningham, “The Italian, a Hindrance to White Solidarity, 1890-1898,” The Journal of 
Negro History 50 (1965), 23. 
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 and that was not a typical circumstance of rural Louisiana.27  “Both Sicilians and 
blacks were quick to realize the mutual benefits to be gained from commerce with 
each other-for example, trading Italian vegetables and clothing for possum and 
alligator meat gotten by black hunters.”28  Furthermore, “the Italians were less 
sentimental about Louisiana’s past. Their economic outlook fitted more into the 
philosophy of the Populists than into that of the Democrats,”29 and their 
participation in politics would be a great threat to the political status quo.  In late- 
nineteenth century Louisiana, voting had become an important instrument for the 
Democratic Party to control the status quo, and wealthy plantation owners used their 
influence and money in the 1884, 1886, and 1888 elections. In 1896, Italians 
decided to vote for the Populist Party since the Democrats were making a plan about 
the disenfranchisement of the African Americans and Italians through “a suffrage 
amendment, based upon an educational and property qualification.”30 In order to 
protest it, Italians paraded on the streets of New Orleans on March 24, 1896 by 
showing the Italian flag. That was a big mistake since, for the “white” New 
Orleaners, this manifestation meant “Italians [were united] on the basis of 
nationality ... and organize[d] the foreign-born population against the natives, in 
order to foster their own personal interests.”31 In brief, by the end of the nineteenth 
century, the Italian immigrants became the enemies of the “native” population in 
Louisiana economically, politically, and socially. 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Scarpaci, “Walking the Color Line,” 68. 
28 Gambino, Vendetta, 56. 
29 Cunningham, “The Italian, a Hindrance,” 29. 
30 Cunningham, “The Italian, a Hindrance,” 29. 
31 Ibid. 30, from Times-Democrat, March 24, 1896. 
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 5.3. The Rehearsal & the Actual Mass Mob Lynching: Michael Cancemi and 
New Orleans 
 
As W. Fitzhugh Brundage states in Lynching in the New South, historians 
treat mass mobs as the most “typical” mobs.32 Suspects charged with rape or murder 
became the victims of mass mobs, and usually more than one person was murdered 
during mass mob lynchings. Sometimes lower-class whites, and sometimes the most 
prominent local residents became the members of these mobs, which numbered from 
hundreds to thousands, and they usually got local approval for their deeds.33 
Another important characteristic of mass mobs was the rituals, which occurred not 
as a result of uncontrolled violence, but as a disciplined rehearsal of right civi 
attitudes.34 In short, as Brundage states, mass mob lynchings had didactic aims, and 
that kind of violence was performed in order to protect social order from the 
intruders. In general, African Americans were the victims of mass mobs, but two 
lynchings incidents of Italians reveal the same features with this form of vigilantism.      
  The following extract is from a song sheet about the murder of a policeman 
named Eugene Anderson, killed by “the desperate Italian burglar,” Michael 
Cancemi, at the corner of Centre and Grand Streets, New York, on July 22, 1857: 
                                                 
32 For detail about the features of mass mobs, see Brundage, Lynching, 36-45 and Stovel, “Lynching 
in the Deep South,” 859.  
33 Ibid., 36, 37. 
34 Ibid., 40. 
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 Figure 5.1 The Murdered Policeman, Eugene Anderson, Who was shot by 
the Desperate Italian Burglar, Michael Cancemi…” 
 
 
The excitement was great beyond all control, 
Kill the murderer—yes lynch him—cried every soul, 
Take at all hazards the base monster vile 
And make the first lamp-post his funeral pile. 
To the Centre Street Tombs the mob sped their way, 
Resolved the murderer should die on that day, 
A rope was prepared, and a gallows likewise, 
To see him advancing watching all eyes. 
The butcher boys followed with determined will, 
The Italian to lynch who did Anderson kill, 
Give us the villain who murdered our friend— 
The carriage by thousands completely was penned.35
 
Thus, Italians had become the target of mob violence well before the 1880s.  
The murderer, Michael Cancemi, was in the end imprisoned as indicated in the song 
                                                 
35 “The Murdered Policeman, Eugene Anderson, Who was shot by the Desperate Italian Burglar, 
Michael Cancemi, corner of Centre and Grand Streets, July 22, 1857. Air-Indian Hunter, by 
Saugerties Bard.” America Singing: Nineteenth Century Song Sheets, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=amss&fileName=as1/as109020/amsspage.db&recNum=0&itemLink=D?amss:26:
./temp/~ammem_ZiqC:...POLICEMAN, April 8, 2005.    
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 and was convicted of murder at his second trial since the jury could not agree on the 
first one36, but the narration of the incident does not portray a typical white 
execution. Even in a city like New York in the antebellum period, Italians were 
treated differently from white people.  This event was the rehearsal of another 
incident of the late nineteenth century, which sparked a major diplomatic crisis 
between the United States and Italy. 
The New Orleans lynching in 1891 was a repetition of the Cancemi incident 
on a larger scale. In October 1890, New Orleans Police Chief David Hennessy was 
murdered while he was returning home.  Hennessy had become a popular figure, a 
local hero in New Orleans in 1881 when he arrested a Sicilian criminal, Giuseppe 
Esposito, who had escaped Italian authorities after his gang “Leone” had kidnapped 
an English tourist, John Forrester Rose, for ransom.  For two years, “it was a matter 
of Italy’s honor that [Esposito] be brought to justice by Italian authorities.”37  But 
Esposito escaped to the United States taking refuge in New Orleans. There, 
Hennessy captured Esposito.  That incident made Hennessy famous as a crime 
fighter in New Orleans, and a possible target for the Italian immigrants.  According 
to an editorial, “Hennessy in some way learned many of the secrets of the worst 
Italian societies transplanted from Italy.”38  
Hennessy’s friend Bill O’Connor reported that his last words before his death 
were “Dagoes did it.” Only O’Connor remembered Hennessy saying this in the nine 
hours it took him to die, but, nevertheless, “at the time of Hennessy’s death, some 
                                                 
36 “Monthly Record of Current Events.” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 16 (1858), 259. 
37 Gambino, Vendetta, 30. 
38 The New York Times, 17 October 1890.  
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 fifty Italians had already been arrested, and between one and two hundred more 
were to be taken during the next twenty-four hours.” 39   
The major figure in the Italians’ arrest was unquestionably the mayor of New 
Orleans, Joseph A. Shakspeare. The speech that he made to the City Council on 18 
October, 1890 demonstrated the mayor’s enthusiasm for the punishment of the 
murderers as well as his attitude about the Italian community in New Orleans: 
The circumstances of the cowardly deed, the arrest made and 
the evidence collected by the police department, show 
beyond doubt that [Hennessy] was the victim of the Sicilian 
vengeance, wreaked upon him as the chief representative of 
law and order in this community because he was seeking, by 
the power of our American law, to break up the fierce 
vendettas that have so often stained our streets with blood ... 
The Sicilian who comes here must become an American 
citizen, and subject his wrongs to the remedy of the law of 
the land, or else there must be no place for him on the 
American continent.40
  
For the investigation of the Hennessy murder, Mayor Shakspeare appointed 
the “Committee of Fifty” which acted independent of the police department.  The 
members of the committee were selected from the “native” citizens of New Orleans, 
and nineteen Italian immigrants were arrested: Pietro Monasterio, Joseph P. Macheca, 
Antonio Marchesi, Gaspare Marchesi, Antonio Scaffidi, Charles Matranga, 
Emmanuele Polizzi, Antonio Bagnetto, Bastian Incardona, James Caruso, Rocco 
Geraci, Frank Romero, Loretto Comitz, Charles Traina, Peter Natali, Charles Pietza, 
Charles Patorno, Salvatore Sinceri, and John Caruso. Of these nineteen names, the 
most significant one was Charles Matranga, one of the two important padroni in New 
Orleans.  The Matranga family was in rivalry with the Provenzanos for the control of 
an important part of the city’s food supply, and “according to unconfirmed accounts, 
Hennessy and the Provenzanos were part owners of a whorehouse called, 
                                                 
39 Gambino, Vendetta, 8. 
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 appropriately, the Red Lantern Club.”41  So Hennessy was hardly a paragon of 
morality himself. But Mayor Shakspeare convinced the whole nation that there was a 
fight against organized crime in New Orleans. 
The Italian Consul in New Orleans, Pasquale Corte, made a great effort to 
save the Italian immigrants in the city. He addressed a letter to Mayor Shakspeare, 
Asking him to calm the public excitement caused by the 
horrible crime and to see that the inoffensive prisoners be 
treated with the same consideration as those of other 
nationalities. The Consul [was] anxious that the assassins, 
whoever they [were], should be punished, but [did] not think 
it [was] just that an entire colony should be held responsible 
for the wrongdoings of a few of its worst representatives.42
             
Consul Corte also paid several visits to Governor Nicholls, even on the day 
of the lynching of the prisoners. But he could not prevent the approaching incident.  
On March 14, 1891, a mob of 6,000 New Orleaners, shouting, “Yes, yes, hang the 
dagoes!” lynched eleven Italians.  They hanged Antonio Bagnetto and Emmanuele 
Polizzi-with the help of three African Americans-on a lamppost and a tree; used 
them for “target practice,” and “some of the women of the city came and dipped 
their lace handkerchiefs in their blood as souvenirs, and crowds of souvenir hunters 
stripped the barks from the trunk of tree on which Bagnetto was hanging.”43  The 
victims of the incident were accused of crimes that were believed to be innate to the 
Italian race, which was not regarded as a part of the “white” race: 
These sneaking and cowardly Sicilians, the descendants of 
bandits and assassins, who have transplanted to this country 
the lawless passions, the cutthroat practices, and the oath-
bound societies of their native country, are to us a past 
without mitigations. Our own rattlesnakes are as good 
citizens as they. Lynch law was the only course open to the 
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 people of New Orleans to stay the issue of a new license to 
the Mafia to continue its bloody practices.44
 
 
5.4 The Tampa Lynching: Terrorist Mob or Posse Violence  
 
Similar to the Ku Klux Klan, “night riders” and “whitecappers” that targeted 
the African Africans for punishment, the citizens committee of Tampa was 
organized to discipline the Italian and other Latin strikers in the city through a 
murderous ritual. It was not analogous to the burning crosses of the Klan members, 
but the victims were left hanged on a tree with signals that signified who was de 
facto principal authority in Tampa.45  
Two Sicilian immigrants, Castenego Ficcarotta and Angelo Albano, were 
murdered in Tampa, on September 20, 1910, during a strike of the Cigar Makers 
International Union (CMIU) against the cigar shop owners. The cigar industry was 
the lifeblood of Tampa’s economy, but Tampa witnessed two other strikes before 
the one in 1910, one in 1899, and another in 1901. Consequently, the businessmen 
in Tampa used vigilante violence to repress the workers.46 Cigar industry workers 
were ethnically diverse—Cuban, Spanish and Italian—but they overcame their 
ethnic differences within their unions. Before the Italian immigrants, the Hispanic 
workers were organizing in the city, but the arrival of the Italians “brought a new 
wave of socialists and anarchists. Many of the Italians came from a section of Sicily 
which had experienced rural uprisings, led in part by socialists, during the 1890s.”47  
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 They also supported a radical newspaper named La Voce dello Schiavo [The Voice 
of the Slave].48 In a short time, Italian immigrants in Tampa began to be identified 
like their Latin neighbors, as the “undesired elements,” “radicals,” and “anarchists.” 
The Spanish and Cuban immigrants were the strike leaders, “but Italians were 
active in the ranks and in supplying street-corner oratory that helped to maintain 
worker solidarity.”49 The attitude toward this ethnic group among the white citizens 
can easily be understood from a 1909 editorial in the Tampa Morning Tribune that 
referred to the number of assassinations within the Italian community: “... not one 
Italian has been punished for any degree of homicide. The spectacle of two or three 
Italians hanging from the gallows would be very edifying and effective about 
now.”50   
Opposition to the ethnic minorities in Tampa preeminently revealed itself in 
the actions of the so-called citizens’ committees. Citizens’ committees were groups 
of leading businessmen “act[ing] as vigilante groups, though many times sanctioned 
by local law. These committees used whatever means, legal or not, to cleanse their 
communities of ‘undesirable elements’.”51  In the 1901 strike, the citizens 
committee of Tampa forced thirteen union leaders to go to Honduras permanently, 
and in 1910, they lynched two Italian immigrants.    
The two Italians, Ficcarotta, a forty-five year old unemployed man accused 
of killing his cousin and found innocent by a jury a year before the incident, and 
Albano, a twenty-five year old insurance salesman and a former cigar worker, were 
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 “accused of shooting J. F. Easterling, a bookkeeper.”52 Easterling was employed at 
the Bustilla and Díaz Cigar Company, and had pulled a gun at one of the members 
of the union organizing committee. That event apparently made the bookkeeper a 
target for the union members.  On September 14, 1910, when Easterling was 
entering the factory at 1:30 in the afternoon, he was shot. The Tribune called 
Easterling “the first American” who had been assaulted, and warned he should be 
“the very last American to be attacked, in this bold, bloodthirsty manner.”53  When 
Easterling was shot, there was a huge crowd of Cuban and Italian workers in the 
factory demonstrating. However, only the two Italians were arrested. Consequently, 
Ficcarotta and Albano were “lynched by citizens of West Tampa with the 
connivance of the local police authorities,”54 while they were being transferred to 
the jail on September 20. They were found hanging from a huge oak tree, still 
handcuffed together, with a sign pinned to Albano’s trousers saying: “Others take 
notice or go the same way. We know seven more. We are watching. If any more 
citizens molested, look out. (signed) Justice.”55
 
                                                 
52 James Allen, Without Sanctuary, 168. 
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    Figure 5.1 Albano and Ficcarotta 
    Source: http://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~~jcane/Iron_Eyes_Cody.htm, February 14, 2007.     
   
  “The English language press pictured [the Italians] as hired assassins, ‘tools 
of anarchistic elements in the city,’ describing their fate ironically as a ‘rebuke to 
lawlessness’.”56 Their lynching was the indigenous form of violence by which the 
native citizens of Tampa responded to immigrants’ disruption of the economic 
order, through violence.  The confidential report the Italian vice-consul at New 
Orleans, Gaetano Moroni, about the Tampa investigation depicted the event as a 
conspiracy: 
The lynching itself was not the outcome of a temporary 
outburst of popular anger, but was rather planned, in cold 
blood, to the most trifling detail, by some citizens of West 
Tampa with the tacit assent of a few police officers, and all 
with the intention of teaching an awful lesson to the strikers 
of the cigar factories who had passed from quiet protest to 
acts of violence against the manufacturers, and, at the same 
time, of getting rid of two ‘terrible ruffians’.57   
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  “A crescendo of violence followed the lynchings”58 in Tampa. Cigar 
industry workers used arson as a vehicle to act against business owners and their 
allies. They destroyed a cigar factory, and the firemen managed to save the Tribune 
building at the last moment. Eventually, the citizens’ committee took the control of 
Tampa, and on January 25, 1911 the strike came to an end. 
 
5.5 Private Lynchings: Hahnville, Tallulah & Erwin 
 
Private lynchings in the southern states were based on private vengeance.59 
They were usually the consequences of arguments and threats, and thus they were 
not public events in which hundreds of people took an active part, but consisted of 
small groups of people. Private mobs acted in secrecy, sometimes carried their 
victims to the place of the alleged crime, and the victims were already in legal 
custody when they were lynched.60 Three other Italian lynchings in the southern 
states share the same characteristics of these private incidents, and they are worth 
revealing since their details are not widely known among the historians of lynching.      
On August 9 1896, three Italians, Lorenzo Salardino, Salvatore Arena and 
Giuseppe Venturella, all Italian subjects, were lynched in Hahnville, Louisiana. 
Venturella and Arena had already been imprisoned for two months for the murder 
of a Spaniard, Joaquin Roxino. Salardino, with another Italian, Connel Marini, his 
son and his wife, had been charged with the murder of Jules Gueymard at his store 
at Freetown.61 At midnight, a group of armed men ordered the jailer, who was 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
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 African American, to open the door and took out the three Italians who were crying 
and begging for mercy. The “crowd took them to a stable a short distance away, 
gave them two minutes in which to pray,”62 and then hanged them. The group 
waited for a few minutes, then opened fire at the dead bodies, and finally 
dissolved.63 The lynching was performed to avenge the murder of Jules Gueymard, 
who was a prominent citizen of St. Charles Parish. Gueymard had a difficulty only 
with Salardino, an agricultural laborer and barber, who had threatened Gueymard 
after his testimony in a suit brought by creditors against Salardino.64 Venturella and 
Arena were convicted of the murder of Roxino, a respectable and quiet old man, 
who was in business of gathering moss like the two Sicilians. One day, he was 
found dead along a road, and Venturella and Arena were arrested since they had a 
strong grudge against Roxino.65 The United States officials asserted that the 
lynching was done not because of the race of the Italians, but because of “the 
intense feeling created by the murder of Gueymard,”66 but that was not a reasonable 
explanation for the assassination of the other Italians who had been convicted with 
the death of Roxino.   
In addition, there was no sufficient evidence for the Italians’ guilt, but “it 
appeared that the Italians now had the sympathy of the Negroes, for ‘a large number 
of Negroes and Italians were present at the burial [of the victims] and went home 
from the scene almost terror-stricken.”67   In the end, the United States paid an 
indemnity of $6,000 to the relatives of the lynched men, all Italian subjects.  
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   The Tallulah lynching in 1899 shared characteristics with the New Orleans 
lynching.  Firstly, Tallulah was also in Louisiana. The victims, Frank Difatta-a fruit 
vendor and small grocer68- his brothers, Joseph and Charles, Rosario Fiducia and 
Giovanni Cirone were all Sicilian immigrants and Italian subjects.  They were 
accused of shooting Dr. J. Ford Hodge, a prominent member of the “white” 
community, although Hodge later recovered from his wounds. 
The Sicilians were captured, a mob gathered and hanged them. Giuseppe 
Defina, an Italian subject and the brother-in-law of one of the lynched men,69 
brought to the acting Italian consul at New Orleans a list of names of persons of 
Tallulah who wanted to lynch him.  Defina stated in his affidavit that he had a shop 
for provisions and articles in Millikens Bend, Louisiana, and “by [his] good 
conduct [he] soon acquired a reputation in the village for honesty above the other 
shopkeepers, and thereby gained many customers ... and was able to lend money 
and sell [his] goods on credit to the families.”70  According to Defina’s affidavit, if 
a Dr. Ward had not warned him at the proper time, he would not have the chance to 
escape to Vicksburg, Mississippi, and would have been lynched by an angry mob. 
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Figure 5.3  FIVE POOR ITALIANS 
Lynched in Talulah [sic] in America  
Source: Edward H. Haas, “Guns, Goats, and Italians: The Tallulah Lynching of 
1899”  
 
In response, Enrico Cavalli, the representative of the Italian consulate in New 
Orleans, traveled to Tallulah, but he was not welcomed there. However, from his 
observations it was obvious that “all the persons composing the population of that 
village had taken part directly in the murder or had consented to it.”71  Cavalli added 
that on the day of the incident a shopkeeper stated that he would provide “whisky 
and beer gratis to [the villagers] if they would lynch the Italians, Frank Difatta, 
Rosario Fiducia and [Giovanni] Cirone.”72  The motive for killing the Italians was 
also apparent; there was “a spirit of rivalry in trade ... [and] a desire to prevent the 
Italians from voting.”73  Italian merchants were selling goods to African Americans 
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72 Ibid., 727. 
73 Ibid. 
 153
 at lower prices because of the cultural affinity between the two groups that 
developed as a result of Italians’ humane attitude toward black customers.74   
The beginning of the twentieth century saw the continuation of this pattern 
with an incident in Mississippi. In July 1901, at Erwin, Mississippi, two Italian 
subjects from Cefalu, Sicily, Giovanni and Vincenzo Serio, “were attacked and 
killed by an armed mob,”75 and a third one, Salvatore Liberto, “was wounded, under 
the circumstances which constituted a lynching.”76  As in the lynching in Hahnville, 
Louisiana, the Italian government demanded the punishment of the guilty people by 
the federal government of the United States.  Secretary of State John Hay replied 
that he would transfer the Italian ambassador’s note to the governor of Mississippi 
who would certainly take action.77  However, the United States government 
reminded the Italian officials of the federal nature of the American government, 
which prevented the federal government in Washington from prosecuting the case in 
Mississippi. Later, a jury in Mississippi, composed of six people, stated “We, the 
jury, sitting as an inquest upon the bodies of Vincin Cerio [sic] and Joe Cerio [sic], 
do find that the said [people] came to their death by the act of God, in that they died 
from gunshot wounds at the hands of unknown parties to this jury.”78  The state 
government of Mississippi could not find the murderers of the Italian subjects, and 
simply declared them unknown, but the Italian ambassador narrated the incident in a 
different manner: 
Vincenzo Serio one of the victims, eight months ago had a 
dispute in regard to a horse of his that was found on the 
property of an American citizen. The latter, and other citizens 
of Glen Allen, armed with guns, attempted to murder Serio, 
whom they left wounded, but who succeeded in escaping to 
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 Greenville[sic]. Lately, having returned for the purpose of 
rejoining his father, Giovanni Serio (the other victim), at 
Glen Allen, the citizens ordered him to leave the village 
within thirty days ... At Glen Allen no secret was made of the 
preparations for the lynching ... At Erwin, Glenville, and 
Glen Allen everyone is afraid to speak, but knows that the 
citizens of Glen Allen are the organizers and authors of the 
lynching.79
 
Despite the efforts of the Italian ambassador, the murderers of the Sicilians were   
not found. 
 
5.6 Italian Lynchings in Colorado 
 
Colorado has an important and undiscovered place in the history of Italian 
lynchings. Several Italian immigrants became victims of mob violence in Colorado, 
which demonstrates resemblance to black lynchings in the southern states. In 
Lynching in Colorado, 1859-1919, Stephen J. Leonard shows that Italian lynchings 
started in Colorado due the increase in the number of Italian immigrants. Colorado 
lynchings appear to have been the outcomes of economic insufficiency and lack of 
work in the late nineteenth century, but the features of the incidents refer to a more 
complex formation which was also related to race relations. A review of  the details 
of these incidents will show that Italian lynchings were not peculiar only to the 
southern states. Thus, two of the lynchings in Colorado will be discussed in this 
part. 
As early as 1881, conflict began to arise between the Italian immigrants and 
the residents of Colorado. The first incident occurred in Poverty Flats between 
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 Americans and Italians that resulted with the destruction of a house.80 Nevertheless, 
the lynching of Daniel Arata, a manager of a hotel and a saloon in Denver, is a 
significant incident that exposes characteristics of a mass mob lynching in the late 
nineteenth-century American west. 
On July 25, 1893 Arata was lynched because of the murder of one of his 
customers named Lightfoot, who was a Civil War veteran. It was alleged that Arata 
beat and shot the sixty-two-year-old man when he did not pay five cents for his 
second beer. Arata was arrested, and taken to the Arapahoe County jail. An angry 
mob including women and the prominent citizens of Denver, marched to the jail, 
shouting, “We’re going to lynch the Dago.”81 They eventually found Arata in the 
prison, wounded him in the stomach with a knife, took him out, and hanged him. 
The crowd also wanted to burn him, but could not accomplish that because of 
rain.82 Instead, similar to Polizzi in New Orleans, they hanged his body from a 
telegraph pole, and chopped pieces from the bloody pole.83 The Arata lynching did 
not cause a crisis between Italy and the United States because the victim was a 
native-born American citizen, though of Italian ancestry.     
However, Lorenzo Andinino, Francesco Ronchietto, and Stanislao Vittone 
were Italian subjects when they were murdered in Walsenburg, Colorado, on March 
14, 1895. This event caused another diplomatic problem between the two countries. 
The Walsenburg incident is also significant in the sense that it demonstrates the 
aspects of a typical southern private lynching. However, the victims were not 
Sicilians like the other ones; they came from Turin. Everything started with the 
rumors that a party of Italians at Rouse murdered Abner Hixon, the keeper of a 
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 saloon, on March 11, 1895. Hixon was from Arkansas and thirty-six years old, and 
he was known as a quiet person. It was claimed that Italian miners Antonio Gobetti 
held Hixon, and Andinino (or, Danino) hit him on his head with a table leg on the 
road to Walsenburg to Rouse, and some workmen from the mines discovered 
Hixon’s dead body with his fractured head.84
On March 13, Andinino and his alleged counterparts, Francesco Ronchietto, 
Stanislao Vittone, Pietro Giacobini, and Antonio Gobetti were arrested for the 
murder of Hixon. When they were on their way to the prison under the custody of 
two armed sheriffs, a man on horseback met the wagon on Bear Creek Bridge, and 
ordered the driver to stop.85 Then, four or five other people on horseback shot the 
Italians in the back with revolvers. Vittone was killed instantly, Ronchietto was 
wounded in his heart, and Gobetto and Giacobini took flight. The driver, Joseph 
Welsby also died.86 Around 1 o’clock on March 14, a group of seven armed and 
masked men broke into the Walsenburg jail, deceived the guard by calling for the 
sheriff, and shot Andinino and Ronchietto to death, but spared other prisoners of 
German origin who were in the same cell.87 Order was restored in Walsenburg on 
the same day, only the Italians in Denver were “watched by the police to prevent 
any organized attempt at retaliation.”88 Italy asked for the punishment of the 
murderers, but the consequence was the same with the other lynchings; the families 
of the victims were paid indemnities by the United States Treasury, and the case 
was closed. 
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 5.7 Italian and American Reactions to Italian Lynchings 
 
The New Orleans lynching of 1891 caused a diplomatic crisis between the 
United States and Italy. In order to understand the reasons for the crisis, a treaty 
signed between the United States and Italy on February 26, 1871 should be 
discussed briefly. The treaty’s third article guaranteed the protection of the citizens 
of both countries: 
The citizens of each of the High Parties to the convention will receive 
within the States and territories of the other one, the most continuous 
protection and security to their personal lives and properties, 
benefiting to this end of the same rights and privileges which are 
already provided or shall be provided to the national citizens, as long 
as they submit themselves also to the same conditions imposed on 
these ones.89
 
  Relying on the 1871 treaty, the Italian government declared that a crime had 
been committed in New Orleans against the Italian subjects living in America. The 
Italian Ambassador in Washington, Baron Francesco Fava, presented the evidence to 
the United States with the reports of Consul Corte. The United States government 
indicated its dual nature, and stated that the federal government did not have a right 
to intervene in state or local matters. Italy then asked for the payment of an 
indemnity to the families of the lynched Italian subjects and also for the punishment 
of guilty people, but the executioners of the eleven Italians were never brought to 
justice.  Consequently, the Italian government recalled Baron Fava in 1892 in 
dissatisfaction of his ineffectiveness.  In the end, President Benjamin Harrison 
ordered the payment of the indemnity of $24,330.90, and the Italian ambassador 
returned to Washington. 
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 The remarkable point that should be emphasized regarding the New Orleans 
crisis is the solidarity of the Italian immigrants.  It is important in the sense that this 
solidarity signifies the development of Italian nationalism on American soil, a 
transformation from campanilismo to italianità.  The Italian American organizations 
in major cities like Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York held demonstrations for 
the Sicilian victims of the lynching.  With “analogous lively meetings held in 
[different cities] people dressed in mourning ... [and] requested the sending of a 
warship, if necessary.”90  In addition, major Italian American newspapers like Il 
Progresso Italo-Americano and L’Eco d’Italia asked for the support of Europe as 
well as the Italian government by stating that “Italy must have reparation, and the 
nations of Europe must aid [Italians] in getting this reparation.”91   
There were similar developments in Italy where people protested the 
lynching of the Sicilians in New Orleans, and the newspaper Popolo Romano 
declared, “Relying on the foresight of the American authorities and out of regard for 
a sincerely friendly power, Italy [had] refrained from sending an ironclad to the 
mouth of the Mississippi.”92   However, there were also other Italian voices that 
manifested the “latent bourgeois’ respectability in disapproving the conduct of some 
groups of emigrants, especially from the South, which perpetrated and exported the 
methods and goals of the Mafia into distant foreign regions.”93 The Milanese 
newspaper, Il Corriere della Sera, was the most significant example of that attitude.  
The newspaper reported the New Orleans lynching with the headline: “Guilt of the 
Sicilians Lynched in New Orleans.”94  Rather than emphasizing the Italian 
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 nationality of the victims, the newspaper referred only to their southern origin, and 
asserted that they were killed because of their “guilt,” presumably because of being 
the members of a secret organization.  In addition, in a letter sent to Il Corriere della 
Sera, which was published on the front page, one I. M. Guastalla affirmed that most 
of the Italian emigrants were mafia members, who were also responsible for the 
death of many Americans: 
Italian colonies leave a lot to be desired in America and 
Africa,  
because, with the exception of a few honest people, they are 
composed of many ‘scoundrels’ escaped from justice, and in 
New Orleans there is a flowering of secret societies that carry 
out the murders of so many American citizens, and which 
have remained unpunished.95  
 
Italian regional prejudice helps us understand why American lynchings of 
Italians did not compromise the positive image of America in Italy. However, 
Sicilians were more devoted to the troubles of the Sicilian immigrants in America.  
An article entitled “American Savagery” in the Sicilian newspaper, Giornale di 
Sicilia, stated, “it was unfair to ‘throw mud on an entire generous people, as 
civilized as any other.’” 96  Italy had to unite and protect the rights of its people 
abroad. In addition, at a conference held in Palermo on May 3, 1891, a lawyer, 
Alberico Pincitore stated,  “the federal government [of the United States had] to 
have all its interest in resolving the problem in Italy’s favor, and cooperate with [the 
Italians] for that,” and added that “Italy’s policy [had to be] of patience and 
firmness.”97  That was “how [they could] win against America.”98  The Italian 
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 argument about U.S. protection of immigrants relied on Art. VI, Section 2 of the 
U.S. Constitution: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and the Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in 
every State, shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution of Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
 
For Pincitore, “this article pronounce[d] that the treaty signed with Italy 
ha[d] the power of supreme law like the [U.S.] Constitution in the United States 
territory, and because of that, the federal government ha[d] to impose the 
observation of the treaty in the same manner and the same force that it [did] 
respecting the Constitution.”99  From the Italian perspective, the federal 
government had to have the sufficient authority over the whole United States, and 
that could only be achieved by enforcing the federal laws.100   
Pincitore argued that if “the law of granting protection and security to the Italians in 
America was only for one particular State, the federal government would not have 
been included in the treaty with Italy in 1871.101   As also declared in the 14th 
Amendment, the citizens of the individual states were also “the citizens of the 
United States, and in [Italians’] case, the judges had to be the federal 
magistrates.”102  Pincitore’s argument, or understanding, was very clear: Only the 
articles of the Constitution and the 1871 Italo-American treaty were valid in the 
Italians’ situation; state law did not apply.  
Traditionally, however, the United States government did not involve itself 
in local and state law enforcement of civil rights. The United States Supreme Court 
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 upheld this jurisdictional arrangement in the Slaughterhouse cases, 83, U.S. 36 
(1873), by differentiating “state citizenship” from “national citizenship.” In effect, 
for American authorities, the 1871 Treaty conferred rights of national citizenship on 
Italian immigrants, but not rights of state citizenship. This was the legal rationale 
for the United States federal government’s weak response to the Italian lynchings. 
Another document approached the New Orleans lynching from a different 
point of view. Referring to the alleged American idea that “when justice did not 
function properly, the lynch law became a legitimate way,”103 Pietro Nocito, a 
member of the parliament, and a famous Sicilian jurist and professor of law in the 
University of Rome, referred to the New Orleans lynching as a “complete barbarous 
act.”104  He stated that the acts of the New Orleaners became legitimate to 
Americans since they were thinking that they were fighting against the mafia.  
Nocito also recalled an incident in 1851 when Spanish subjects were wounded in the 
United States. As a result of that event, the U.S. government paid reparation to 
Spain. He indicated “the American minister James G. Blaine, in his note ... 
remembered the diplomatic incident between the United States and Spain, but forgot 
that American Congress had admitted the principle of indemnity in a case more 
remote [than the New Orleans lynching].”105  Nocito added that he believed in “the 
good intentions of the American government for the completion of penal justice.”106  
As a consequence of the crisis between the countries, Italy would not wish to declare 
war on the United States, “but there [was] also an abyss between war and 
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 resignation, between the rumble of the cannons of [Italian] battleships and the 
silence of [Italian] diplomacy.”107
  Gino Speranza108, an Italian American who was born and raised in the 
United States, and who was also the founder of the Society for the Protection of 
Italian Immigrants, approached United States federalism from an entirely Italian 
point of view. In his 1904 article entitled, “How It Feels to Be a Problem” he asked 
what would have happened if Americans were lynched in Italy: 
                    What appeal can the doctrine of state supremacy and federal non- 
                            interference make to [the Italian immigrant]? Imagine what you 
                            would think of Italian justice if the American sailors in Venice, in 
                            resisting arrest by the constituted authorities, had been strung upto 
                            a telegraph pole by an infuriated Venetian mob, and the 
                            government at Rome had said, with the utmost courtesy: ‘We are  
                            very sorry and greatly deplore it, but we can’t interfere with the   
                            autonomy of the province of Venetial!...109
 
In brief, the Italian authorities as well as the Sicilian intellectuals were aware 
that there was federalism in the United States, but their attitude about the issue was 
different from that of the Americans. The United States officials indicated the 
federal government’s limits of authority over the states, but Italy continued to 
emphasize the omnipotence of a federal ruler by referring to the American laws and 
the Constitution, and especially to the treaty signed between the United States and 
Italy. Giuseppe Mazzini’s earlier critique of American federalism was vindicated. 
The response of the American public to the New Orleans lynching was best 
reflected in the newspapers. There were different voices about the assassination of 
the Italians. Often in the local newspapers like the Picayune and the Times-
Democrat of New Orleans, the actions of the “native” citizens, were justified.  Apart 
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 from that, one of the points that the lynching supporters indicated was the 
connection between the murdered Italians and organized crime. Most Americans 
considered the victims of the incident as the members of the mafia, so their murder 
was a natural reaction to save the order of the country: 
Such a society is not only an offence against civilization and 
decent citizenship; it is itself ‘Lynch Law’ organized and  
made permanent. Here was a society which was a continuous 
conspiracy against everything that is righteous and civilized. 
The lynchers of New Orleans were “law-abiding” men in the 
sense that they waited for the administration of justice 
according to law before undertaking to execute justice not 
according to law.110
 
In “Lynch Law and Unrestricted Immigration,” Henry Cabot Lodge revealed 
the same attitude about the lynched Italians and their connection to the mafia. He 
asserted, “the men who were killed were members of the Mafia, a secret society 
bound by the most rigid oaths and using murder as a means of maintaining its 
discipline and carrying out its decrees.”111 Lodge also indicated that the secret 
organizations like the mafia were completely alien to American culture, and they 
were “the product[s] of repressive government on the continent of Europe.”112  In 
his opinion, those organizations were formed after the immigration of the European 
people to the American continent, but the tendency to commit a crime did “come 
not from race peculiarities, but from the quality of certain classes of immigrants of 
all races.”113  Nevertheless, he also indicated that the best immigrants to America 
were from Germany and Scandinavia.  In order to prevent the arrival of “alien” 
people, Lodge concluded that Congress had to bring certain regulations to southern 
European immigration to the United States. 
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 As noted earlier, some Italians called for military action in response to the 
New Orleans incident. The Italian navy was the third largest navy of the world in the 
late nineteenth century, and thus, the New Orleans incident created a short-time war 
scare in the United States. For the first time after the Civil War, “the sudden war 
scare climate ... galvanized the whole United States into true national unity.”114  But, 
in fact, apart from some individual declarations, the Italian government did not have 
the intention to declare war on America.  However, Americans took the war scare 
with Italy seriously.  “Besides preaching the gospel of national unity in the face of 
the Italian threat, [the war scare] also emphasized [the Americans’] belief that 
sectionalism would disappear in the event of hostilities.”115  The consequences of 
the New Orleans lynching that created a war scare in the United States became 
significant elements in the reunion of the southern and northern states, and the 
establishment of a new navy that represented the new American expansionist foreign 
policy. By the 1890s, the United States navy was one of the most powerful and 
modern navies of the world which could repel alien forces from the American 
continent. It became one of the symbols of American national greatness. 
The consequences of the Walsenburg, Hahnville and Tallulah lynchings 
were similar to the New Orleans incident: the Italian government asked for the trial 
of the guilty people, the American government stated that the victims were all 
naturalized United States citizens at the time of their lynchings, but Italians asked 
for and eventually received an indemnity for the murdered men who were mostly 
Italian subjects. In Walsenburg, the Department of State declared that “a high and 
honorable sense of justice w[ould] determine a suitable amount to indemnify the 
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 families of the victims of the Colorado mob.”116 In the Hahnville incident, the 
United States paid an indemnity of $6,000 to the relatives of the lynched men.  
  About the Tallulah lynching, the Italian ambassador Baron Fava sent all the 
information about the incident to the U.S. government on January 15, 1900, and he 
also referred to Article 1018 of the Louisiana Statutes, which indicated the duty of 
the attorney general of the state to take action if judges did not act on the case.  U.S. 
Secretary of State John Hay replied to the ambassador after thirty days, indicating 
that he “immediately sent [the report] to the governor of Louisiana.”117 On April 
17, 1900, the Italian ambassador received a message from Acting Secretary David 
J. Hill, which enclosed a message from District Attorney W. S. Holmes to Governor 
Murphy James Foster.  The governor asserted that all the witnesses had testified, 
swearing they knew nothing about the event and the grand jury’s investigation into 
the Tallulah lynching “ha[d] been thorough and ha[d] resulted in failure to 
implicate anyone.”118  Baron Fava stated that with this verdict the violations of the 
1871 treaty became more apparent, and in order to prevent a recurrence of the crime 
in the future, Fava demanded the president to take action against the failures of the 
states as in the case of Louisiana.119  The discussion between Italian and American 
authorities came to an end in December 1900 with President William McKinley’s 
message to Congress in which he referred to the 1871 treaty and Italy’s demand for 
justice: 
I renew the urgent recommendations I made last year that the 
Congress appropriately confer upon the Federal courts 
jurisdiction in this class of international cases where the 
ultimate responsibility of the Federal Government may be 
involved, and I invite action upon the bills to accomplish this 
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 which were introduced in the Senate and House. It is 
incumbent upon us to remedy the statutory omission which 
has led, and may again lead, to such untoward results ... Its 
enactment is a simple measure of previsory justice toward the 
nations with which we as a sovereign equal make treaties 
requiring reciprocal observance.120
   
The policy of the United States did not change in the Erwin lynching. After 
nearly six months of correspondence, on January 2 1902, David J. Hill informed the 
Italians “the Senate and House of Representatives [were going to] have under 
consideration the president’s recommendation that indemnity be graciously 
tendered to the families of the victims and that legislation be enacted to give the 
Federal courts original jurisdiction of treaty offenses against aliens.”121
  An important detail about the Erwin lynching is the Italian government’s 
attitude about the incident.  The message that the U.S. ambassador G. V. L. Meyer 
sent to John Hay on December 23, 1901 revealed the reaction of the Italian Senate 
to the lynching.  The message enclosed a translation of an extract from the 
newspaper, Tribuna of December 21.  According to the reports, the foreign affairs 
minister Giulio Prinetti declared that Italy was going to accept the indemnity 
offered by the U.S. government, but the Italian government was also expecting that 
the federal government would achieve its promise “for the future to use all possible 
efforts to prevent the repetition of similar occurrences.”122  Prinetti also emphasized 
the importance of Italian emigration to “far regions [where] the Italians were 
received with a great measure of benevolent hospitality.”123  The Italian 
government considered that U.S.-Italian relations could not be sacrificed over the 
murder of a small number of Italian immigrants, especially those of southern Italian 
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 origin. Again, Italian regional prejudice undermined the stated Italian goal of 
national unification. 
The Tampa lynching also concluded with the payment of an indemnity to 
the Italian victim. At the time of the incident, Ficcarotta was a naturalized 
American but Albano was still an Italian subject, thus the Italian government again 
asked for an immediate punishment and for the payment of indemnity of $6,000 to 
Albano’s mother.124  President Woodrow Wilson recommended Congress to pay an 
indemnity to Albano’s family “as an act of grace and without reference to the 
question of the liability of the United States.”125  Consequently, the U.S. 
government paid the indemnity, the Italian ambassador “warmly thank[ed] [the 
Secretary of State] for [his] official and cordial action, by which this painful 
occurrence ha[d] been satisfactorily settled,”126 and the case was closed. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
 
After the New Orleans lynching, the U.S. House of Representatives “took 
up the  subject of lynching, albeit briefly, and for the first time, a number of states 
adopted official remedies for lynching, enacting legislation to punish collusion and 
the dereliction of duty on the part of sheriffs, jailers, and other officers.” 127  Federal 
efforts for a law which would make “any State violation of international treaties a 
federal juridical case”128 commenced with President Benjamin Harrison in 
December 1891. “Following out the president’s request, Senator Sherman 
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 introduced a resolution instructing the Committee on Foreign Relations to draw up 
a bill to protect the treaty rights of aliens.”129  That was basically about a more 
powerful federal control over the states concerning international legal cases, and the 
prosecution of the criminals in federal courts.  The Sherman Act was introduced on 
March 2, 1892, but Congress did not pass it as a law. In 1911, the Republican 
Missouri representative Leonidas C. Dyer, “who represented a largely black 
constituency in St. Louis,”130 introduced an anti-lynching law, but Congress again 
did not pass it. Questions about the Dyer Bill’s constitutionality arose, centered on 
its provision for federal punishment of lynchers which critics believed was federal 
encroachment on the jurisdiction of states.131  But finally, “the Dyer Bill of 1922 
[that Congress passed] included a clause for the protection of aliens, adopting the 
form suggested in 1891,”132 and reflecting a significant strengthening of federal 
authority after World War I.           
The lynchings of the Italian immigrants in the United States in the late 
nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries were the results of a variety of social, 
political, and economic causes. The negative Italian stereotype that had its origin in 
the 1850s created the bias against the immigrants in America and the influence of 
ethnic stereotypes exerted an influence in subsequent lynchings.133 A short time 
after their arrival, the southern Italian contadini [peasants] were put into the same 
place with blacks, especially in southern states. Most of the Italians, as a result of 
the Italian government’s policies about emigration, saw America as a model 
country filled with economic opportunity. Thus, they perceived America as a 
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 temporary residence where they could obtain material welfare and then return to 
their homeland.  Their isolation in the United States was a natural outcome of that 
belief, but that remoteness deteriorated the situation. Additionally, the alleged 
Italian involvement in organized crime and anarchism made the Italian immigrant 
more unwanted.  He was perceived as a peril to the white solidarity in America. The 
aftermath of the lynchings demonstrated the diplomatic complexities and 
confusions between the United States and Italy.  Italy, whose statesmen did not 
grasp the meaning of American federalism entirely, considered the incidents as 
diplomatic breakdowns between Italy and the United States that violated the 1871 
Treaty, and urged the U.S. government to take federal action against criminals.  
Simultaneously, the Italian officials could not risk the economic benefits of the 
Italian emigration to the United States, and therefore maintained a moderate policy.  
The United States, meanwhile, starting with the Harrison administration, “faced 
either the domestic political death-trap of tampering with State Rights by modifying 
the Constitutional separation of Federal and State powers, or risked offending 
traditional nationalist and isolationist feelings by ‘caving-in’ to a European 
Power.”134  Only as the United States was enacting strict immigration restriction 
laws did it also enact a federal anti-lynching law. Nonetheless, the presence and 
controversy of Italians who were victims of lynching eventually contributed to the 
strengthening of federal authority over “states’ rights.”  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE MALFATTORI: ITALIAN ANARCHISM AND ITALIAN 
ANARCHISTS IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE WORLD 
WAR I 
 
 
 As the Italian anarchist Errico Malatesta noted in his L’Anarchia [Anarchy] 
in 1891, anarchism comes from the Greek word anarchos meaning “without a 
government.”1 It is old as the formation of the first state, and distinguished from 
other political theories because of its rejection of power, formal organization, hence 
the state.2 It was initiated as the individual’s reaction to the will of the tribe, and 
grew as “the credo of the idealist who discovered that power corrupts and must be 
destroyed at its source.”3 Anarchism was transformed into a social doctrine in 
modern times with the rise of the age of the reason and then the French Revolution. 
Anarchism became a distinctive ideology in Europe during the era of the First 
International and the Paris Commune. It became powerful in the 1870s and 1880s in 
Italy when the political philosophies of  Michael Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin were 
adopted in the society. 
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Italian anarchist violence in Europe became extremely intense in the late 
nineteenth century when Sante Geronimo Caserio killed the French president Sadi 
Carnot in 1894, Michele Angiolillo shot the Spanish prime minister Antonio 
Canovas in 1897, Luigi Luccheni killed Empress Elizabeth of Austria in Geneva in 
1898 and finally when Gaetano Bresci killed the Italian King Umberto I in 1900. 
 All the Italian assassins of the late nineteenth century manifested the emergent 
transnational aspect of Italian anarchism. Bresci, in particular, was born in Italy, but 
later moved to Paterson, New Jersey as an immigrant and went back to Italy to 
assassinate the king. This detail demonstrated that anarchism was also prevailing on 
the western side of the Atlantic. This chapter shows how anarchism provoked a joint 
response from the United States and Italian governments and was a basis for their 
informal alliance. 
Italian anarchism in the United States began as one of the consequences of 
the mass immigration of the 1880s to the major cities in the north, and in the mid-
1890s it reached the Pacific Coast. The first Italian anarchist group, named the 
“Gruppo Anarchico Rivoluzionario  Carlo Cafiero” [Carlo Cafiero Revolutionary 
Anarchist Group] was formed in New York City in 1885, and another one with the 
same name was established in Chicago in 1887. The same Cafiero group started to 
publish the first Italian anarchist newspaper, L’Anarchico [The Anarchist] in 1888 in 
New York.4  
 Cafiero was a prototypical Italian anarchist of the late nineteenth century. He 
was an educated son of a middle class Italian family. His sense of injustice done to 
the poor and defenseless made him intolerant of the pietistic liberalism of Giuseppe 
Mazzini, and—with Giuseppe Garibaldi aging and reluctant to become involved 
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again in the struggle—Michael Bakunin was the leader to whom he turned. 5 
Bakunin changed Italian anarchism by attacking Mazzini’s ideological domination 
of the Italian left.6 Bakunin was a positive anarchist who became the main reason 
for anarchism’s later association with violence and chaos. With other collectivists, 
he rejected individual possession of property and preferred possession by voluntary 
institutions.7 Bakunin emphasized the importance of making a social revolution to 
destroy the state which would open way to the complete and direct abolition of 
classes and political, economic and social inequalities through the destruction of the 
existing framework of society.8 His approval of violence as a weapon against the 
oppressors ended up with nihilism in Russia, and individual acts of terrorism.9 The 
growth of the anarchist movement and First International in Italy was a consequence 
of Bakunin’s presence in Italy.  
 But that growth was observed by the Italian government with concern, thus 
the Minister of the Interior sent instructions to the provincial authorities to destroy 
the International in their regions. The police raided the Bologna Congress and 
arrested Cafiero, Costa and Malatesta.”10 Several insurrections like the ones in 
Bologna (1874) and in Benevento (1877) failed or were repressed by the 
government. Indeed, the suppression of the International in Italy was achieved by 
the left’s leaders like Agostino Depretis, Giovanni Nicotera and Francesco Crispi 
who assumed power on March 18, 1876 in Italy. The Ministry of the Interior 
Giovanni Nicotera defined anarchists as malfattori [malefactors]. The definition 
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infuriated the anarchists since it announced them as ordinary criminals rather than 
fighters for justice and liberty. By denying political legitimacy to the anarchists and 
branding them common criminals, Nicotera had devised a brilliant strategy whereby 
the anarchists would be prosecuted almost as criminals and outlaws; he struck on 
April 19, dissolved internationalist sections, suppressed newspapers, and arrested 
every anarchist of importance.”11 From then on, Nicotera’s malfattori strategy was 
used against the anarchists in Italy, many of whom consequently sought refuge in 
the United States.  But Italian anarchism entered a period of decline in the 1880s. 
However, during the May days of 1898, riots spread to Florence and Milan, and 
demonstrators were shot down by the government forces. “It was in revenge for the 
severe repressions of this year that [Gaetano] Bresci later killed King Umberto I.”12
That Bresci returned to Italy to assassinate Umberto was not surprising 
because the United States was a common place for the Italian anarchist exiles, or in 
other words, the intelligentsia of Italian anarchism. Several notable Italian anarchists 
followed Carlo Cafiero to America. The first significant anarchist that arrived to the 
American shores was Francesco Saverio Merlino, who landed in New York in 
1892.13 Merlino was one of the founders of Italian anarchism, and he was a lawyer 
who had defended the Italian anarchists in various cases in the peninsula. Unlike 
most of the Italian anarchists in the United States, Merlino was fluent in English, 
and founded one of the earliest Italian anarchist journals in the United States, Il 
Grido degli Opppressi [The Cry of the Oppressed], and the English-language 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Woodcock, “Anarchism in Italy,” 293. 
13 Ibid., 165. 
 174
Solidarity. As well as these, Merlino carried out a speaking tour in the United States. 
In 1893, he returned to Europe.14  
Pietro Gori, “the poet of the anarchists,” was another influential anarchist 
who went to the United States in 1895. During his one-year stay, he held between 
two hundred and four hundred meetings.15 He wandered from one place to another 
with his guitar, sang like Christian evangelists, and lectured on anarchism.16 Gori, 
like most of the Italian anarchist leaders, came from a middle-class family, had a 
university degree in law, and was widely read in America and Europe. He died at the 
age of forty-five, in 1911 after his return to Europe.   
Giuseppe Ciancabilla arrived in Paterson, New Jersey—which was one of the 
most important Italian anarchist centers in the east—in 1898. He became the editor 
of La Questione Sociale [The Social Question] that was established by Gori in 1895. 
Ciancabilla later moved to Spring Valley, Illinois which was a small coal-mining 
town with a population of seven thousand. After President William McKinley’s 
assassination by the Polish anarchist, Leon Czolgosz, in 1901, Ciancabilla, along 
with 300-500 other Italian anarchists in the town, became the target of the residents 
of Spring Valley. In Spring Valley, the Italian anarchists published a newspaper 
entitled, L’Aurora [Dawn] and Ciancabilla was its editor. After McKinley’s 
assassination, the newspaper extolled Czolgosz’s deed, and hailed him as a martyr.17 
As a consequence, Ciancabilla was ordered to leave the town after a mass meeting, 
but he refused to do that. However, he was arrested on September 27, 1901 and was 
jailed on a charge of publishing lottery advertisements in his journal and thereby 
                                                 
14 For more information about Merlino, see Ibid. 165 and Paul Avrich, Sacco and Vanzetti: The 
Anarchist Background, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 46.  
15 Avrich, Anarchist Portraits, 165. 
16 Paul Avrich, Sacco and Vanzetti, 47. 
17 Sidney Fine, “Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley,” The American Historical Review 60 
(1955), 785. 
 175
violating postal regulations.18 Ciancabilla ended up in San Francisco, where he 
edited the journal, La Protesta Umana [The Human Protest]. He suddenly took ill, 
and died in 1904, at the age of thirty-two.19  
 The renowned Errico Malatesta also made a brief visit to the United States in 
1899, during which he took up the editorship of La Questione Sociale. During one of 
his lectures in West Hoboken, New Jersey, he was shot by another Italian, 
Domenico Pazzaglia, whose motives are still unknown. Malatesta was seriously 
wounded in the leg, and interestingly, the person who subdued Pazzaglia was 
Gaetano Bresci, who was going to kill King Umberto I in 1900.20 Malatesta returned 
to Italy, and died in Rome under house arrest in 1932 during the fascist era. 
 
6.1 Luigi Galleani and La Cronaca Sovversiva  
 
The leading Italian anarchist in the United States for the first two decades of 
the twentieth century was Luigi Galleani. He was born on August 21, 1861 in 
Vermicelli, Piedmont to a middle-class family. While studying law at the University 
of Turin, Galleani was attracted to anarchism, and refused to become a lawyer. He 
spent more than five years in prison and exile before escaping from the island of 
Pantelleria in 1900. He arrived in the United States in October 1901, one month after 
the assassination of William McKinley. He settled in Paterson, New Jersey and 
followed Malatesta as the editor of La Questione Sociale. Galleani was a very 
powerful orator; his “rhetoric and vision of total freedom raised his listeners to a 
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high pitch of enthusiasm.”21 Therefore, in a short time, a great number of anarchists 
commenced to gather around him including Niccolo Sacco and Bartalomeo Vanzetti.     
One of the most devoted Galleanisti groups was the Barre anarchist group in New 
England, which was established in 1894. The members of the group were stone and 
marble cutters, and among these people, Galleani began to publish his La Cronaca 
Sovversiva [The Subversive Chronicle] that turned out to be one of the most 
important periodicals of the anarchist movement.22 In 1914, he also published 
Faccia a Faccia col Nemico [Face to Face with the Enemy], a collection of his 
articles that had been published before in La Cronaca Sovversiva. The book 
defended propaganda by the deed and declared its practitioners like Angiolillo and 
Bresci as martyrs. A report of the Department of Justice described Faccia a Faccia 
as the “glorification of the most anarchistic assassins the world has ever seen.”23 
Another significant and lethal document written by Galleani was the forty-six-page 
bomb manual La Salute è in Voi! [Health is in You!], published in 1905. It was 
adopted from a guide to explosives written by Professor Ettore Molinari of the 
Politecnico in Mila, who was also an anarchist and friend of Galleani.24 The manual 
was put into use by the Galleanisti in different occasions like the John Rockefeller 
attempt of 1914, the Preparedness Day Parade in San Francisco on July 22, 1916, 
and finally the Wall Street Explosion of September 16, 1920 which was presumably 
prepared and planted by Mario Buda, one of the militant revolutionary anarchists led 
by Galleani. The Federals called the explosion as “the work of a ‘gigantic plot’ 
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organized by anarchist terrorists (probably Italians) to overthrow the capitalist 
system.”25   
  The final work of Galleani was The End of Anarchism?, which started as a 
series of articles which would serve as answers to Merlino’s interview, “The End of 
Anarchism,” published in the Turin newspaper La Stampa in June 1907. Merlino 
had joined the socialist movement, and declared that anarchism came to an end.26 
Galleani answered the former anarchists in ten articles by defending communist 
anarchism against socialism and reform. When World War I broke out, he opposed 
and denounced it in la Cronaca Sovversiva by repeating the slogan, “Contro la 
guera, contro la pace, per la rivoluzione sociale!” [Against the war, against the 
peace, for the social revolution’!].27 In May 1917 Galleani published his article 
“Matricolati!,” [Registrants!] which advised his followers to avoid registering the 
draft, even if that meant leaving the country.28 For a period of time, the majority of 
the Galleanisti, including Niccolo Sacco and Bartalomeo Vanzetti, fled to Mexico to 
avoid military conscription. However, eventually, Galleani became the person who 
left the United States forever. He was arrested on charges of obstructing the war 
effort, and on June 24, 1919 he was deported to Italy where he died on November 4, 
1931.29     
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27 Ibid., 170. 
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6.2 “Carlo Tresca, alias Carluccio: Alleged Alien Anarchist” 
Despite the fact that he called himself not an anarchist but a syndicalist,30 Carlo 
Tresca was the head of the anarchist syndicalists. Tresca was born on March 9, 
1879, in Sulmona, Abruzzi.31 For a short term, he served as the secretary of the 
Italian Railroad Workers Union, and became the editor of a journal called Il Germe 
[The Seed]. Tresca continuously attacked the Italian monarchy in his writings, thus 
he was given two years of imprisonment, but accepted ten years of exile. First he 
went to Lake Lugano in Switzerland where he met Pietro Govi who advised him to 
go to America.32 Tresca took the advice, and immigrated to the United States in 
1904 where he settled in Philadelphia. There he became the editor of the Italian 
Socialist Federation’s official organ, Il Proletario [The Proletarian]. In 1906, he 
began to publish his own anarchist newspaper, La Plebe [The Plebs] in 1906. Later, 
he moved to Pittsburgh, where there were a significant number of Italian coal-
miners. In a short time, Tresca became well-known because of his radical activities. 
He was arrested three times in Philadelphia and nine times in Pittsburgh.33  
In 1912, the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.) invited Tresca to 
Lawrence, Massachusetts to get support from him to free the Italian strike leaders. 
Tresca, who was called the “Bull of Lawrence” after the incident, participated also 
in the Little Falls, New York textile workers’ strike in 1912, the New York hotel 
workers’ strike in 1913, the Paterson, New Jersey, silk workers’ strike in 1913, and 
the Mesabi Range, Minnesota strike of miners in 1916. 
In Mesabi Range, Tresca was arrested, and narrowly escaped lynching. After 
his arrest, labor demonstrations for Tresca were organized in every American city, 
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and Italian laborers protested the United States near the American consulate in 
Rome.34 On September 19, 1916, the workers called one another to arms to protect 
the rights of the proletariat against the oppressive government. The workers had to 
act “with force against force, and with violence against violence.”35 The decisive 
time had come not only to liberate Carlo Tresca, but also the future of that great 
country. In that way, the destiny of the oppressed classes would change, and those 
people would become liberated.36 Italians’ image of America began to change.  
Significantly, Eugene Debs, the former leader of the American Railway 
Union, and the presidential candidate of the Socialist Party stated: 
There is not a [more] courageous fighter for the working class than 
Carlo Tresca and precisely because of this fact he is now under 
indictment in a capitalist court and threatened with the severest 
penalty that may be inflicted under capitalist law … We must not fail 
[Tresca and his comrades] in this supreme hour. We must prove 
ourselves men and not cowards; we most stand by our class and not 
desert it; we must strike a blow for solidarity by freeing our comrades 
and thus vindicating our self-respect and our title to a place in the 
labor movement.37  
    
Eventually, Tresca was released from prison on December 22, 1916, and was 
acquitted of federal charges; however, L’Avvenire [The Future], the newspaper that 
he had published in New York since 1913 closed down. After that, Tresca 
commenced to publish Il Martello [The Hammer], which was also restrained by the 
United States government several times. He was also against the First World War 
since he considered that Wall Street and the capitalists wanted the war. The prices of 
consumer products were increased because of the war, and capitalists profited from 
“the misery of laborers,”38 he said.  
                                                 
34 L’Avvenire, October 13, 1916.  
35 Ibid., September 19, 1919.  
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Although the Justice Department kept him under surveillance for deportation 
in 1919-1920, Tresca avoided deportation. During this period, he became active in 
the Sacco-Vanzetti case by raising funds and keeping the issue alive in Italian and 
American communities. Thus, he played a significant role in organizing the defense 
of Niccolo Sacco and Bartalomeo Vanzetti in 1920-1921, but that was never a full-
time occupation for him.39 He succeeded the deported Galleani as the leader of the 
Italian anarchists in the United States who turned to him as a matter of course when 
they were in trouble.40  
Sacco and Vanzetti were executed on August 23, 1927.  The Italian 
government’s involvement in the issue began in 1920 in the form of reluctant 
gestures of a liberal government that had long shown deep-rooted hostility toward 
anarchism.41 Thus, none of the prime ministers issued a formal protest against the 
case. Despite his antagonism to anarchism, Benito Mussolini—presumably because 
of his socialist background—reacted to the political repression in the United 
States.42    
Tresca had started his struggle against Mussolini’s fascism in his newspaper, 
Il Martello. In 1923, the Italian ambassador officially requested that the United 
States suppress the newspaper since it was “spreading poison among all the Italian 
workers in [the United States].”43 The federal authorities commenced to search for 
seditious material among Tresca’s correspondence, but they could never find the 
adequate evidence for his deportation. Eventually, Tresca was killed by an assassin 
on the night of July 11, 1943 in New York City. Official reports indicate that the 
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killer was unknown, however, it was known that Tresca had a lot of enemies from 
the fascist and communist groups in the United States. There is a  theory which 
supports the idea that Tresca was shot by the boss of all bosses of the Mafia, 
Carmine Galante. According to this hypothesis, Galante took the order to kill Tresca 
from Mussolini since he was the most out-spoken anti-fascist in the Italian American 
community, thus he had to be silenced.44
Actually, most of the details and secrets about Tresca’s life and activities in 
the United States are revealed in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 1, 358 pages 
long Carlo Tresca Files that were released under the Freedom of Information Act. 
The files start with the investigations about Tresca’s nationality (it was discovered 
that he never became naturalized) in the early 1920s, and finish with the closing 
stages of his murder case in the 1950s. These documents are undoubtedly very 
valuable both to understand Tresca’s and other Italian anarchists’ activities, and the 
United States’ government’s prosecution alien anarchism in America.      
   
6.3 Conclusion: Italian and American Perspectives about Anarchism 
 
One day after the assassination of King Umberto, President William 
McKinley sent a message to the new Italian King, Vittorio Emanuele III to “offer the 
sincere condolences in [that] deep hour of bereavement.”45 In his message to the 
Italian Ambassador, Baron Francesco Saverio Fava, Secretary of State John Hay 
stated that the king’s assassination “had profoundly shocked public sentiment in the 
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United States.”46 The Italian officials thanked the United States government, and the 
new king Vittorio Emanuele III indicated that the American people “ha[d] 
strengthened the old bonds of friendship existing between the two nations”47 by 
sharing the grief of the Italian people. Italians in turn warned the United States 
government through Baron Fava about the security of President McKinley. 
According to the Daily Mail of New York, the ambassador requested from the 
Department of State the arrests and punishments of the Italian anarchists. The 
United States officials accepted the Italian demand, and the authorities of the state of 
New Jersey made an investigation of the issue. The security around President 
McKinley was increased.48 However, McKinley was shot by a Polish immigrant, 
Leon Czolgosz, on September 6, 1901 at an American exposition in Buffalo. 
Czolgosz, who believed that there should be no authority, signed a confession in 
which he stated that he had killed the President because he regarded it as his duty to 
do so.49 Similar to the Italian anarchists, he indicated that his plot against McKinley 
was an individually made plan, and he was fully aware of the consequences. 
Nevertheless, McKinley’s death accelerated the anti-anarchist movements that 
resulted with the deportation of immigrant anarchists and communists. 
  After McKinley’s death, Theodore Roosevelt became the United States 
President. He began his first message by giving a clear definition of anarchism. 
Roosevelt stated that   “President McKinley was killed by an utterly depraved 
criminal belonging to that body of criminals who object to all governments, good 
and bad alike, [and] who [we]re against any form of popular liberty.” According to 
him, the target of the anarchists was not the President but all presidents and every 
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symbol of government. For Roosevelt, anarchy was special expression of 
criminality, warranting special international attention:  
The anarchist, and especially the anarchist in the United 
States, is merely one type of criminal, more dangerous than 
any other because he represents the same depravity in a 
greater degree … The anarchist is a criminal whose 
perverted instincts lead him to prefer confusion and chaos 
to the most beneficent form of social order … The anarchist 
is everywhere not merely the enemy of system and of 
progress, but the deadly foe of liberty … For the anarchist 
himself, whether he preaches or practices his doctrines, we 
need not have more concern than for any ordinary murderer 
… He is a malefactor and nothing else … Anarchy is a 
crime against the whole human race; and all mankind 
should band against the anarchist. His crime should be 
made an offense against the law of nations, like piracy and 
that form of man—stealing known as the slave trade; for it 
is of far blacker infamy than either. It should be so declared 
by treaties among all civilized powers.50  
 
For Roosevelt, anarchism presented a form of international terrorism, which 
required the United States to collaborate with other nations in an unprecedented 
way. 
         There is a great similarity between the policies of the United States and Italy 
in relation to anarchism. Like Nicotera, Roosevelt used the word “malefactor” 
while referring to the anarchists. Similarly, he considered that those criminals had 
to be punished by the whole world since they were the enemies of the laws of all 
nations.  Roosevelt aspired to find an international remedy to the problem of 
anarchism since the anarchists were overwhelmingly immigrants. According to 
him, the situation in the United States was an outcome of the unsatisfactory 
immigration laws: 
We need every honest and efficient immigrant fitted to 
become an American citizen, every immigrant who comes 
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here to stay, who brings here a strong body, a stout heart, a 
good head, and a resolute purpose to do his duty well in every 
way and to bring up his children as law—abiding and God—
fearing members of the community. But there should be a 
comprehensive law enacted with the object of working a 
threefold improvement over our present system. 51  
According to Roosevelt’s proposed plan, not only the anarchists but also the people 
who were known to have anarchistic tendencies had to be excluded from the United 
States. That would require a more careful inspection both abroad and at the United 
States’ immigration ports. Secondly, an education test had to be applied to the 
people who intended to migrate to the United States. That kind of a test would 
provide information about the immigrants’ intellectual capacity to understand 
American institutions and act sanely as American citizens. Lastly, the people who 
were below a standard economic fitness had to be excluded from immigration since 
they would not have adequate capacity to earn a living. In that way, both dangerous 
elements and cheap labor would stop. 52  
 Roosevelt supported immigration as long as the immigrants had the ability to 
become assimilated in the American melting pot. Thus, while discussing the solution 
for the problem of anarchism, he attempted to secure the Americanism of the 
newcomers by referring to literacy and education tests that many advocates of 
immigration restriction in the late nineteenth century supported.  In fact, it was not 
the first time that a literacy test was introduced; in 1895, Congress passed a literacy 
test law, but President Grover Cleveland vetoed it. After Roosevelt’s above-
mentioned proposal, a new literacy test passed the House, but it could not gain a 
favorable vote in the Senate.53 Nevertheless, two anti-anarchy bills were introduced 
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in Congress. The Ray Bill provided the “death penalty for persons who killed the 
president, vice-president, those in the line of presidential succession, and 
ambassadors of foreign countries” whereas the Hoar Bill provided the “death penalty 
for the persons who willfully killed or attempted to kill the president, the vice-
president, any officer upon whom the duties of the president might devolve, or the 
sovereign of a foreign nation.”54               
 However, in order to stop anarchist immigrants’ arrival in the United States, 
new forms of anarchist-exclusion laws were made. On May 27, 1902, a measure that 
placed the “anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force 
or violence of all governments, or of all forms of law, or assassination of public 
officials” in the category of excludable immigrants, passed the House.55 The 
measure was expanded by including also the persons who were affiliated with 
organizations teaching anarchist views, and it passed the Congress on March 3, 
1903, and received the president’s approval on the next day.56  
Despite these precautions, the annual number of the immigrants reaching the 
United States increased to 1,285,000, and according to the recommendations of the          
Dillingham Commission that was established in 1909 with the aim of studying the 
impact of immigrants on the United States, the twentieth century immigration was 
dominated by the so-called inferior people who were physically, mentally, and 
linguistically different from the native population of the country. Thus, new 
restrictions had to be brought upon the United States’ immigration policy.57 
Roosevelt himself was shot by an assassin when he went to Milwaukee on October 
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14, 1912 for a scheduled address as part of his presidential campaign for the 
Progressive Party. The shooting took place in a street when Roosevelt was shaking 
his head to the crowd that was waiting for his speech. The assassin was caught, and 
Roosevelt showed the torn manuscript of his speech which the bullet perforated in 
his vest pocket. He only had a superficial flesh wound, and said “It takes more than 
that to kill a Bull Moose" while showing the bullet hole through the sheets of 
paper.58 The former president was saved, but the assassination attempt reflected the 
presence of anarchists still in the United States, a problem that provoked more 
severe United States immigration restrictions beginning during World War I. In 
1919-20, a right-wing reaction prevailed on both sides of the Atlantic in which 
Italian anarchists became the targets of repression.59 The red scare in the United 
States reached its peak point with the Palmer Raids of 1919 and the deportation of 
alien anarchists like Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman.  
Anarchism was a unique problem in Italo-American relations because 
anarchists did not have a single enemy or a single governmental system to fight. 
Thus, all the symbols of authority in the world were the foes of anarchism, and all 
these authorities allegedly stood together in their battle. Especially after the 
American entrance to World War I, the United States deported the anarchists to their 
native country, and Italy kept them under custody during the liberal, nationalist and 
fascist eras. Anarchism was an issue that brought the United States and Italy close 
together on the eve of World War I.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
AMERICAN IMPERIALISM: THE ITALIAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
The second half of the nineteenth century was a significant era for both the 
United States and the Kingdom of Italy. There was rapid industrial development in 
the post Civil War period, and the westward expansion on the American continent 
for the United States came to an end in the 1890s. Hence the reunited and 
economically strong United States commenced to seek new ways of expansion that 
would support it in becoming a great power, and protecting its security at the same 
time. Similarly, Italy became a united country during the 1860s, and began to search 
for new ways of economic development. Lacking economic and social resources that 
the United States had, the Italian Kingdom aspired to dominate other lands in order 
to become a prosperous country among the wealthy nations of the Old World. The 
subsequent two chapters will attempt to clarify some aspects of American 
imperialism and Italian colonialism with the purpose of explicating what the two 
countries thought about each other’s social, economic and political conditions in the 
late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. By revealing these details about the 
United States and Italy, their diverse conditions in the world arena will also be 
exposed. 
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7.1 The Spanish-American War: American Imperialist in he Eyes of the 
Italians 
 
The last two decades of the nineteenth century witnessed the creation of a 
powerful United States navy. The United States defeated Spain in the Spanish-
American War of 1898. The war manifested the ongoing development and 
expansion of the United States, which was recognized widely as an economic 
empire after the victory. Did Italy get interested and make comments about the 
Spanish-American War? Did the Italian politicians and strategists assess the 
increasing naval power of the United States?  The answers to these questions as well 
as the Italian anxieties about American imperialism will be revealed in this part.  
  The Spanish-American War of 1898 was an outcome of the Cuban civil war 
which started in 1895 between the Cuban insurrectos and the Spanish governors. 
The rebels were eager to involve the United States in their war, and the American  
daily yellow press (especially the New York World and the New York Journal) 
reflected the Spaniards’ atrocities—particularly General Valeriano Weyler’s (alias 
“Butcher Weyler”) “reconcentration” camps in which the civilians were put to avoid 
their support to the rebels—in detail to the public. Thus, Americans started to feel 
sympathy towards the insurrectos, but the reluctance of Presidents Grover Cleveland 
and William McKinley to declare war on Spain delayed the initiation of the conflict 
between the two countries. The sinking of the Maine at its berth in Havana Harbor 
on February 18, 1898 due to unknown reasons, and the death of 260 sailors 
accelerated the jingoist war plans in the United States. Mass demonstrations 
throughout the whole country supported the rapid declaration of war on Spain. From 
Spain, President McKinley demanded a swift armistice and the end of its 
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concentration camp policy. Otherwise, he stated that Spain would have to accept 
American arbitration in Cuba. However, Spain acted slowly and reluctantly, and 
eventually declared war on the United States on April 25, 1898. One day later, the 
United States declared war on Spain as a response. On June 22, the first United 
States troops landed in Cuba. Theodore Roosevelt, who was at the head of the 
Rough Riders, swept the Spanish troops off San Juan Hill, and the Atlantic fleet 
destroyed the Spanish fleet. Consequently, the Spaniards surrendered Santiago.           
The war came to an end with the Treaty of Paris that was signed on December 10, 
1898. With the treaty, Spain lost its control over Cuba, left Guam and Puerto Rico to 
the United States, and ceased its sovereignty in the Philippines in return for 20 
million U.S. dollars. In brief, the Spanish empire came to an end with this war, and 
the hegemony of a more economically and politically powerful United States started 
in world affairs at the dawn of the twentieth century. 
Italians were genuinely concerned with the war and its international 
consequences. Several Italian military writers wrote about the Spanish-American 
War. One was Commander Domenico Bonamico, the greatest naval strategist in 
modern Italian history.1 The life and the works of Bonamico are not studied widely; 
nevertheless the significance of the commander in Italian naval history is 
undisputable. Bonamico compared favorably to the American naval historian and 
theoretician, Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose The Influence of Sea Power on History, 
1660-1784 Bonamico read and analyzed.    
Bonamico was born in Cavallermaggiore in 1846, and died in Turin in 1929. 
Throughout his entire career, he never had the opportunity to control a big fleet like 
Mahan, but he was indisputably the Italian counterpart of his American 
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contemporary since he also believed that national greatness was related to 
possessing a strong navy.2 Bonamico’s works reflect his deep analyses of Mahan’s 
studies; he admired, but also criticized the American strategist. Bonamico stressed 
the importance of the development of a strategic naval geography because he 
considered that it would not be possible to protect Italy only from the land. Mahan’s 
book was “a true revelation for Bonamico,”3 and had a significant effect on the 
formation of his ideas about the protection of European supremacy. 4
Similar to Mazzini, Bonamico placed the United States of Europe at the 
center of his works. His idea was to safeguard the integrity of Europe against the 
threats coming from Russia and the United States. The safety of the European 
colonial empires could be protected only by a solid military capacity and the perfect 
control of the sea. From this perspective, the control of the Atlantic Ocean was very 
crucial for Bonamico. The loss of European hegemony in that part of the world 
could put European economy and civilization in jeopardy.5
The Italian commander’s forethought became concrete with the Spanish-
American war. Accordingly, the compilation of his articles entitled, Il Conflitto-
Ispano Americano [The Spanish- American Conflict] is significant to comprehend 
Bonamico’s analyses about Mahan and his influence on American expansionism. 
The book includes the articles that Bonamico wrote about the issue from June to 
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September 1898. It starts with an extensive summary of Mahan’s strategies and the 
current conditions of the American and Spanish navies. Bonamico asserted that the 
conflict between the United States and Spain was a concrete and precise application 
of Mahan and his numerous disciples’ theories, and the European states had to 
anticipate the consequences of the incident since the European decadence had started 
and was progressing with the Latin nations.6 In June 1898, Bonamico stated that the 
United States was in an advantageous position against Spain.7  In July 1898, the 
Italian commander denoted the ideological aspect of the war; he referred to Mahan, 
and pointed out the possibility of German-American solidarity, as well as the 
traditional one between England and the United States.8  
La Guerra Ispano-Americana [The Spanish-American War] was another 
work that was published in 1898. Its author Alfredo Feliciangeli presumably was an 
officer serving in the Italian Army since the book was published by Rivista Militare 
Italiana [Italian Military Journal]. Rivista Militare began publication in Rome, in 
1859, founded by Luigi and Carlo Mezzacapo, who were ex-officers of the 
Neapolitan Army. Carlo Voghera, who later established other military journals like 
L’Esercito [The Army], Carabiniere [Carabineer], L’Esercito Illustrato [The 
Illustrated Army], L’Italia Militare [Military Italy] and Marina [Navy], was the 
editor of the journal. The Mezzacapo brothers aspired to circulate a journal about 
Italian military science, which would be competent to its European counterparts, and 
thus invited officers and prominent military and political figures to write articles for 
the journal. Their objective was to issue an influential journal about Italian military 
affairs, and they mainly succeeded in that plan. Rivista Militare reflected the major 
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military events in Italian history starting with the Risorgimento, and it offered 
substantial information to its readers about Italian colonial activities in North Africa 
and the World Wars.9
La Guerra Ispano-Americana involves a long description of the war with the maps 
of the island of Cuba, and provides information about the exact number of troops 
and the battleships. More significantly, Feliciangeli referred to the situation in Cuba 
by stating that the United States declared war on Spain to fight in the name of liberty 
and human rights, but by the end of the war, the Americans started the military 
occupation of the Cuban coast. According to the writer, the annexation of the island 
in the near future would end with a new evolution of the American Union to defend 
its possessions. That evolution would oblige the United States to integrate and 
complete its forces both on land and sea.10 As a consequence, that kind of a 
completion would mean a more powerful and dominant United States in the Atlantic 
Ocean.  
Another prominent figure who wrote about the war between Spain and the 
United States was Professor Augusto Pierantoni. Professor Pierantoni was an Italian 
jurist and senator.  He was born in Chieti in 1840 and died in Rome in 1911, and 
worked as an associate professor of constitutional and international law at the 
universities of Modena, Naples and Rome. Pierantoni wrote works about the ancient 
Roman lawyers, constitutional law and the carbonari of the Pontifical State.11 He 
                                                 
9 For more information about Rivista Militare, see “150th Anniversario della Rivista Militare” [150th 
Anniversary of Rivista Militare] http://www.collezioni-f.it/museo/00new/il_passa/riv_mil.html, date 
of Access: December 5, 2006.  
10 Alfredo Feliciangeli, La Guerra Ispano-Americana [The Spanish-American War], (Roma: Enrico 
Voghera, (Rivista Militare Italiana), 1898), 94. 
11 Augusto Pierantoni, “I Carbonari dello Stato Pontificio ricercati dalle Inquisizioni Austriache nel 
Regno Lombardo-Veneto (1817-1825)” reviewed by H. Nelson Gay, American Historical Review,17 
(1911), pp: 138-140; some of Pierantoni works are Chiesa Cattolica nel Diritto Comune [Catholic 
Church in Common Law], (1870); Avvocati di Roma Antica [Lawyers of Ancient Rome], (1900); 
Trattato di Diritto Costituzionale [Treatise of Constituional Law], (monograph) .  
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was also concerned with the situation of the Italian immigrants in the United States, 
and he protested the Italian lynchings in America in an article in The Independent in 
1903.12  Beforehand, he wrote about the Spanish-American War in 1898 in his 
work, Cuba e Il Conflitto Ispano-Americano [Cuba and the Spanish-American 
Conflict].  
  Pierantoni started his book by referring to the discovery of American 
continent, and stated that the early Spanish settlement commenced on “the major 
island of Central America,” Cuba.13 The influence of Spanish colonization in 
America was reduced due to the declaration of independence of the United States 
and the French Revolution, and the separatist idea in Cuba that started to be 
influential in 1823.14 Pierantoni referred to a United States official note from 
October 22, 1851 that declared that the island of Cuba was not far way from mouth 
of the Mississippi River, an important commercial site for the United States. Thus, if 
a European nation were to gain the control of Cuba, that situation would be a great 
risk for the Americans.15   
The book continues with the narration about the incidences that occurred in 
Cuba after the 1850s. Pierantoni focused on most of the important events in that 
period like the 1868 insurrection, the Cuban Republic, the constitutions of 1869 and 
1870, the abolition of slavery on February 13, 1880, the new Civil Code of July 31, 
1889,  the 1895 insurrections, and finally the declaration of American neutrality on 
June 6, 1895. He also stated that the prolonged civil war in Cuba damaged the 
                                                 
12 Augusto Pierantoni, "Italian Feeling on American Lynching," The Independent, LV (1903), 2040-  
42.  
13 Augusto Pierantoni, Cuba e il Conflitto Ispano-Americano, (Roma: Stabilimento Tipografia della 
Tribuna, 1898), 6. 
14 Ibid., 11. 
15 Ibid., 16. 
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American commerce and navigation, and that became an important factor for the 
American declaration of war on Spain.16  
Before the initiation of the Spanish-American war, the American proposal 
about arbitration was not accepted. That was a wrong decision taken by Spain 
according to Pierantoni because Cubans’ nationalism and desire for independence 
was growing.17  He suggested the Pope as a possible mediator, and stated that before 
the Declaration of Independence, the presence of Catholicism in the British colonies 
was the primary energy of republicanism, and the greatest modern monarchies in 
world history were all Catholic, thus America had separated the Church slowly from 
the State because the laws of Catholicism were living in the republic.18  In brief, 
Augusto Pierantoni indicated that while the United States’ offer of arbitration was 
refused, arbitration could have been achieved by the Pope since the Cubans were 
also Catholics, and the real meaning of republicanism was veiled in the Catholic 
religion. 
The book comes to an end with the Italian professor’s remarks about the 
Monroe Doctrine and the changing characteristics of the United States. Pierantoni, 
warned America about the decadence of the Latin element in European political 
history. He also stated that the pacifist spirit of Penn, the religion of the Pilgrims, 
and the feeling of justice and high philanthropy of Washington and Franklin had 
provided the American nation a morality that was superior to the old European 
nations. However, the war of secession changed the American military tradition, and 
the Americans were no more pacifists. Additionally, the emigration from Europe 
reduced American isolationism. Therefore, it would not be a surprise for the 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 38. 
17 Ibid., 52. 
18 Ibid., 53. 
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Europeans to witness the expansion of the United States’ dominion outside the 
American continent.19    
  Another Italian who wrote about the Spanish-American War was Ferruccio 
Vitale. He was born on February 5, 1875 in Florence to an upper-class family. His 
father Lazzero Vitale was a renowned architect, and the ancestors of his mother 
Countess Giuseppina Barboro were the designers of the world’s first botanical 
garden in Padua.20 After having his classical education, Vitale graduated from the 
Royal Military Academy in Modena in 1893, and became a military engineer. In 
1898, he was appointed as the Italian military attaché in Washington, D.C. In the 
same year he was sent to the Spanish-American War as an international observer to 
accompany the American troops. “Vitale witnessed the famous blockade of Manila 
harbor by Admiral George Dewey as well as the battle of Malate outside Manila, 
where the Spanish troops were repulsed.”21 After his return to Italy, he was also 
made a Chevalier of the order of the crown of Italy for his service in the Philippines. 
Vitale resigned from his office in 1900 and returned to the United States in 1904, 
and began to work in New York as a landscape architect. In 1921, he became a 
naturalized American citizen, and died in New York City on February 2, 1933.  
Vitale’s story is different from the majority of the Italian immigrants in the United 
States. His prominence continued in America; he was appointed as a member of the 
Fine Arts Commission in September 1927 by President Calvin Coolidge, and took 
part in designing Meridian Hill Park, Washington. He was also a trustee of the 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 62, 61. 
20 For detail, see Terry R. Schnadelbach, Horrace Havemeyer III, Ferruccio Vitale: Landscape 
Architect of the Country Place Era (Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 2001), 1-4. 
21 Ibid., 2. 
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American Academy in Rome and a member of the Architectural Commission of the 
Century of Progress Exposition in Chicago.22  
What is striking and completely unknown about his years in the Italian 
military was the pamphlet that he wrote about the Spanish-American War issued by 
the Rassegna Nazionale [National Review]. Rassegna Nazionale was published in 
Florence in 1879-1952, and its most vital period was between 1898 and 1908.23 The 
directors of the journal declared themselves as “Catholics and Italians,” and they 
believed that Italian politics, society, and religious institutions had to be protected. 
Rassegna Nazionale was read by aristocrats, teavhers and academics, ministers and 
patrons of public libraries, and Americanism was among the issues that the journal 
concentrated on.  
Vitale’s La Politica Imperialista degli Stati Uniti [The Imperialist Policy of the 
United States] was published in 1901, three years before his migration to the United 
States. In general, the pamphlet is about the United States’ reasons for declaring war 
on Spain, and its consequences on the subject of American imperialism. Vitale 
started his discussion by referring to the essence of American policy about Cuba: 
was it an altruistic policy or a policy of interest?24  According to Vitale, the 
politicians had the desire to agitate troubled waters of national diplomacy for their 
personal comfort, and also to make favors to their friends. The contractors 
constituted another part that benefited from the wars. Thus, the politicians presented 
the “terrible disgrace” of the Maine to the American public as the motive for a 
                                                 
22 See Ferruccio Vitale’s biography  on 
http://eng.archinform.net/arch/73615.htm?ID=85b3664e54307b82ce8e802dc955fc70 , November 15, 
2006.  
23 For more information, see Ornella Confessore, “Conservatorismo politico e riformismo religioso: 
La "Rassegna Nazionale" dal 1898 al 1908” [Political Conservatism and Religious Reformism: 
Rassegna Nazionale from 1898 to 1908] reviewed by Raymond Grew, The American Historical 
Review 81 (1976), 624-625  
24 Ferruccio Vitale, La Politica Imperialista degli Stati Uniti, (Florence: Ufficio della Rassegna 
Nazionale, 1901), 3.   
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sacred war and redemption of the oppressed humanity from tyranny. Vitale stated 
that these politicians and contractors had nothing to lose, but a lot of things to earn 
in an international adventure. These people were also powerful due to the support of 
the public, bankers, and industry, as well as the majority of the yellow press.25   
Vitale asserted that the altruism of the majority of the public should not be 
confused with the egoism of the few who manipulated the society’s enthusiasm for 
their personal purposes.26 However, the press started to think that the war could 
increase the wealth and power of the country besides liberating the oppressed 
Cubans. Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico and other naval bases were fundamental points 
for the national greatness of the United States, and the “first puff of imperialism” 
was delivered to the public opinion in that way.27 Hence the imperialist dream was 
clearly designed, and the society, little by little, welcomed this mirage which was 
not far away.28  
Similar to Commander Bonamico, Vitale warned about the Anglo-American 
solidarity by stating that those people were coming from the same race, thus a 
formal alliance had to be made between them.29 Accordingly, England and the 
United States had stipulated a new convention which would support the Americans 
to gain the possession of the naval stations on Cuba, the key to the Gulf of Mexico, 
and to control the Antilles.30 Yet, the events that took place in Cuba could also be an 
advantage for the Cubans. The United States was guaranteeing a stable and secure 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 4. 
26 Ibid., 4-5. 
27 Ibid., 6. 
28 Ibid.,  7. 
29 Ibid., 7. 
30 Ibid., 13. 
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regime, thus the Cubans could benefit from that stability and develop their industry 
and increase production.31    
Nevertheless, Vitale acknowledged that the United States had entered a new 
era. The sentiments of liberty and independence were coming to an end as a result of 
the new current of imperialism, which was a degeneration of the spirit of 
nationalism. The War of 1898 affirmed that the aristocratic-military imperialism of 
the old Spanish kingdom was being transformed into the democratic-commercial 
imperialism of the young North American Confederation, and that was a genuine 
symbol of the global hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon race.32
The fears of a growing Anglo-American alliance that would end up with an 
Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the Old World were also revealed in Riflessioni sulla 
Guerra Marittima tra Spagna e Stati Uniti, in Relazione alla Marina Nostra 
[Reflections about the Maritime War between Spain and the United States in 
Relation to our Navy] which was published in 1898. Nothing is known about the 
writer since he used a pseudonym “Timone” (meaning helm in English) instead of 
his real name. Yet, he was evidently a southern officer in the Italian navy or a very 
nationalist political thinker Timone indicated that the war had opened the eyes of the 
governors of the “noble Latin nation.” He believed that the character of a nation 
could directly influence the politics of its government, and a country could have the 
desire to maintain the voice of its ancient fierceness without supporting that 
fierceness militarily.33  Timone was definitely searching for a Latin solidarity as an 
alternative to the one between the United States and England. He knew that Italy did 
not have continental or insular colonies except the ones in Eritrea, and the semi-
                                                 
31 Ibid., 17. 
32 Ibid., 8, 19, 20. 
33 Timone [pseud.], Riflessioni sulla Guerra Marittima tra Spagna e Stati Uniti, in Relazione alla 
Marina Nostra (Napoli: Stabilimento Tipografico R. Pesole, 1898), 8-9. 
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security of the Italians would be lost in the near future.34 Thus, the Italian navy 
should be immediately “cured” in order to protect the country from the future 
threats. Otherwise, the days of mourning would start for Italy similar to the days of 
the Spanish misfortune.35
Timone was deeply concerned with the renovation of the Italian navy. Like 
Bonamico, he believed that the national greatness of a country was strongly related 
to the power of its navy, and, as Timone suggested, the Italian navy had not been 
renovated for the last 38 years. According to him, the courageous, talented, and 
ingenius Simone de Saint Bon was the last commander who had modernized the 
Italian navy.36 But for the future, Italians needed strength to take the risks, and 
perseverance to achieve their purposes, and the Eagle of Savoy had the power to 
defeat its great rival under the shadow of the ancient Roman Eagle.37  The pamphlet 
ends with the words “Viva il Re—Viva la Marina!”38
 
 7.2 Italy and the Venezuela Crisis of 1902-03 
 
The Venezuelan crisis of 1902 occurred as a consequence of the unpaid debts 
of Venezuela to Britain, Germany and Italy. United States President Theodore 
Roosevelt called Venezuelan President Cipriano Castro “an unspeakably villainous 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 23, 24. 
35 Ibid., 35. 
36 Ibid., 40. Simone Pacoret de Saint Bon was born in Chambory in 1828, and died in Rome in 1892. 
He was sent on diplomatic missions to France and Great Britain in 1861-1865, and became the 
commander of the Naval Academy in Naples. In 1891, he established an important naval base in 
Taranto. He was also a senator. For more information, see 
http://www.marina.difesa.it/Storia/MOVM/Parte03/Bio03/MOVM305b.htmb, Date of Access: 
December 3, 2006. 
37 Ibid., 40. 
38 “Long live the King—Long Live the Navy” 
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little monkey,”39 because Castro resisted the pressure of the three countries which 
ultimately blockaded the Venezuelan coast to collect debts.  
When on November 25, 1902 Britain and Germany officially informed the 
Department of State that they planned to blockade the Venezuelan coast, “Secretary 
of State John Hay replied that the United States greatly deplored any European 
intervention in the affairs of the South American republic, while conceding that the 
action in this case was justifiable.”40 However, there was nothing for President 
Roosevelt to do except to send Admiral John Dewey in the gunboat, Mayflower to 
the Venezuelan coast on December 1 to observe the situation. On December 8, the 
British and German ambassadors in Caracas informed President Castro that they 
were closing their embassies in Venezuela. They were also planning to “initiate 
‘specific measures’ to satisfy their claims against Venezuela.”41 Italian claims 
against Venezuela started on December 17, and in order to protect Italian interests in 
Venezuela, the Italian foreign affairs minister Prinetti made a start. After referring to 
the offenses made against British and German citizens, violation of trading vessels 
and nonfulfillment of government contracts, the foreign affairs minister stated: 
 Italy has also considerable claims to make against Venezuela for 
damages to the property of Italian citizens during the insurrections which 
have now    been going on for years in that Republic. As early as April 
last the royal minister at Caracas, having exhausted all efforts for a 
friendly settlement, had presented to the Government of Venezuela a list 
of the claims examined by him, and which had reduced to the smallest 
amount possible, to be duly paid, and amounting to 2,810,255.95 bolivars 
… as soon as I was informed of the action of Germany and England, I 
communicated with the cabinets of Berlin and London … Italy’s 
proposal was willingly accepted … our fellow citizens will not lack 
                                                 
39 Judith Ewell, Venezuela and the United States: From Monroe’s Hemishere to Petroleum’s Empire, 
(Athens, Ga. & London: University of Georgia Press, 1996), reviewed by George W. Schuyler, H-
LatAm (March 1997), 2. 
40 Edmund Morris, “‘A Matter of Extreme Urgency’: Theodore Roosevelt, Wilhelm II, and the 
Venezuela Crisis of 1902 - United States-Germany conflict over alleged German expansionistic 
efforts in Latin America,” Naval War College Review (Spring 2002), 4.
41 Ibid., 4. 
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efficient protection, similar to that enjoyed by English and German 
subjects.42  
 
In this message, there are a few points that should be highlighted. Firstly, 
Prinetti informed the American ambassador that the situation in Venezuela was 
getting worse, and it warranted an intervention. Secondly, he stated that Italy was in 
communication with Britain and Germany, and thirdly—perhaps most 
importantly—Italy wanted to be treated equally with Britain and Germany. This 
message was repeated to American officials throughout the whole crisis. It reflected 
Italy’s effort, like that of the United States at the time, to become a great power 
measurable in terms of acquiring overseas territories, building a modern navy; and 
asserting itself as a significant diplomatic player.43  
On December 19, Italy officially informed the United States that starting 
with December 20, it was going to participate in the Anglo-German blockade of 
Venezuelan ports since “the United States of Venezuela [did] not satisfy Italian 
complaints.”44 In addition, Prinetti declared that Italy would be glad if the office of 
arbitrator of the claims which the Governments of Italy, Germany and England had 
against Venezuela might be assumed by Roosevelt by guaranteeing that the same 
treatment would be provided to all governments.45  
  Cipriano Castro answered the questions about the payment of the debts and 
arbitration with a telegraph in which he stated that the payments were delayed due to 
the civil war in Venezuela. He also supported the idea of an immediate settlement of 
                                                 
42 [Enclosure—Translation] G. V. L. Meyer to John Hay, Rome, December 17, 1902, FRUS (1903), 
602.  
43 Paul Kennedy, Rise and Fall of Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), 203-6.  
44 Ibid., [Subenclosure--Translation] Mr. Meyer to Mr. Hay, Rome, December 21, 1902, 604.  
45 Ibid., [Enclosure—Translation] Mr. Meyer to Mr. Hay, Rome, December 25, 1902, 605. 
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the problem at the Hague or by the arbitration of an American republic,  but not the 
United States.46  The United States did not accept that suggestion. 
  One of the champions of Anglo-American solidarity was unquestionably 
Theodore Roosevelt. He strongly believed “in the oneness of the American and 
British interest … and in the combination [with which] the Americans and the 
British could dominate the world—to the advantage of civilization.”47  In addition—
regarding the Venezuela crisis of 1902—he thought that Germany, not Britain, was 
the most threatening part since its imperialist aims had gained impetus in the late 
nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Roosevelt believed that Germany had 
the desire of establishing a strongly fortified place near the future isthmian canal, 
which would be a great disadvantage for American hegemony in the Caribbean.48 
Thus, the main antagonist of the 1902 crisis from his perspective was Germany.    
Roosevelt’s Anglo-Saxonism was particularly related to the common ethnic 
origin of the British and American nations. As a patriot, he definitely believed in the 
greatness of the American nation, and that greatness was related to the white, Anglo-
Saxon, English-speaking race of which the British constituted a significant part. 
Influenced by Darwinian scientific explanations, Roosevelt placed the “white” race 
at the top of racial hierarchy, but he also welcomed the Europeans who aspired to 
become Americans regardless of their ethnic, religious and social origins. He 
believed that America was a melting pot in which a hybrid race could be formed, 
and that mix would create and sustain American racial superiority.49   
                                                 
46[Enclosure—Translation] Mr. Hay to Mr. Meyer, Washington, December 31, 1902, 606. 
47 Ibid., 85. 
48 Morris, “A Matter of Extreme Urgency,”  6.
49 Gary Gerstle, “Theodore Roosevelt and the Divided Character of American Nationalism,” The 
Journal of American History 86 (1999), 1281.  
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  He felt that his “true Americanism” allowed him to welcome all “racially 
inferior” European immigrants to become Americans.50 This was presumably 
behind the inclusion of Jews, Italians and African Americans in Roosevelt’s Rough 
Riders. The Americans, of different ethnic backgrounds, fought for liberty and 
human rights against one of the most powerful tyrants of the Old World according to 
Roosevelt. In brief, Roosevelt’s racism was based on the supremacy of the Anglo-
Saxon race, but other Europeans could also become Americans by submitting 
themselves to the ideals and principles of Americanism. 
  Roosevelt had mixed feelings about the Italy and its people. When he went to 
Italy in 1887, he wrote a letter to his siste Anna Roosevelt in which he stated that 
Italy was a country where there was an immense manual labor. However, he did not 
like the people, and said “Praise heaven for America—even with the alderman and 
the anarchists.”51 Significantly, Theodore Roosevelt made a comment about the fall 
of the Latin races: 
          I feel very strongly that the English-speaking peoples are now   
closer together … their interests are really fundamentally the same 
they are far more closely akin, not merely in blood, but in feeling 
and principle … The day of the Latin races is over … we must 
         stand together!52   
From this perspective, Italians did not constitute one of Theodore 
Roosevelt’s favorite ethnic groups. Most of the Italians did not arrive in the United 
States with the intention of becoming Americans. Italians represented the scum of 
Europe as Roosevelt’s friend, Jacob Riis noted in his work entitled How the Other 
Half Lives. They did not eagerly dissolve in the melting pot that formed the ideal 
mix of the American nation. In short, Roosevelt did not like Italians. Regarding the 
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New Orleans lynching of 1891, he told “various dago diplomats” that lynching was 
“rather a good thing.”53 Conceivably, the only common idea and policy that the 
Italian officials and Roosevelt shared was the preventive measures that should be 
taken against anarchy as mentioned in Chapter 6. 
 
Figure 7.3 Theodore Roosevelt and Judge Bernard Barasa, Municipal Court, 
standing with Italian soldiers in railroad station, Chicago Daily News, 1918 (The 
Library of Congress: American Memory), http://memory.loc.gov/  
 
Theodore Roosevelt was not the favorite American president for the Italians 
on the other side of the Atlantic either. He was not praised or admired like Abraham 
Lincoln or Woodrow Wilson in the pre-Versailles era. Roosevelt was a prominent 
name both in the world and in Italy, and he had also the virtues and defects of a 
strong man; he had a lot of friends, but also a lot of enemies who fought with him 
and denigrated him.54 According to the Italians, he was a successful president who 
fought with trusts, and promulgated special laws against anarchism. However, he 
                                                 
53 Roosevelt quoted in Beale, Theodore Roosevelt, 53. 
54 Vito Garretto, Storia degli Stati Uniti dell’America, 448. 
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was not interested in the situation of the blacks, and that created a discontent in his 
country.55
In the end, the Venezuela crisis came to an end when Britain accepted the 
American proposal about arbitration, and also persuaded Germany to accept the 
condition. An agreement about the crisis was reached on May 7, 1903 that declared 
that the Tribunal at the Hague should decide how the revenues would be divided 
between the blockading powers.56 The Venezuela crisis provoked the United States 
Congress to welcome Roosevelt’s appeal for a buildup of American naval power as 
well as Roosevelt’s assertion of his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.57
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
The late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries were the times when 
American imperialism started to accelerate, and Italians were aware of that fact. 
With the Spanish-American War, the reality about U.S. expansionism became more 
visible. The Italian politicians, soldiers and intellectuals approached the issue from 
different perspectives. Firstly, they understood that Old World imperialism in the 
New World came to an end with the defeat of the Spanish navy in Cuba. Secondly, 
they also knew that there was a traditional alliance between the American and 
British nations, and a possible alliance could also include Germany. In 1910, 
Roosevelt visited Italy again and met the Italian king, but his biases about the Latin 
race come to the surface once again: 
                                                 
55 Umberto Biasoli, Piccola Storia, 77. 
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The king showed that he was deeply and intelligently interested in 
every moment for social reform, and was not only astonishingly 
liberal but even radical, sympathizing with many of the purposes and 
doctrines of the Socialists … I should have liked to see more of him; 
but after all I am doubtful whether it would have been worth while, 
for even with the pleasantest and kindliest king there must of 
necessity be a little that is artificial in association with a civilian 
foreigner, and especially a civilian foreigner from a huge 
democracy.58
 
That racial ideology and policy making could be very dangerous for the 
Italians who were originally Latin like the Spanish, and who also traditionally 
lacked a strong navy. Due to the development of Italian nationalism, jingoistic 
voices about the greatness and strength of the Italian navy began to be heard. 
Professional naval strategists like Bonamico expressed the dangers that were 
awaiting the Italians if they did not renovate their navy. In brief, Italians anticipated 
that the American continents were going to be ruled under the hegemony of the 
United States, and possible Anglo-Saxon solidarities could endanger the future of 
Italy. America was acting according to its designs about becoming a great power by 
centering its might on the idea of racial superiority and naval supremacy, and Italy 
had to enhance its national power at least in its own region, and possibly the 
Atlantic. 
         The Venezuela crisis of 1902-03 can be examined from this perspective. In 
December 1902, Italy decided to join the Anglo-German blockade at the last minute. 
Its main objective was to recover its debts from the Venezuelan government, but 
Italy would not act alone in that blockade if Britain and Germany had not decided to 
do so. Afraid of yielding to a complete Anglo-American alliance, Italy preferred to 
be on the side of the Americans, the British and the Germans. By requesting 
arbitration from Roosevelt, the Italian officials wanted to secure America’s support 
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in their relations with South America. Therefore, they decided to be on the side of 
the United States which had declared its hegemony over the whole American 
continent in the last years of the nineteenth century. Thus one would-be great power 
could gain acknowledgement of its own rise by itself acknowledging the rise of 
another. 
 208
  
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
 
AMERICA AND NORTH AFRICA: DIFFERENT TYPES OF  
 
ITALIAN COLONIALISM 
 
 
 
  As an outcome of the Italian unification, the second half of the nineteenth 
century witnessed a preindustrial Italian imperialism that was heavily based on 
agriculture. Colonization—settling men on the land—was one of the major concerns 
of Italian imperial policy.1 The Italian policy makers considered that a greater Italy 
or an Italian empire could be established through emigration. Consequently, all of 
the places that Italians migrated to became potential Italian colonies. From 
Argentina to Asia Minor and from the United States to Libya, Italy sought to 
establish its colonies in different forms. But the definition of the word “colony” 
changed from one place to another. This chapter will seek to clarify some aspects of 
Italian colonialism by referring to Italian colonial activities in North Africa and 
America, and the United States’ attitude about Italian expansionism both in the Old 
and the New World.   
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8.1 From the Heirs of Ancient Rome to a “Proletarian Nation”: The Features of 
Italian Colonialism 
 
  Italian colonialism is important because it was central to the construction of 
nationhood for the newly united kingdom. 2  In order to understand the meaning of 
Italian colonialism, a thorough definition of this term should be provided. Firstly, it 
should be stated that there was a strong connection between the idea of colonization 
and the consequences of Italian emigration. Significantly in the late nineteenth 
century, Italian liberals wished for the Italian emigrants to establish spontaneous 
colonies that would enhance the economic conditions of the Italian kingdom. An 
“ethnographic empire” built through the peaceful toil of emigrant laborers could 
produce “colonies of direct dominion” that followed the footsteps of the ancient 
Roman Empire.3
The double meaning of the word colonìa was first mentioned by Leone Carpi 
in 1874. Being one of the first Italian intellectuals who studied Italian colonialism, 
Carpi stated that the word “colony” referred to both overseas expansion and the 
emigrant settlements in foreign countries, thus emigration was a form of colonial 
expansion.4 Similar to Carpi’s approach, Francesco Crispi, the first Italian 
imperialist politician who became the prime minister in 1887, designed a definition 
for colonization: 
The [Italian] Government … must never lose sight of [emigrants] in 
their new home … Colonies must be like arms that the country 
extends far away in foreign districts, to bring them within the orbit of 
                                                 
2 Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Mia Fuller, eds. Italian Colonialism (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 
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3 Mark I. Choate, “From Territorial to Ethnographic Colonies and Back Again: the Politics of Italian 
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its relations of labor and exchange, they must be like an enlargement 
of boundaries of its action and its economic power.5     
 
Crispi was a leader who longed for the national greatness of the Italian people and 
for a strong Italian foreign policy. Hence he aspired to have solid ties with the 
scattered Italian population all around the word by establishing cultural and 
economic bonds between the migrants and their mother country. In brief, starting 
with Crispi, Italian policy makers aimed at establishing ethnographic colonies in the 
Americas, and direct dominion in North Africa. Crispi was an example for the 
southern politicians who were in a search for land where Italy’s surplus population 
could be settled in prosperity under the Italian flag.6
  Nevertheless, Luigi Einaudi—later the first president of the Italian Republic 
in 1948—introduced a different colonial perspective in his book,  A Merchant 
Prince: A Study of Italian Colonial Expansion published in 1900. He hoped to 
establish a colonial myth of Italy’s medieval republics, whereas Crispi fantasized a 
new Roman Empire.7 Instead of North Africa, Einaudi presented South America as 
the ideal place of Italian colonization; he was an example for the northern traders, 
bankers and manufacturers who were in a search for markets, natural resources and 
investment opportunities,8 although he neglected the fact the number of the Italian 
merchants sent abroad was very few. 
The first Italian colonial society, Società Geografica Italiana [Italian 
Geographic Society] (SGI ) was founded in Florence in 1867, and moved to Rome in 
1871 when the Eternal City became the capital of the Italian Kingdom. The 
membership of the society was dominated by political, military and diplomatic not 
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scientific interests. Also, the society was an organization that was seriously 
interested in emigration problems and searched for scientific solutions. In the 1880s, 
the Neapolitan Società Africana d’Italia [African Society of Italy] was established 
with the aim of establishing colonies in North and East Africa that would serve as 
markets for Italian commerce and destinations for southern emigration.9
The Italian Kingdom was the last European state that moved toward Africa 
during the imperialist movement that was initiated by Belgian King Leopold II’s 
activities in Africa, and German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s colonial policies.10 
However, colonialism was generally neglected in late nineteenth-century Italy. 
Firstly, Italy became a united country as a consequence of national self-
determination; hence colonialism was completely contradictory to the Italian 
character according to the liberal politicians. Secondly, Italy was not a developed 
country like France and England, and economic underdevelopment was an important 
obstacle for its overseas expansion. That was why the Italian governments gave the 
impression of being extremely cautious about colonialism during the age of 
European imperialism. That caution began to disappear when the Italian state 
colonized the Asab settlement in Africa11 notwithstanding Italian apologists who 
emphasized this different position of Italy in regard to imperialism and colonization. 
They referred to the backwardness of Italy, and stated that it needed lands in other 
parts of the world where the Italian emigrants could go, settle and prosper.  
The idea of Italian demographic colonization entered a different period with 
the Sicilian Prime Minister, Francesco Crispi, who indicated that Italy had a 
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historical mission in Africa. Suggesting later nationalist and fascist rhetoric, he 
stated that that mission was dictated by Italy’s maritime history and geography, and 
the Atlantic Ocean and the Red Sea were the seas where “[Italians’] fathers cleared 
the path to new civilization.”12 However, Crispi was a hesitant politician; he did not 
show his enthusiasm for the colonialist cause in the Parliament, and never voted in 
favor of the colonial enterprises during his two ministries.13 He always stated that he 
inherited the colonial policy of Italy, and the defeat of Italian forces at Adowa by 
Menelik II of Ethiopia in 1896 brought Crispi’s political end but intensified the 
nationalist feelings of the Italians.   
Italian imperial activities in Africa that started with Crispi can be divided 
into three parts. The first period started with the acquisition of Eritrea and 
Somaliland and came to an end with the Italian defeat at Adowa in 1896. The second 
phase for the quest for an Italian colonial empire began with the occupation of the 
Turkish territory of Libya in 1911, which had become an important land for the 
Italians especially after the French occupation of Tunisia. In this period, Italy also 
gained the control of the Dodecanese Islands that had a significant strategic 
importance. By 1914, Italy expanded its territory to Eritrea, Somali and Libya. The 
final stage of Italian colonialism in Africa started with the conquest of Ethiopia in 
1935-6. Fascist Italy gave a particular importance to overseas expansion of the 
Italian Empire. Mussolini, obsessed by the Italian defeat in Adowa, stated that “the 
tendency to Empire [was] a manifestation of vitality, [and] its contrary or the ‘stay at 
home’ mentality [was] a sign of decadence.”14 As a consequence, he combined 
Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia in a united Italian East Africa in 1936. 
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The most important and influential colonial society in the post-Adowa 
period, the Istituto Coloniale Italiano [Italian Colonial Institute] was established in 
1906 by the prominent colonial advocates and geographers with government 
subsidies. The society was one of the few organizations that made scientific studies 
about Italian emigration. In 1890, it published a book entitled, Researches about 
Italian Emigration to Foreign Countries, and discussed the profound problems 
about emigration in three congresses in 1892, 1895 and 1898.15  Its first president 
was the future foreign affairs minister, Antonino di San Giuliano. Another future 
foreign minister of Italy, Baron Sidney Sonnino was also a member of the institute. 
These people also favored the creation of magna Italia in Africa. San Giuliano 
stated that the nation’s chief export was not capital but peasants, and Italy needed a 
suitable empire for its development.16  
The expansionist cause that was inflamed in the early 1900s gained impetus 
also with the literary movements of the period. The Italian nationalists utilized 
literature to defend Italian expansionist objectives. One of the leading spokesmen of 
the nationalist ideology, Errico Corradini stated that Italy’s condition could be 
improved by converting the spirit of emigration to the spirit of colonialism and 
imperialism. In that way, Italians could become a great nation.17 Another significant 
name that had a great influence on twentieth-century Italian colonialism was 
Giovanni Pascoli who summarized Italian expansionism in his oration, “La Grande 
Proletaria si è Mossa!” [The Great Proletariat is Stirred!] on November 26, 1911.18 
The “great proletariat” that Pascoli referred to was the Italian nation because Italians 
did not have any wealth except their physical power. The poet noted the 
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humiliations that the Italian immigrants faced in other countries. For instance, he 
indicated that the Italian immigrant were treated like Negroes in the United States; 
they were lynched in an inhumane manner. Thus, Italians had to go to North Africa, 
to Libya, as the successors of the Roman Empire, in order to overcome the 
humiliations of emigration and to have a proper population outlet. From that 
perspective, the war was a test of national unity.19 American nativist violence helped 
encouraged Italian imperialism in Africa.   
Undoubtedly, Libya was one of the significant symbols of the Italian 
nationalist movement. It was the “Promised Land assigned by Providence to 
Italy.”20 The motive that lay behind Italian colonization in Libya was the mission 
that Italy embraced with the rise of nationalism: bringing civilization to the 
neglected parts of the world. A typical attitude that promoted Italian national 
greatness in relation to colonial expansion in Africa was Chevalier Tullio Irace’s 
With the Italians in Tripoli, published in 1912. The book is a rich source about the 
Italian occupation of Libya that shows Crispi’s thoughts about Africa. It consists of 
numerous maps and illustrations. Irace started his account by declaring that the 
world owed nothing to the Turks except distress, and to Italy its present civilization 
to a great extent.21 For him, the occupation of places like Tripoli and Benghazi, 
which resembled old Italian towns, was very natural since Young Italy had drawn 
once more the sword of the Caesars in Northern Africa.22  The conquest of Libya 
was not an invasion; it was “a great work of civilization.”23 Nevertheless, Irace also 
referred to the anti-Italian campaigns that would urge the Italians to “an 
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International Conference for the purpose of putting an end to the war in the interest 
of the Turks.”24 Irace declared that Italy was going to continue its expansion on its 
“fourth shore” as the redeemer of the deprived people despite all criticism. While 
promoting Italian imperialism he preferred to refer to Italians as “the proletariat 
nation” like the poet Giovanni Pascoli did: 
      The Italians are returning today to this land which belonged to them of 
Old, and in which their glorious ancestors have left many traces of  
      civilization and greatness that even the Arabs and the Turks have never 
      been able to efface … Italy, the world’s greatest proletariat, Italy, the  
      simple-hearted, the laborious, more used to suffer than enjoy; Italy the 
      redeemed of barely fifty years, steps down today into the arena, fit and 
      ready to become in her own good time the redeemer of other lands and  
      other peoples!25        
 
In 1915, Italy’s friends Britain and France gave the promise of African 
compensations to Italy as a reward for entering World War I. However, after 1919, 
Britain offered only a small land on the Egyptian-Libyan Frontier and a Kenyan 
province, and France made small adjustments of the Tunisian-Libyan frontier.26 The 
outcomes of the Italian colonialism in North Africa ended with frustration and 
anger. Once more, the major powers of the Old World showed that they regarded 
Italy as the least power among themselves. 
 
               8.2 Italian Government’s Emigration Policy   
 
                 Being convinced of migration’s economic benefits to the Italian kingdom as 
well as to the poor contadini, the Italian government encouraged the emigration of 
southern Italians as “a ‘safety valve’ lessening the social tensions that might 
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otherwise have exploded into revolt.”27  However, with the increase in the number 
of the Italian migrants, the government continued to promote return migration and 
intended to control emigration and to take necessary precautions to carry on labor 
and return migration successfully.             
                 Initially, Italians used an efficient way to control migration: the padrone 
system, “which was a logical outcome of the economic individualism and ‘amoral 
familism’ of south Italian society.”28   The padroni provided connections of the 
unskilled Italian laborers to the world, and “Italian laborers were not slaves but 
rather ‘servi’ (clients or dependents) to their padroni ... patronage was an integral 
part of Italian life at every level of society.”29  Those “patrons” or “bosses” found 
jobs for the unskilled immigrant workers, “supervised them at work ... [and] did not 
hesitate to protect their investment by maintaining a prison-like control over the 
workers.”30  For their “service,” the padroni received a fee called la bossatura.31  
This management of Italian labor in foreign countries was vital for the Italian 
government before the mass migration. “In 1868, Italy’s Minister of the Interior 
actually instructed mayors not to issue permission to emigrants to go to Algeria or 
America without a padrone.”32  Because of a shortage of labor during the Civil War, 
the United States authorized contract labor in 1864. Thus, the padrone system helped 
the Italian immigrants “in introducing them in the American labor world,”33 and was 
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the  Italian government’s first policy of emigration, previously “left to take its own 
course without receiving encouragement or obstacles of any kind.”34
                Francesco Crispi, who became the Prime Minister in August 1887, believed 
that emigration had to be a part of Italy’s foreign policy, and the government had to 
focus on the Italian population abroad for both the migrants’ and Italy’s benefit.35  
“If Italy was going to be a great power, every sector of its foreign policy had to 
function in that scope ... the emigrants, too, had to contribute to a ‘winning’ image 
of Italy abroad.”36  For that purpose, the role of the Italian representatives abroad 
had to be strengthened. Thus, the opening of the Italian Information and Protection 
Bureau at Ellis Island in 1894 was regarded in Italy as a significant diplomatic 
achievement.  Both the United States and Italian governments supported the Bureau 
to combat the padrone system. 
The U.S. government regarded the padroni as a menace on American soil, 
prohibiting contract labor by federal statute in 1885.  To enforce this law, an Italian 
Bureau on the Ellis Island would be a great advantage for the Americans since the 
desirable immigrants would be separated from the undesired padroni with the 
support of the Italian government. The Bureau was opened with the support of the 
United States Treasury, and existed for five years. It actually offered little protection 
to the Italian immigrants.  Its main objective was not to fight the padroni, but, as 
Fava wished, “to find employment directly for [Italian] people and to scatter them 
through the States especially in the agricultural districts.”37 On 10 July 1894, Fava 
wrote to Alberto Blanc: “My success in obtaining the Office on Ellis is directly 
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related to my careful use of the argument that it is the United States government that 
must take steps to suppress the evils of the bosses and speculators.”38  For the Italian 
government, the Bureau was going to initiate the desired transitional process for the 
Italian immigrants by sending them to the areas specifically selected for colonization 
programs.39   
                With the Emigration Act of 1901, the Italian government advanced its 
emigration policy. Emigration “ceased to be a gentlemanly discussion of economic 
and social change, and became instead a clamour for imperialism.”40  Italian 
emigration was the major basis for colonization, and “in mass emigration 
nationalists found the justification for Italian colonialism.”41    The method of 
colonization was widely discussed, but Italian nationalists agreed that the 
government had to stimulate colonization by regulating emigration in order to 
compete with the leading powers in Europe.  
                 The following extract is from “The Ten Commandments for Italians Abroad” 
which was published on December 25, 1912, in Rivista Coloniale (Colonial Review) 
by the Istituto Coloniale Italiano (Italian Colonial Institute). The institution was 
significant  for “the nearness of the membership to those who made foreign policy. 
... Vice-Presidents were two former Ministers of Foreign Affairs, San Giuliano and 
Guicciardini.”42 The commandments demonstrate the continuity in Italy’s policy 
about emigration in the twentieth century: 
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1. The patria is one only. Your patria is Italy. No other 
country can be loved by you like Italy. ... 
7.   Do not take fellow citizens away from patria, allowing your 
descendants to lose their italianità and be absorbed by the 
people among whom you have emigrated. Educate your sons in 
the cult of Italy. ... 
8.Be proud to declare yourself, always, on every occasion, an 
Italian by origin and sentiment, and be respectful without 
servility among those who give you hospitality.43
 
                 The “new” Italian immigrants in the United States seem to have obeyed 
these “Ten Commandments,” for they continued to live in their own communities, 
or “ethnic colonies,” and preserved their lifestyles. In this regard, the Italian policy 
of colonization proved stronger than the American policy of citizenship. The first 
immigrants were usually single young men who came to America to earn money to 
buy land or to pay dowries.  The ones who were married left their families behind. 
Other family members went to the United States after the father had sent them 
tickets and money.  As well as their family union, the southern Italians brought 
brigandage, Mafia and Camorra—criminal activity—from Italy to the United 
States. “The propensity for violence of the south Italians was not a symptom of 
social disorganization caused by emigration but a characteristic of their Old World 
culture.”44  These organizations were manifestations of the “patron-client type” of 
relation that flourished in the mezzogiorno, which was an important aspect of 
southern Italian culture that the immigrants continued to preserve in the United 
States.      
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8.3 Italian Agricultural Colonies in the United States 
 
  After the 1880s, the number of the Italian immigrants increased rapidly in 
major cities of the United States. That was not a desired situation for both the Italian 
and United States governments. Americans did not prefer to receive immigrants in 
large numbers in major industrial centers. The immigrants could not become 
assimilated, lived in isolation and were manipulated in the hands of the illegal 
padroni. The Italian policy about those illegal bosses was strict since their presence 
was a hindrance to the Italian government’s economic control over its emigrants.         
Italians aimed to divert their immigrants to the southern parts of the United States 
where they could have the chance to establish agricultural colonies. At this point, it 
should be stated that Italian officials were referring to the authentic meaning of 
colonization, which “generally means the distribution of farm laborers and farm 
lands to agricultural sections, and their eventual conversion into farm owners.”45 
The southern states seemed to be the very best section of the country for the Italian 
immigrants where their work was most needed. Thus, they had to “leave the 
congested cities and seek a purer atmosphere in agricultural work.”46  
The Italian Foreign Affairs Minister was Alberto Blanc when the Bureau was 
opened in 1894. Blanc personally gave a great importance to the establishment of 
Italian agricultural colonies in the southern part of the United States. Therefore, the 
Italian government celebrated the establishment of the Italian Information and 
Protection Bureau at the Ellis Island with the publication of the 78th Libro Verde 
[Green Book]. The book is a significant source that provides of information about 
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the idea of having agricultural colonies in the United States. It is a compilation of 
the reports sent by all of the Italian consuls in the United States. After stating that 
the padrone system was a menace to the Italian immigrants in America, Blanc 
indicated the importance of protecting them from the illegal intermediaries and the 
violence of the Lynch Law by establishing a “Labor Office” in New York.47    
The book continues with the reports of the Italian consuls in the United 
States. From the published documents, it is clear that some Italian diplomatic 
officials were in favor of an agricultural colonization in America. But in big 
industrial cities like New York, Chicago or Philadelphia this was not possible since 
the Italian immigrants continued to be ignorant and isolated laborers who could not 
even talk in the language of their adopted country. Therefore, as Ambassador Baron 
Francesco Saverio Fava stated, the Italian immigration in the United States had to be 
directed to the agricultural centers in order to give the opportunity of prosperity to 
the immigrants.48  
The Green Book continues with the observations of Professor Alessandro 
Oldrini who agreed with Baron Fava. Professor Oldrini indicated that the Italians in 
the United States did not have protection, and there were some Italians living in 
Texas, Alabama and significantly California, but not enough for agricultural 
colonies.49 Another important detail about the Green Book is the fact that the reports 
of some consuls contradicted the others. For instance, the report of the Italian consul 
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in New Orleans, Carlo Motta, who witnessed the New Orleans lynching, was deleted 
because he was uncertain about the usefulness of Italians owning property in the 
American South.50 Nevertheless, Blanc encouraged Fava to lobby the United States 
government to admit Italians over the other immigrants in the Southern states.51
Did the Italian government succeed in diverting its emigrants to the 
agricultural parts of the United States? The answer to this question is no since the 
Italian officials made no effort for those intended colonies after the publication of 
The Green Book and the establishment of Information Bureau at the Ellis Island. The 
Bureau was closed in 1899, and the problem of Italian immigration in northern 
United States cities continued. The extract below is from a speech of Tommaso 
Tittoni who was the foreign affairs minister in 1905. He referred to Henry Cabot 
Lodge’s visit to Rome and indicated the ongoing Italian immigration to the United 
States:      
Senator Lodge remarked he would be favorable to Italian 
immigration if, instead of stagnating in the large cities, it 
were to be directed to the agricultural States. The Hon. di 
San Giuiliano has pointed out the difficulties of directing 
these streams of emigration to the west.  I think he has been 
excessively pessimistic to the possibility of directing them 
to the south and southwest. Our Ambassador has recently 
undertaken a trip to those regions to make a close study of 
them and has everywhere been received with great honors. 
At Austin, for instance, he was admitted to speak before the 
assembled State Legislature, an honor which could not be 
greater, and he spoke of the opportunity of Italian 
immigration and found applauding hearers. He expressed 
above all a very just idea, that is to say, that the Italian 
emigrant should not be considered as a possible substitute 
for negro or Mexican labor, but as a civilized laborer, with 
a sentiment of dignity worthy of placing him on the same 
level as the American laborer … we should fail to our most 
elementary duty if we did not study this question with every 
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attention and did not make effort towards directing our 
emigrants to those regions.52
 
Apparently the Italian officials could not achieve their plan for a mass agricultural 
colonization in the United States, and they were still searching for a solution. 
However, there were some organizations that assisted the government’s 
colonization plan, and established individual colonies in the southern United States. 
In 1905, the above mentioned Italian ambassador visited one of those colonies 
during his visit in America.  
 
8.4 Tontitown: An Agricultural Colony in Arkansas   
  
Due to the increasing intensity of the emigration problem of Italy and the 
deprived conditions in which the emigrants were living in other countries, the 
discussions about preserving the italianitá of those people became stronger in the 
mother country.  The Italian “political” Catholics like the Bishop of Piacenza, 
Giovanni Battista Scalabrini, and the Bishop of Cremona, Geremia Bonomelli, 
warned the emigrants about the “perils of the deep, and of that soul-destroying 
Protestantism or godless materialism and socialism which waited upon them in the 
New World,” and searched for the ways to institutionalize Catholicism in emigrant 
communities which  would move hand in hand with Italian nationalism. 53  
Bishop Scalabrini (1839-1906), is one of the most significant names in the 
development of Catholicism among Italian immigrants in the United States.  In Italy, 
he was first clergy who organized the religious and social assistance to Italian 
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immigrants in South and North America.54 In 1888, Scalabrini asked for permission 
from Pope Leo XIII to establish at Piacenza the Istituto Missionario Cristoforo 
Colombo [Christopher Columbus Missionary Institute](later renamed the 
Congregazione dei Missionari di San Carlo [Congregation of Saint Charles 
Missionaries]) to train priests for overseas missions to Italian migrants and a lay 
association (the Societá di San Raffaele [San Raphael Society]) to provide material 
and moral assistance to them.55 It is widely known that the Italian Kingdom was in 
conflict with the Catholic Church from the first days of the Risorgimento, but the 
problem of emigration became a common issue for these two powers. In fact, 
Bishop Scalabrini had a significant influence on the Italian government, and the 
people who established St. Raphael’s Society for Italian Immigrants in Italy acted 
under the direct influence of Scalabrini.56   Also, in addition to the papacy and 
Italian hierarchy, the interested European laity blamed substandard pastoral care in 
the United States. Thus, the American clergy “adopted a policy of providing Italians 
with national parishes in which compatriot clergy and sisters offered continuity in 
language and devotional customs.”57  And that compatriot clergy became an 
important component of the development of Italian colonies in the United States.  
  In 1895 Austin Corbin, a wealthy resident of New York City, sought 
inexpensive Italian workers to work his land in Chicot County, Arkansas on the 
Mississippi River, which was an ideal place for his cotton plantation. Prince 
Ruspoli, the Mayor of Rome, supported Corbin in his plan for sending 100 Italian 
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families to the colony annually for five years. Each family was to be sold 20 acres of 
land with various improvements, and for these tracts the families were to pay $2,000 
each over a 20 year period.58  Ruspoli also wrote a letter to Scalabrini indicating that 
the colony should be established with the moral cooperation of a missionary.59 The 
first group arrived in Chicot County in December, 1895, and named their colony 
Sunnyside. Corbin had chosen Father Pietro Bandini, organizer and at that time 
secretary of the St. Raphael Society of the United States for the Protection of Italian 
immigrants, to direct the colony.60 In fact, Father Bandini had arrived in New York 
in 1891 to open the Italian office at Ellis Island. He also had a strong relation with 
Scalabrini, and the two men corresponded in the early 1890s about Bandini’s plans 
of establishing colonies in Alabama, Wyoming and the border line between the 
United States and Canada.61  
Shortly after the establishment of Sunnyside, Austin Corbin died, and the 
colonists began to scatter as a consequence of the harsh climate and malaria. Some 
returned to Italy, and some went to South America. Father Bandini persuaded the 
remaining 35 colonists to accompany him to Northwest Arkansas. They left 
Sunnyside on February 17, 1898, and on April 6. “Father Bandini then organized the 
settlers into a community, directing them to grow apple orchards and grape vines 
which were familiar crops to [the] farmers [from central and northern Italy],”62 and 
gave the name of the Italian explorer, Enrico Tonti (1650-1704) to the new Italian 
colony. 
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60 Fontinel, “History of Tontitown.” 
61 Letter from Bandini to Scalabrini, July 31, 1891, Rosoli, “La Colonizzazione Italiana,” 363. 
62 “Tontitown’s Founding Priest Dies: Father Bandini Honored Here and in Italian Home,” The 
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       The first years in Tontitown were not very easy. The Italian immigrants had 
crop problems, and prejudiced locals attempted to burn the Catholic Church and to 
frighten the colonists.63 Nevertheless, the Italians developed an ideal colony in 
Tontitown under the leadership of Bandini. The Italian Ambassador in the United 
States, Baron Edmondo des Planches visited Tontitown on May 16, 1905. The visit 
was a major event. Hundreds of people waited for his arrival, and the ambassador 
was welcomed by a salute of guns and the waving of American and Italian flags in 
Tontitown. Baron des Planches attended a reception and made brief talks to Father 
Bandini and other residents of Tontitown. He also encouraged the Italian immigrants 
to strengthen their ties with the United States by describing Northwest Arkansas as 
the most progressive section of the country he had seen.64 Later, des Planches 
mentioned his visit in an address at St. Louis: 
I went  into a strange and beautiful country . . . and found my 
people happy, contented, prosperous, upright and respected 
citizens . . . . During my stay in Tontitown, I have 
investigated carefully my people, their habits and 
environment, and the manner in which they were treated by 
their neighbors. Many of them came into the locality without 
a dollar and hardly a coat to their backs. Today every man in 
the colony owns a farm and has paid for it, while a good 
many of them have a good-sized bank account. They have 
built up a model little village from one or two huts and 
hovels, and are supplied with all the conveniences of modern 
times, including a post-office and telephone system .  .  . 
There has been but one death in five years, and never an 
arrest in the history of the colony.. The men are respected by 
their business associates, and not one has ever failed to pay a 
bill or an obligation.65
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The ambassador’s observations indicated that Bandini achieved what the Italian and 
United States governments had been aspiring to for a long time. In Tontitown, the 
Italian immigrants were transformed into happy and prosperous respected citizens. 
They were no more illiterate and poor immigrants, and they also showed that Italian 
emigration could be transformed into a functional type of colonization which could 
be favorable for both the United States and Italian officials.    
By 1917, more than 85 families were living in Tontitown and the grape crop 
was flourishing.66 Father Pietro Bandini introduced the silkworm industry to the 
Italian immigrants. He published two articles about the problems of Italians in 1908 
and 1911, and supported the establishment of the Catholic Colonization Society in 
1910 of which he became the vice president because of his dynamism and 
exemplary altruism.67 Bandini also received a gold medal from the Italian 
government and an award from the Vatican in 1911. He died of a stroke on January 
2, 1917, but his colony never diminished.  
There were other Italian agricultural colonies in the United States besides 
Tontitown like Knobview and Marshfield in Missouri; St. Helena, North Carolina; 
the Gangi Farm of Progressive Agriculture in Ladson, Daphne and Lambert in 
Alabama; Natchez, Canton, Gulfport, and Greenville in Mississippi; Bryan (2,500 
Sicilians under the leadership of Father Giovanni Militello), Dickinson, Galveston 
and Houston in Texas, Vineland and Hamilton in New Jersey, and Avon, Genesco 
and Mount Morris in New York.68 However, they were not always successful like 
Bandini’s Tontitown. For instance, the presence of Italians in St. Helena increased 
white hostility in the surrounding township where Italians were described as 
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foreigners whose speech, custom, and religion identified them as outsiders.69 The 
failure of the Italian agricultural colonies was partly related to the political, social 
and economic factors in the southern states, including the collapse of cotton prices 
and periodic depressions after the Civil War70, and partly to the irresolute and 
inconsistent emigration policy of the Italian kingdom.  
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
        Colonialism started as a required commercial and political activity for the 
Italian kingdom after the Risorgimento. Specific political leaders had a significant 
role in accelerating the idea of imperialism and colonization, whereas some others 
did not get involved with the issue. For instance, Francesco Crispi was a significant 
policy maker who initiated the idea of Italian imperialism as a consequence of his 
scheme of Italian national greatness. Italian expansionist policy was postponed after 
the Battle of Adowa, and the period of Crispi’s main adversary started. Giovanni 
Giolitti did not give a real importance to Italian colonialism, but the situation 
changed with the rise of Italian nationalism. In general, national greatness was the 
leading factor for the development of Italian colonial activities, but because of the 
contradictions between the policy makers, the aspects of colonialism could not 
become clarified. Italy could not develop a coherent colonial policy and endeavored 
to adapt different definitions to different situations. Its agricultural colonization 
policy in the United States was a combination of the Italian quest for national 
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greatness and emigration policy. Italian policy makers aspired to have social and 
economic ties with their emigrants in other parts of the world by preserving these 
people’s ethnicity and religion. At the same time, they wanted the Italian immigrants 
to be transformed into respected and civilized ambassadors of Italy. These goals 
were partly attained, and Italians gained significant achievements in South American 
colonization.  
          The United States supported and acted together with Italy in relation to the 
establishment of Italian communities in the southern states. The large number of 
immigrants in major American cities was a menace for political, social and 
economic order in the United States. It was not possible to control the ignorant and 
illiterate Italian immigrants who were manipulated in the hands of the illegal 
padroni. Hence the United States officials supported the establishment of the Italian 
Protection Bureau at the Ellis Island. On diplomatic level, the United States 
maintained its neutrality regarding Italian expansion in North Africa. The Italian 
ideal of establishing the Third Rome with the acquisition of the Fourth Shore was 
not a major incident for the United States during period between the late nineteenth 
century and World War I. On October 24, 1911, President William Howard Taft 
declared the United States’ neutrality during the Turco-Italian War in Libya. When 
the Italian kingdom asked for the American recognition of Italian sovereignty over 
Libya, the Secretary of State, Alvin A. Adee declared: 
It was not the custom of [t]his government to proceed in that 
manner, especially with regards to European affairs; that 
when the United States took over the Philippine Islands and 
Porto Rico, foreign governments were not asked for their 
acquiescence nor for their recognition, and none was given 
… the United States was fully aware of what had taken place 
… and while it had no objection at all to the attitude of Italy, 
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nevertheless an explicit form of recognition must not be 
expected.”71
 
The United States did not want to intermingle with European affairs. In 
return, American officials demanded European neutrality in the American sphere of 
influence. The hegemony of the United States was built in the western part of the 
world, and, for the moment, Americans did not seem to be interested in the affairs of 
the Old World unless the Europeans intruded in America’s territory and attempted to 
challenge its national greatness. Nevertheless, Italian expansionism and irredentism 
became a nuisance for American officials during World War I and after Italy’s 
demands in Paris Peace Talks in 1919 when President Woodrow Wilson would 
perceive Italian imperialist and colonial aims in Asia Minor and East Europe to be 
perilous for both the Old and the New World.        
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FRUS (1913), 609.  
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 Figure 8.1 Father Pietro Bandini 
Source: http://www.encylopediaofarkansas.net  
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Figure 8.2  Father Pietro Bandini celebrating mass at St. Joseph Catholic Church  
in Tontitown, circa 1917. 
Source: http://www.encylopediaofarkansas.org   
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CHAPTER 9 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR I ON U.S.-ITALIAN 
  
RELATIONS 
 
 
 
When World War I erupted in August 1914, there were two opposing 
alliance systems in Europe: the Triple Entente of Britain, France and Russia, and the 
Triple Alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary, minus Italy. Italy was one of the 
members of the Triple Alliance, but it declared its neutrality due to the eruption of 
the war. Because of that decision, Italy has been usually regarded as a selfish 
country by its former allies, but as the United States Ambassador in Italy from 1913 
to 1919 Thomas Nelson Page indicated, that decision was partly related to the 
“sibyllic” [sic] character of the Italian statesmen and partly to Italy’s determination 
of securing its higher interests.1  
  The most vital interest of the Italians in the early twentieth century was to 
secure their national greatness. The Italian kingdom had made the first attempt of 
becoming a unified and powerful country with the Risorgimento, which was a half-
achieved development for Italy. Therefore, Italian officials utilized every possibility 
that would provide them the opportunity of becoming a more powerful and united 
country in the world arena. From this perspective, World War I was an opportunity 
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for Italy rather than being an obligation. Thus, Italians changed sides in April 1915 
with the London Pact that provided Italy’s entrance to the war against Austria.2   
However, with the United States’ entry in the war, Italian plans were 
changed. During the era of American neutrality, Italy searched for the ways to 
secure its irredentist aims, and the Italian nation supported its leaders for their 
expansionist and imperialist motives. When the United States became a member of 
the Allies, Italy changed its domestic as well as diplomatic policy and aspired to 
accommodate United States policy by manipulating Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points and his ideas about the New World Order and the League of Nations for its 
irredentist potential. This chapter will assert that both nations exhibited positive 
opinions about each other in the beginning of the war. But will also state that more 
than the politicians, the Italian people confided in the United States and Woodrow 
Wilson’s New World Order in relation to Italia irredenta [irredentist Italy]. 
However, by the end of the Paris Peace Conference, due to the immense frustration 
that Wilson caused in the Italian society, the relation between the two countries 
entered a period of estrangement. 
 
9.1 Americans and the Italian Army 
 
Italians entered World War I later than the other countries, and only 
reluctantly. That was partly related to Italy’s plans about irredentism and gaining the 
optimal outcome from the war. However, the Italian army’s insufficiency was 
another significant factor for the postponement of Italy’s entrance in the war. 
                                                 
2 Italy’s part in the Middle East was decided later with the Agreement of St.-Jean-de-Maurienne that   
was signed on April 26, 1917. According to this agreement, Italy received the whole southwestern 
Anatolia except the Adana region that was given to France. During the Paris Peace Conference in  
1919, Italian and Greek claims on Ottoman lands clashed, and the Greek prime minister Eleutherios  
Venizelos obtained the permission to occupy Izmir.      
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Although it possessed a noteworthy numerical advantage over the enemy, the Italian 
army did not have highly trained officials, heavy artillery, and advanced strategy.3  
It is generally considered that American society did not have adequate information 
about the Italian military, but there were a few sources that presented thorough 
information about the Italian Army. For instance, a detailed depiction of the Italian 
Army was provided to the American society in 1892 by General Staff Colonel 
Giovanni Goiran. His article, which was composed in a solid military manner and 
offered detailed information about the Italian army to the English speaking reader, 
was published in Harper’s New Monthly Magazine. The drawings in the article were 
made by the artist Brore Thure de Thulstrop (1848-1930) who lived in New York, 
and is often known for his works about military, horse, and narrative genre.4 In its 
introduction, Goiran indicated that the history of the Italian army went back to the 
history of the army of the former kingdom of Sardinia, and the nucleus of the army 
of the United Kingdom of Italy was constituted by the army of the Savoy.5 The 
army was reorganized in 1862, 1866 and 1870, but the political relations between 
France and Germany, and Austria and Russia, the new colonial policy of the 
principal European powers particularly after the Treaty of Berlin, and the changes in 
the commercial policies especially of France placed Italy in a fully dangerous 
position.  Thus, new modifications in the military system were made in 1882 with 
which the country counted on 400,000 perfectly armed and equipped combatants of 
the first line. 6   
In 1887, the Italian national army was modified once again under the 
organization that consisted of the active or first-line army, which was composed of 
                                                 
3 James Burgwyn, The Legend of the Mutilated Victory: Italy, the Great War, and the Paris Peace Conference, 
1915-1919, (Westport & London: Greenwood Press, 1993), 37-38.   
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5 Giovanni Goiran, “The Italian Army,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 85 (1892)\ 419. 
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corps kept permanently in active service; the active militia that was kept under arms 
only during the period of instruction and for the maintenance of public order and 
peace; and the local militia that was kept under arms in time of peace temporarily for 
the same purposes as the active militia.7       
In the article, Goiran referred to the insufficiencies of the Italian army. He 
stated that the army was far from having the proportions of cavalry and horse 
batteries that the armies of Germany, France and Austria-Hungary had, partly as an 
outcome of the poor state of Italy’s national finances. However, Italy was able to 
check with its army any offensive movement from either the west or the east.8  The 
writer also indicated that every able-bodied Italian was liable to military service 
from the age 20 to 39 under the most liberal conscription laws of all Europe,9 and 
that mechanism brought additional troops to the Italian army. Undoubtedly, victory 
would finally be achieved by the Italians, only the exact time could not be estimated. 
“In the meantime, the Italian army remain[ed] what it ha[d] always been, the most 
vivid expression of reconstructed Italy, and the most elevating and effective school 
of national unification.”10 In brief, Colonel Goiran was well aware of the 
weaknesses of his country’s army, but he was also optimistic about its future. 
Therefore, he aimed to provide comprehensive information about the development 
of the Italian army in a short time like fifty years, and indicated that the Italian army 
would keep on improving.  
Twenty-five years after Colonel Goiran, an American journalist E. Alexander 
Powell composed a work about Italy and its army in the Great War. He started the 
book, With the Italians and the Allies in the West, by expressing a widely held 
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prejudice about the Italians and war. When Powell told his friends that he was going 
to the Italian front, they smiled disdainfully, and said “There isn’t anything doing 
there.”11 Throughout the whole book, the journalist challenged that idea of Italian 
significance by referring to the fact that Italians were fighting with arms that was 
third in Europe in numbers, second in quality, and probably second in equipment.12 
However, despite that fact, Powell admitted many Americans did not have any 
adequate conception of why Italy entered the war and did not appreciate the part 
Italy played in the war. This was due not to Italian laziness but to the government’s 
reticence about its war effort:  
They are suspicious of foreigners. They are by nature shy. More 
insular than the French or English, they are only just commencing 
to realize the political value of our maxim:  “It pays to advertise” 
… What little news is permitted to filter through is coldly official, 
and is altogether unsuited for American consumption. The Italians 
are staging one of the most remarkable and inspiring performances 
that I have seen on any front—a performance of which they have 
every reason to be proud—but diffidence and conservatism have 
deterred them from telling the world about it.13  
 
Powell started his journey in Rome, then moved to Venice, and then to the  northern 
parts of the country near the Alps. When he reached a village named Campo Formio, 
he met the Italian soldiers and Austrian prisoners. The high-spirited and confident 
Italian soldiers “were dog-tired, dirty, caked with mud and blood, but they grinned at 
[Powell] cheerfully.”14 Bersaglieri, “the flower of the Italian army,” were still 
wearing their flat-brimmed hats with huge bunches of drooping feathers.15 At that 
instant, Powell asserted that the Italian troops could be compared very favorably 
with any in Europe. The men were generally short and very thickset, but they were 
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all clean shaven and extraordinarily neat.16 The Northern troops had stamina and 
endurance, but the Neapolitans and the Sicilians were the best fighters who 
advanced through storms of fire that the northerners refused to face.17  
Powell also mentioned the color of the Italian uniform, and stated that it was 
claimed to be the ugliest and the least visible of any worn in Europe. That was 
related to the fact that the Italian military authorities were among the first to make a 
scientific study of colors for uniforms. They did not prefer blue like the French, and 
chose the color green-gray since it was the best option to camouflage on the tree-
clad mountain slopes where Italians were fighting.18 Also, the uniform of the Italian 
officers was the same cut and of same material as that of the men, and it was 
difficult to distinguish an officer from a private.19 In addition, despite the fact that 
the war was a heavy financial strain for Italy, the Italian government never objected 
to the expenditures that were necessary to keep the soldiers in good health.20
In 1917, the Italian army was “war-hardened by experience and encouraged 
by the results of the past,” and the official report about Italy’s spring offensive was 
composed in a similar way to Powell’s account. According to the report, the 
organization of the Italian army was improving, its units were enlarged and 
strengthened, and the most recent scientific inventions were being adopted. New 
regiments were formed, powerful artillery was cast and distributed, and the number 
of the machine guns was largely increased as well as the engineer corps service. 
Aviation was also greatly developed. In brief, Italy entered its third year in the war 
victoriously with a great increase in material and continued progress in organization, 
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and it had a perfect faith in final victory. Despite its organization and modern 
techniques, the army in Italy had always been regarded as an unpopular institution 
among the Italian public. It was always torn between rivalry between the king and 
the parliament that aspired to control military leadership, and suffered from financial 
insufficiencies.21  
  The last example about the positive image of the Italian Army among 
Americans can be given from Ernest Hemingway. In his A Farewell to Arms, which 
was published in 1929, Hemingway tells the love story between the ambulance 
driver, Frederic Henry and the nurse, Catherine Barkley. The setting of the novel is 
Italy, starting in 1915, and ends when the two lovers escape to Switzerland, and 
Catherine dies during childbirth in 1917. In the novel, Hemingway refers to Henry’s 
escape from the hands of the fanatical Italian soldiers and the whims of the Italian 
army by portraying their disastrous retreat from Caporetto in 1917.22  
 In reality, Hemingway arrived in Italy in 1918 at the age of nineteen, served 
only two weeks as an ambulance driver when the war was not active, and was 
wounded after only six days of serving refreshments to the Italian soldiers.23 He 
never had enough time to serve in the Italian army, but was awarded the Italian 
Cross of Merit because of Italians’ extended courtesy to the volunteers driving 
ambulances and serving at canteen posts.24 Hemingway also wrote some letters to 
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his parents from his hospital bed that reflected his genuine opinions about the Italian 
army. 
In a letter that he wrote on August 29, 1918, after indicating that his Italian 
vocabulary was improving, Hemingway stated “This war makes us a lot less fools 
than we were. For instance Poles and Italians. I think the officers of the two nations 
are the finest men I’ve ever known. There isn’t going to be any such thing as 
‘foreigners’ for me after the war now.”25 And in another one, he wrote: 
And the Italians have shown the world what they could do. They 
are the bravest troops in the Allied Armies! The mountain country 
is about impassible to skilled Alpine climbers and yet they fight  
and conquer and by the time you get this they’ll have the Austrians 
all the way out of Italy. Italy has been fighting her own war all along 
and deserves all the credit in the world!26    
 
Apparently, eleven years before the publication of his semi-biographical fiction, A 
Farewell to Arms, Hemingway had a more positive perspective about Italy and the 
Italians. That change was presumably related to the era after World War I and the 
rise of fascism.27 However, Hemingway’s private letters to his family would not 
have been a source for American public opinion, and his uncomplimentary view of 
the Italian army was more characteristic of American opinion. 
 
9.2 Woodrow Wilson and the Italians 
 
 In Il Mito Americano nell’Italia della Grande Guerra [The American Myth in 
the Great War’s Italy], Daniela Rossini states that Italians had mixed feelings about 
the Americans and their country. That was partly due to the fact that the middle and 
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high class Italians were not well-informed about the United States. For instance, 
Ambassador Thomas Nelson Page indicated that the majority of the Italians did not 
know the difference between the United States and the South American states.28 
Once, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sidney Sonnino stated that the United States 
was quasi non-existent for him since he was too old to go there.29 Some Italians did 
not like the United States at all because they believed it was a violent and venal 
country, a “decadent republic.”30 American isolation from Europe until World War I 
prevented the Italian upper classes from needing to know much about American 
history or politcs. However, there were also some Italians who regarded the United 
States as the Promised Land, or the land of liberty. These were mainly the villagers, 
the contadini. They created the “Merica myth” that would enable them to have better 
lives, and as an American writer in Italy indicated in 1917, the Italian immigrants 
knew more about the United States’ political importance and power than the Italian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.31
  By 1916, the United States was a country that was ideologically far away 
from Europe according to the majority of the Italian newspapers.32 Therefore, the 
United States initiated a pro-American propaganda in the peninsula. Charles E. 
Merriam was appointed as the high commissioner of American propaganda in Italy 
by the United States Committee on Public Information. Merriam believed that 
Italians accepted Wilson as their hero in the World War, but he intuitively felt that 
the situation could easily change according to the shifting conditions of the war. 
Hence, American strategists commenced to search for the Italian Americans who 
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could spread the Wilsonian gospel in Italy in a Mazzinian and Garibaldian manner, 
i.e. which they believed was purely democratic.33 For instance, John Spargo, one of 
the leaders of the Social Democratic League of America, was invited to Italy by the 
Committee of Public Information to engage the Italian socialists in a Wilsonian 
dialogue. Spargo later befriended the socialist leader Filippo Turatti who considered 
that American intervention in the war had transformed an imperialist struggle into a 
crusade for democracy.34   
 The United States also utilized the American Red Cross and YMCA to make 
propaganda through assistance.35 Consequently, Italians began to play basketball 
and watched American movies and chewed American chewing gums.36 Under the 
command of William Wallace, the 332nd regiment of the United States Army 
showed the Italians that Americans had arrived to their country to guard the Italian 
frontier.37 The first Italian American elected to Congress, Captain Fiorello 
LaGuardia, was also among the volunteers who went to his native country during 
World War I. 
 The support that Italian Americans gave to Italy is also noteworthy. The 
war-time relationship between Italy and its immigrants in the United States 
emerged with the Royal Italian Mission that went to America in 1917 under the 
leadership of Prince Ferdinando, Duke of Genoa. The main aim of the mission was 
to impress upon the United States government the urgent necessity of supplying 
Italy with coal, steel and other raw material.38 The United States gave economic 
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support to Italy, partly because as an Italian American journalist boasted at the time,  
no people had supported the American Government’s plan of war financing to a 
greater extent than those of Italian extraction.39 Luigi Criscuolo, who was the 
chairman of the Italian Committee for the Liberty Loan in the Second Federal 
Reserve District and the Assistant Secretary of the Italy-America Society, noted the 
significance of Italian Americans’ economic support to Italy. Criscuolo stayed in 
Washington as a financial expert for the Advisory Committee on Finance until the 
end of the war. In 1921, he was knighted by the King of Italy.40 He stated that 
Italian Americans had bought nearly $15 million in the Third Liberty Loan. Buying 
Liberty Loans was a good investment for the Italian immigrants to aid their mother 
country in its war against Austria, and to have an interest in the future and 
prosperity of the Italian nation, and the Order Sons of Italy took an active part in 
that war finance movement.41  
 The most important factor that shaped the Italo-American relations during 
and after the war was United States President Woodrow Wilson’s ninth point in the 
Fourteen Points, which stated that “a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be 
affected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.” The Italian government 
initially perceived this as a pro-Italian point in relation to Italia irredenta, however, 
the Italian government later realized that the Fourteen Points were completely 
against Italy’s gains especially in Fiume. When Wilson went to Italy in January 
1919, he never referred to Fiume, but even at that time he believed that Italians did 
not have any rights in that region. On April 13, 1919, Wilson suggested to the 
Council of Four (Italy, the United States, France and Britain) that Fiume had to be 
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made a free city. However, the agitations in Italy about the city’s annexation were 
increasing. Wilson did not listen to the Italian Premier Vittorio Orlando’s demands 
about Fiume. He had already made a favor to Italy by accepting the position of a 
major part of Slovenia, the northern side of the Dalmatian border and Trentino and 
Trieste as indicated in the secret treaty of London, which was signed between 
France, Russia, England and Italy.42 Wilson believed that Italy did not have the 
right to annex Fiume since the city was not ethnically a part of the Italian kingdom. 
Yet, Orlando continued to invoke the principle of self-determination, and “Wilson 
could not resist the temptation to ask whether New York City was claimed because 
of its Italian population.”43 Wilson saw the treaty during the war, however in 1919, 
he declared that the United States was not bound to secret treaties like the London 
Pact which was signed on April 26, 1915.  With the Treaty of London, Britain 
offered Italy a large territory in the Adriatic, including Tyrol, Dalmatia and Istria. 
On January 13, 1919 Wilson stated  to Orlando that the Treaty of London was no 
more valid. The discussion ended with Orlando’s great sobs near a window. Wilson 
went near Orlando and assured him that he had everything for his country, but Italy 
could not possess Fiume.  This anecdote suggests an important point. As previously 
revealed in the conflict over Italian military conscription of Italian Americans, the 
role of assimilation in building “national greatness” had opposite implications for 
the United States and Italy: for American policy-makers assimilation of immigrants 
was crucial; for Italian policy-makers assimilation of Italians elsewhere was 
intolerable.  
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 Americans actively promoted Woodrow Wilson as an ideological savior of 
the Italian common people. And despite his opposition to Italian expansionism, 
Wilson became one of the most favorable heroes of the Italian nation during the 
Great War. Thomas Nelson Page indicated Wilson’s popularity to the president 
before his visit to Italy: 
The Italian people, whatever their faults, are singularly 
idealistic and every word that you have uttered has found its 
way to their heart. You have become to them something 
which I scarcely know how to express. A man of high 
standing said to me today that they regard you now as a sort 
of a Messiah sent to save them from all the ills that the war 
has brought on the world. It is because of this feeling for you 
and for America I have been so urgent for you to come to 
Italy. Your visit will, I believe, not only prove to you the 
devotion which they feel towards you as the leading 
champion of the people in their struggle for liberty and peace 
but will give you one of the strongest backers of your policies 
which the world affords. You have just been elected a citizen 
of Rome and Don Prospero Colonna, the Mayor of Rome, 
representative of perhaps the oldest noble family in Italy or 
for that matter oldest in Europe, spoke of you in terms which 
only his knowledge of the sincerity of the people of Rome 
with himself at the head could have inspired.44
  
Therefore, the ambassador urgently recommended Wilson to go to Italy.45  On 
January 3, 1919, Wilson arrived to the train station in Rome at 9.30.46 In his 
address to the Italian Parliament, he stated that “the United States knew Italy and 
witnessed its sufferings, its sacrifices, its heroic action upon the battlefield and its 
heroic endurance at home.”47  He also asserted that he was aware of the fact that 
“Italy had gone into the war for the same exalted principles of right and justice that 
moved the [American] people … therefore, [their] task at Paris [would be] to 
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organize the friendship of the world, to see to it that all the moral forces that ma[d]e 
for right and justice and liberty [were] united and [were] given a vital 
organization.”48      
 However, at this instant, the significant point in Wilson’s days in Italy is the 
admiration that the Italian people showed to him. Nearly two months before his 
arrival, the Italian King Vittorio Emanuele saluted “the strong people of the United 
States of America in [that] era which mark[ed] for liberated democracies that 
triumph of the ideals for which the great American Nation under [Wilson’s] will 
and firm guidance … took up arms on the side of the peoples fighting for their 
independence.”49 During Wilson’s presence in Rome, Premier Vittorio Orlando and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sidney Sonnino did not want Wilson to talk in front of 
the public presumably because of his negative opinions that the two men sensed 
about the Italian annexation of Fiume.50 Nevertheless, Wilson was welcomed like a 
victorious Caesar in the Eternal City.  Even a “very plain man” in Rome, 
approached him and told that the Americans had helped to feed Italy during the 
war.51  When Wilson met the Reformist Socialist leader Leonida Bissolati and 
asked if most Italians had confidence in the League of Nations, Bissolati replied, 
“The Italian people are the most Wilsonian in Europe, the most adapted to your 
ideals.”52 These incidents and the great affection that the Italian people—who had 
mixed feelings about the United States—illustrate Wilson’s heroic depiction in 
Italy.  
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49 King Vittorio Emanuele of Italy to President Wilson, Rome, November 16, 1918, The Paris Peace 
Conference, 1919, Volume I, FRUS, 4-5. 
50 Fiume, today Rijeka, is a harbor in Croatia and was a part of Italia irredenta during World War I. 
Thus Italians made claims about that port.  
51 After Dinner Remarks at the Quirinal, January 3, 1919, Woodrow Wilson Papers, 601.   
52 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 197.  
 247
 There were a variety of books written about Woodrow Wilson during the 
war in Italy, and most of them were utilized to create a connection between Italia 
irredenta and the Fourteen Points of Wilson. These sources are also significant to 
demonstrate the reasons for the Italians’ frustration by the end of the Paris Peace 
Conference. The first striking example about the books written on Wilson was one 
composed by Meuccio Ruini (1877-1970). Ruini is one of the most important 
characters of modern Italian history since he is considered to be the protagonist of 
the Constitutional Assembly and the father of the Italian Constitution.53 He 
supported the reforms of the Socialist Party—thus he was on the side of the 
interventionists in Italy’s entrance in the war—and became a deputy in the Italian 
Senate in 1913. Ruini also served as the President of the Senate in 1953. 
 His book, Il Pensiero di Wilson [The Thoughts of Wilson] was published in 
1918, when the writer was a deputy in the Parliament. While eulogizing Wilson, he 
cunningly endorsed Italian irredentism. According to Ruini, Wilson was a powerful 
thinker, and had an aristocratic subtlety and an apparent conservatism in his 
mentality that he presented in his democratic and republican thoughts.54   
 Two of the Fourteen Points were significant for Italy: the freedom of the 
seas and the systematization of colonies.55 In relation to them, Ruini considered that 
the formulated Italian projects about the Latin American and African colonies could 
be achieved in a short time. Undoubtedly, Italian politicians perceived the benefits 
in Wilson’s ideas about the new world order, with Italy as a great power. 
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 Ruini also indicated that there were only a few states that were less 
imperialist than Italy, but European countries and Wilson could not understand the 
complicated problems of the Italians in the Alps and the Adriatic. Thus, Italy’s 
problems related to ethnicity of the people living in those regions; indispensably the 
problem of security needed to be clarified.56  Thus, no country more than Italy 
required the United States’ help and integration in and after the war. Italy had 
established itself with its own efforts, but it needed an economic assistance from the 
outer world to walk on the road of sufficiency.57  
 After revealing the Italian need for American support, Ruini stated that the 
United States had its own interests in Italy, which could be its economic station and 
collaborator. None of the other countries in Europe could present that kind of a 
position to the Americans.58 In the future, Italy was going to be the location that the 
United States would need to reach the Mediterranean and the Orient, and in return, 
the United States would support Italy in building its ports and railroads. In short, 
Americans would economically support Italians, and Italians would provide them a 
position that had a significant geopolitical importance for the United States’ 
expanding future in Europe.  
  Another interesting work about Wilson was composed by Professor 
Giovanni Gallerani, a colonel and the director of the physiotherapy center of the 7th 
Armed Corps in Camerino during World War I.  Gallerani also served as the rector 
of the University of Camerino before and after the war, and made nationalist 
speeches at the opening ceremonies of the university.59 The document entitled, Alla 
Triade Luminosa di George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson [To 
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59 For detail, see “Ateneo” [University], http://www.unicam.it, January 5, 2007.   
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the Bright Triad of George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson] was 
based on the discourses that were held at the physiotherapy center on July 4, 1918. 
The title of the pamphlet suggests that the writer praised these three leaders 
throughout the whole work, but he also acclaimed Italy’s greatness by referring to 
the common civilization shared by the Italians and Americans as a consequence of 
Columbus’s discovery of the American continent. Gallerani began his words by 
stating that July 4, 1776 was an unforgettable date and it still had a supreme 
importance, and the sun that had risen on that day was illuminating the entire sky.60  
Italy had a great significance in American history because Italian genius was the 
revealer of the New World and the primary reason for the actual existence of the 
United States, thus the Italian spirit was transfused in the virgin lands of America.61 
Italians in Italy mythologized Columbus, although, different from their compatriots 
in the United States, without rendering him as an Anglo-Saxon. 
 For Gallerani, Washington, Lincoln and Wilson were the representatives of 
the capital periods of the United States history that coincided with three great wars. 
The first one was fought for political liberty, the second one for the liberty of the 
slaves, and the third one was being fought for justice, liberty and equality of the 
nations.62 The spirits of Washington, Franklin and Jefferson were with the Italians, 
and the American and Italian flags were together on the mountains, in the valleys 
and rivers of Italy symbolizing victory.63 The Declaration of Independence and 
Wilson’s inspirations were the sources of a new liberty for the whole world. Hence, 
                                                 
60 Giovanni Gallerani, Alla Triade Luminosa di George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow 
Wilson [To the Bright Triad of George Washington, Abraham Lincoln] (Camerino: Tipografia 
Marchi, 1918), 2. 
61 Ibid., 4. 
62 Ibid., 19. 
63 Ibid. ,21. 
 250
Gallerani finished his pamphlet with the sentences: “Glory, America … Rise the 
empire of Justice and Reason. Viva America—Viva the Armies of Civilization.”64  
 Likewise Carlo Paladini dedicated his twenty-three pages long pamphlet, 
The United States, Wilson and Italy to the American press in general, but to the 
New York Herald, Times, Tribune, and Evening Post in particular which, according 
to him, “ha[d] always upheld the patriotic and democratic aims of Italy, with 
gratitude and sympathy”65 The document is basically about the United States’ 
presence in the Great War, but Paladini also emphasized the cordial relation 
between Italy and United States by making references to Mazzini and Garibaldi, 
and the great sympathy that the American nation showed to Italian unification. He 
asserted that before the United States’ entrance in World War I, Wilson was 
misunderstood because of his delay, but he “induced his country to enter the arena, 
where nearly all of old Europe [wa]s fighting, to win independence and peace for 
the world.”66 Before Wilson’s declaration of war, European countries considered 
that America would continue to look upon a bleeding Europe selfishly, seeing in it 
only an economic gain. However, Wilson was “a powerful, generous American, 
willing to fight for the rights of man, not only in America, but in Old Europe”67  By 
the end of his work, Paladini revealed the resemblance between Italy and the United 
States by emphasizing Italian irredentism: 
…The policy of President Wilson was and is inspired by the 
traditions of the United States and the doctrines of the founders of 
American democracy, and that these doctrines were those of the 
Italian patriots … We are fighting as is the United States for 
democratic freedom and to liberate our brothers of Italian blood and 
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traditions from the yoke which so many years was borne by part of 
what is now Italy.68   
 
Italian propagandists utilized the American ideology of expanding liberal 
democracy to justify Italian ethnic nationalism.  
 The last example about the books on Wilson written by Italian writers 
during World War I is Vico Mantegazza’s Gli Stati Uniti Alla Difesa dell’Europa 
[The United States in the Defense of Europe].   Mantegazza was a Florentine writer 
and journalist, and the director of the newspaper La Nazione [The Nation]. He 
composed works about Italian foreign policy, the Balkans, and the Italian colonies 
in North Africa. In Gli Stati Uniti, Mantegazza demonstrated his profound 
knowledge about United States history by referring to general issues like the 
aspects of the American Revolution, and specific topics like John Brown. He 
asserted that Wilson was not merely a theoretician and a dreamer, and his 
interventions in Mexico in 1914 and 1916 were a consequence of his ideal of 
universal peace which required actual war to maintain civilization and the greatness 
of nations.69  
 Mantegazza approached the American entrance from that perspective like 
the other writers, and indicated that Wilson declared war to bring peace by making 
war. Thus, Wilson’s message of the declaration of war on the Entente was an 
excellent document of uprightness, sincerity, faith and guidance. In the future, 
Wilson’s name was undoubtedly going to be written near the names of the glorious 
Washington, Lincoln and Grant.70 At that point, the writer also referred to the fact 
that Americans always felt themselves as the greatest power in the world, and thus 
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their soldiers were going to be glorious in the Old World as they had become 
victorious during the Civil War.71  
 
9.3 The War and the Peace Conference: Italy and the United States 
 
 Italy entered the World War because of its irredentist schemes and yearning 
for empire, and made neat calculations during the period of its neutrality. That was 
the reason why before denouncing its membership in the Entente, all the Italian 
prime ministers before Antonio Salandra had a flexible relation with the Allies. 
From that perspective, the Italian announcement of neutrality, Giolitti’s parecchio 
[lot] letter that implied the acquisition of the territories populated by unredeemed 
Italian populations without making war, and more significantly Salandra’s 
declaration of Italian sacro egoismo [sacred egoism; selfish national interest; 
egocentric nationalism especially in foreign relations] were all the components of a 
well-designed Italian plan about entering the war. Since the unification, Italians had 
had the desire to obtain two unredeemed Italian regions, Trentino and Trieste, 
which were under the control of the Austrian Empire. However, with the passing of 
time, these two regions became only parts of Italia irredenta [unredeemed Italy].  
In the early twentieth century, all the portion of the Tyrol lying south of the 
Brenner, the Carso plateau, the entire Istrian peninsula, the Hungarian port of 
Fiume, and the whole of Dalmatia and Albania were regarded as parts of Italia 
irredenta. After ten months of neutrality, Italy entered the war on the side of the 
Allies, which promised more territory than the Central Powers. In addition, that was 
a strategic decision since by entering the war in that way, it reduced the number of 
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its enemies to one: Austria. Italy signed the secret Treaty of London on April 26, 
1915, which awarded to the Italian Kingdom the Trentino and South Tyrol to the 
Brenner Pass, the Friuli-Julian area eastward to the Julian Alps, as well as Trieste, 
Istria, and several islands off the Dalmatian coastline and the Albanian city of 
Valona. The Italian officials, especially Sidney Sonnino, considered that that 
alliance would be an optimum benefit for Italian irredentism since the Allies 
(although not the United States) also promised a sphere of influence on the southern 
coast of Anatolia, and a future share in German colonies in Africa. If the Italian 
kingdom could have gained all those territories, it would become a major power in 
Europe. The Treaty of London gave the impression of being the vital sign of Italian 
national greatness in the twentieth century, but when the war ended, Italians 
realized that they would not be able to secure all that had been promised.72
 Italy was not the only country that signed secret treaties. In May 1916, the 
British and French reached the Sykes-Picot Agreement with which they projected 
their partition of the Ottoman Empire. Sidney Sonnino was not notified nor Italy 
compensated with that agreement.73 The Italian government attempted to secure its 
territorial gains by obtaining “an equitable share in the division of Turkey in 
Asia,”74 despite the rising problems with Greece in relation to Anatolia. 
Nevertheless, Italians had a more important problem that was related to the United 
States and Woodrow Wilson’s idealistic arrangements after the war. As Sonnino 
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indicated, “the Allies would help Italy to win, and also to lose,”75 and the United 
States was the strongest ally that could lead Italy to victory or defeat.  
 When the United States declared war and entered the fight on the side of the 
Allies, Italians welcomed the Americans in the Old World. Americans were aware 
of the fact that Italians had a small but a well-organized army that needed economic 
support. Nevertheless, the United States realized that there was “the obvious danger 
of social revolution and disorganization”76 for the Italian kingdom. Socialism and 
anarchism had always been important risks for Italy and with the Bolshevik 
revolution of 1917, those threats became more serious for the peninsula. In 
addition, Germany could utilize every opportunity to become Italy’s ally. Thus, the 
United States took action to protect the status quo of Italy, to strengthen it and to 
support the Italian participation in the Great War.  
 The British and French premiers, Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau, 
aspired to find a midway between Italy and the United States by introducing a draft 
letter to Orlando that denied Fiume,77 but on April 23, 1919, Wilson decided to 
make a dramatic stand and released his manifesto on April 24. He wanted to explain 
the reasons why he was against the London Pact and why Fiume must not be given 
to Italy. He indicated that “Italy’s frontiers could be extended at the expense of 
Austria, but not at the expense of the new states arising from the defunct empire.”78 
After reading the manifesto, first Orlando and then Sonnino departed from 
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Versailles. Colonel Edward Mandell House79 also attempted to effect a compromise 
about the Adriatic between Wilson and the Italians,80 but the manifesto of April 24 
symbolized the end of an era in U.S.-Italian relations in which the two nations 
believed their similar goals of national greatness were compatible. In his manifesto, 
Wilson stated that the London Treaty was unacceptable since Italy had acquired a 
lot of advantages since the beginning of the war. It was the time for the Italians to 
act in a friendly manner towards the other side of the Adriatic. Italy needed to work 
together with the United States for the rights of all nations.81 In short, Fiume did 
not belong to the Italian nation. 
 The manifesto was a heavy blow for the Italian nation that previously held  
President Wilson in high esteem, it was an attack on Italia irredenta as well. On 
April 24, the streets of Rome were full of intense anger and the newspapers made 
violent attacks on Wilson. During a demonstration in Piazza Colonna, Italy’s rights 
in demanding an immediate adjustment of her frontiers and a settlement of her 
claims in the Adriatic were emphasized.82  The Mayor of Rome, Prospero 
Colonna—who had welcomed Wilson in January 1919—stated that Italy would rise 
against any formation which offended justice and which denied Italy’s rights, “the 
people of Italy would rise, rise against all and everyone.”83 The United States 
consuls were warned to instruct Americans and especially soldiers in uniform and 
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to keep out of crowds.84  When House met Sonnino in Paris on May 8th, the Italian 
minister told him that he and Orlando were exceedingly sorry for what had been 
said in Italy both in public speeches and in the press85, but undoubtedly the 
Wilsonian era came to an end in Italy after the Fiume manifesto.    
 Wilson caused a major crisis between his country and Italy because of his  
idealistic approach to the future of Europe, but Italy was also remote to the main 
European theater of war, and to Wilson it seemed stubbornly fixed on its irredentist 
cause, and some of its leaders sounded imperialist in their loud claims for Nostra 
Guerra [Our War].86 Italians fought their own irredentist war against the Austrian 
Empire, and regarded the World War and the Allies as exceptional opportunities to 
gain Italian national greatness.      
  
9.4. Conclusion: Friendship, Crisis and Estrangement 
 
 The First World War was a period when friendship, crisis and estrangement 
were felt successively in Italo-American relations. The kingdom of Italy entered the 
war to enhance its national greatness that it had been endeavoring to develop since 
the unification. The declaration of Italian neutrality, and then the decision of 
fighting in the war were the consequences of that policy of Italy. If other countries 
than the Allies would have proposed the regions that were offered in the Treaty of 
London, Italy would easily switch its standing point in the war. In brief, Italians 
were pragmatic in their quest for great power status. 
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 When the United States declared war in 1917, Woodrow Wilson became the 
hero of the Italians since they considered that the American president would 
support them in their plans about Italia irredenta, and especially Fiume. Italy 
assumed that it had found a friend that could solve the peninsula’s domestic 
problems which hindered the country’s national and international greatness. By 
manipulating Wilsonian principles, Italians believed that they could have the 
opportunity to solve their border and colonial problems.  
 The United States socially and economically supported Italy because, first of 
all, Italy was an ally. Secondly, there was the risk of social turmoil in Italy, and that 
would be a great disadvantage for the United States. As the Italian writers who 
wrote about Wilson indicated, Italy could give an excellent support to the 
Americans in the Mediterranean, and “integrate” the United States in the region. In 
addition, as a consequence of the inconsistency between the Italian Premier 
Orlando and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sonnino regarding Italy’s priorities, the 
crisis was deepened and became worse by the end of the Peace Conference. 
Eventually, Italians left the conference with an immense disillusionment about the 
European countries and especially the United States. The peace talks that were 
designed with the objective of establishing a League of Nations, were brought to a 
close with Italy’s frustration and estrangement. 
 Similar to Orlando and Sonnino, Wilson also failed in his aspirations about 
the League of Nations a world safe for democracy. World War I brought 
estrangement also to the United States. The outcome of the war showed that 
Europeans rejected American policy-makers’ pursuit of national greatness through 
democratic assimilation.  
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 In Italy’s disappointment, Sidney Sonnino expressed nationalist and 
irredentist impulses expressed in the language of sacro egoismo.87 He never 
completely trusted Wilson’s plans, but he also could not grasp the limitations on the 
irredentist plans of his country. The Orlando cabinet left office on June 19, 1919, 
and Francesco Nitti became the prime minister of Italy with the support of the Left 
and Giovanni Giolitti. However, he could not invigorate the deprived domestic and 
diplomatic conditions of Italy. The invasion of Fiume by a group of adventurers 
worsened the situation. From 1920 to 1922, Giolitti became the Premier, but he also 
could not eradicate the disappointment and isolation that materialized in post-war 
Italy. Eventually, Benito Mussolini came to power in October 1922 because he 
promised his people that Italy was going to have an imperial foreign policy despite 
its social, military and economic weaknesses. With boundless ambitions and an 
arrogant style, the Duce guaranteed the national greatness to the Italians, which 
they had been yearning for since the Risorgimento. In this way, the pursuit of 
Wilsonian democratic principles by the United States helped contribute to the rise 
of Italian fascism.88
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CHAPTER 10 
 
CONCLUSION 
SACCO AND VANZETTI: TWO ITALIANS IN AMERICA 
 
 
1920 started as a dreadful year for the radicals and anarchists in the United 
States. In January, about 10,000 radicals were arrested in the Palmer Raids. On April 
15, 1920,  in South Braintree, Massachusetts, Frederick Parmenter and Alessandro 
Berardelli were killed by two men while they were carrying two metal boxes 
containing $16,000 for the workforce of Slater and Morrill shoe factory. The two 
killers took the money boxes and drove out of town.1  In May 1920, two Italian 
immigrants, Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti were arrested for the crime, and 
their trial commenced on May 31, 1921. That day was an important date since some 
agreements and controversies were initiated with the hearings of the two Italian 
American anarchists. Sacco and Vanzetti had their supporters and opponents; the 
debates that were centered on the Red Scare and Progressive ideas reflected the 
existing and clashing socio-political developments in the post-World War I United 
States. When Sacco and Vanzetti were executed on August 23, 1927, the writer John 
Dos Passos declared, “All right we are two nations.”2 The execution of the two men 
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represented an estrangement within the American society and the incident had long 
term consequences, and caused enduring discussions. However, the story of Sacco 
and Vanzetti also uncovered some certain outcomes of the Italian immigration to the 
United States, which are also referred to in this dissertation’s chapters separately.    
  Sacco and Vanzetti were two Italians who migrated to the United States as a 
consequence of the new immigration wave that started after the 1880s. Both of them 
arrived in America in 1908. Vanzetti was a northerner who was born in Villafalletto 
in 1888, and Sacco was a southerner who was born in Torremaggiore in 1891. They 
had better family backgrounds than many Italian immigrants in the United States. 
Sacco’s father owned a vineyard in Italy whereas Vanzetti’s father was a “bird of 
passage” who owned a farm in Italy; he lived in California temporarily.3 However, 
both men obtained their skills in the United States. For nearly five years, Vanzetti 
worked as an unskilled laborer in various jobs, and sometimes faced extreme 
poverty. Eventually, Sacco became a shoe worker and Vanzetti a fish peddler. They 
were beyond the stereotypical representations of Italian immigrants in America. 
“Where Italian immigrants were presumed by their critics to be stumbling clods, 
Sacco and especially Vanzetti remarkably was thoughtful and articulate.”4 
Nevertheless, they had a radical tendency that made them potential dangers both in 
the United States and Italy: Sacco and Vanzetti were anarchists. 
In the United States, generally Italian immigrants were associated with 
anarchism. They were regarded as bomb-throwers, that was the stereotype.5 From 
this perspective, Sacco and Vanzetti fitted the conventional depiction of the Italian 
immigrant which was designed by the overwhelming white  population in the United 
                                                 
3 For more information, see Ibid., 11-14.   
4 Ibid., 12.  
5 Paul Avrich, Anarhist Voices: An Oral History of Anarchism in America, Abridged Edition, 
(Princeton: Princeton Univeristy Press, 1996), 67. 
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States. In fact, the two Italian immigrants became anarchists after their arrival in the 
United States. That was partly related to the injustices they witnessed among the 
working class in the United States, and partly to the American perspective that 
regarded the Italian immigrants as the members of an inferior social class in the 
country. Anarchism was the way of avoiding Americanization and overcoming 
economic insufficiencies. For these reasons, the two men become devoted 
anarchists. Sacco collected money for the workers (Vanzetti was among the strikers) 
who participated in the textile strike in Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1912. He was 
also a devoted reader of Luigi Galleani’s La Cronaca Sovversiva. Nonetheless, the 
bona fide Galleanisti among the two men was Vanzetti. 
Beltrando Brini, who testified that he was delivering eels with Vanzetti on 
the day of the murder, indicated that Vanzetti was “anarchism personified,” who 
believed in the perfectibility of human nature.6  Vanzetti met Galleani in 1916, and 
became an occasional contributor to La Cronaca Sovversiva.7 Two years later, in 
May 1918, Sacco and Vanzetti were among the sixty Galleanisti  who fled to 
Mexico to avoid military conscription. In September 1918, they returned to the 
United States, and in June 1919, Galleani was deported to Italy. There campaign that 
the United States government started against the radicals and anarchists which 
commenced after the numerous bombs that exploded in seven cities in June 1919 
ended up with the prosecution of numerous Italian anarchists. The federal 
government’s war against the radicals reached its peak with the Palmer Raids in 
early 1919. 
  Sacco and Vanzetti were prosecuted in that atmosphere. The trial did not 
only reflect the United States government’s policy of eradication of radicals, but it 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 68. 
7 Topp, The Sacco and Vanzetti Case, 185. 
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also signified the condition of the Italian immigrants in the United States. From 
many perspectives, the Sacco and Vanzetti case was a consequence of the aspects 
that are indicated in this dissertation. The two Italian immigrants were blamed and 
prosecuted as an outcome of the several biases and prejudices that the “white” 
Americans possessed about the Italian immigrants in the late nineteenth and the 
early twentieth centuries. According to them, Italians were the people who had “low 
foreheads, open mouths, weak chins, poor features, skew faces, small or knobby 
crania, and backless heads,” and they lacked “the power to take rational care of 
themselves.”8 Sacco and Vanzetti were not the stereotypical representatives of their 
ethnic group, but their active participation in anarchism turned out to be a 
manifestation for the Italian immigrants’ discomfort and resistance to 
Americanization. Another significant and detail about the Sacco and Vanzetti case 
was the fact that one of the victims of the murder was an Italian, and that could be an 
illustration for the habitual vendetta among the Italian immigrants.  
For the supporters of Sacco and Vanzetti, the trial and the men’s execution 
was the example of an official lynching. Like African Americans, Italians were 
occasionally lynched in the United States, but the Sacco and Vanzetti case had a 
more profound impact on the American society. As the poet Edna St. Vincent 
indicated, “Justice [was] Denied in Massachusetts” on August 23, 1927, and the trial 
became the manifestation of a crisis, and later an expanding estrangement between 
different ethnic groups in the United States.  
                         
  
        
                                                 
8 Edward Ross, “The Old World in the New,” in Topp, The Sacco and Vanzetti Case, 56. Ross  was a 
sociologists who made critical analyses of immigration. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
MONONGAH MINE DISASTER, 1907 
 
 
 
  On December 6, 1907, around 10 o’clock in the morning, the mines Nos. 6 
and 8 of the Fairmont Coal Company exploded in Monongah, West Virginia. Three 
hundred sixty-two men were killed as a result of the explosion. The impact of the 
explosion was so great that the underground structure was twisted, and the roof of 
the engine house was blown more than 500 yards, and the victims, who were 
suffocated with toxic gases, were found sitting in upright positions.1 The American 
Red Cross Society initiated a relief campaign for the relatives of the catastrophe’s 
victims, but only $ 3,762.11 were spent as expenditure for one of the greatest coal 
mine disasters in world history. 
Significantly, 171 of the victims of the Monongah mine disaster were Italian 
immigrants, and 86 of them came from the same region in Italy, San Giovanni in 
Fiore, Calabria. Today, they are all buried in Monongah’s Mt. Calvary Cemetery, 
and a commemorative monument salutes them from San Giovanni in Fiore. Below is 
the list of the Italian victims of Monongah mine disaster. The list consists of a few 
distinctive characteristics of Italian immigrants in the United States. Firstly, it 
illustrates that Italian campanilismo was prevalent also in a small town in West 
Virginia; half of the miners came from the same region in Italy. It also demonstrates 
that these men were married to Italian women who were relatives, and some of the 
                                                 
1 “Monongah Mine Disaster,” The Illustrated Monthly West Virginian, (January 1908). 
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widows went back to their native country after the disaster. It is also evident that 
mining was a family profession for most of these men. Tragically, 11 people from 
the same family died in Monongah explosion. As the 77-year-old  Joseph F. 
D’Andrea, who has been making a research about the incident for 15 years, indicates 
these people are not only names, they are human beings with a history.2   
In November 2004, owing to an invitation from the Vatican, miners from 
various parts of Italy went to Monongah to raise a cross in Mt. Calvary Cemetery. 
Also, during his visit to the United States, the former Italian president Carlo Ciampi 
made a speech that recalled the disaster. However, ninety-nine years after the 
Monongah incident, the Italian American governor of West Virginia, Joe Manchin 
has gone to Calabria to sign a pact of friendship between Calabria and his state. 
Manchin is undoubtedly a living evidence that shows the transformation which the 
Italian immigrants passed through during the last century.3 He also demonstrates the 
success of American colonialism in the United States.  
 
                                                 
2 Jessica Legge, “Author Honors Miners Killed in 1907 Disaster,” Charleston Daily Mail, November 
20, 2006.   
3 Valeria Sabatini, “1907. Quella Strage Dimenticata” [1907. That Forgotten Destruction], Oggi, 
December 3, 2006, 22. 
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 l 
 
The entrance of the Monongah coal mine after the explosion. 
Source: http://www.boisestate.edu/history/ncasner/hy210/mining.htm  
 
Monongah Mine Disaster Italian Casualty List1
 
Abbate, Carlo                                                                 
Abbate, Francesco 
Abbate, Giuseppe 
Abbruzzino, Francesco:  born in San Giovanni in Fiore on June 28, 1881. On June 4, 
1905, he married Caterina Oliviero in San Carlo Borromeo Church in Monongah. 
His wife returned to Italy in 1908.  
Adducchio, Angelo 
Adducchio, Antonio 
Adducchio, Pasquale 
Agostino, Domenico Pasquale 
Anciello, Biase 
Anciello, Celestino 
Anciello, Fomenico 
Anciello, Paolo 
Angiollilo, Antonio 
Bagnoli, Angelo 
Basile, Francesco Antonio 
Basile, Giovanni 
Basile, Salvatore 
Basile, Saverio 
Belcastro, Giuseppe 
Belcastro, Serafino:  born in San Giovanni in Fiore on May 15, 1875.  
Berardo, Angelo 
Berardo, Felice 
Berardo, Celestino 
Berardo, Giacinto 
Berardo, Vincenzo 
Bitonti, Antonio:  married Giulia Nicoletti on February 13, 1904 in Madonna di 
                                                 
1 http://archiver.rootsweb.com/th/read/WVMARION/2004-01/1074562481, 
http://archiver.rootsweb.com/th/read/WVMARION/2004-01/1074562543 (last access: 
January 19, 2004), and “1907. Quella Strage Dimenticata,” 23. 
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Pompei Church in Monongah. 
Bitonti, Rosario:  born in San Giovanni in Fiore on May 5, 1878. On August 26, 
1905, he married Barbara Veltri in San Carlo Borromeo Church in Monongah.  
Bonasso, Giovanni:  born in San Giovanni in Fiore on August 18, 1884. On May 9, 
1907 he married Caterina Veltri.  
Borzonia, Tomasso 
Brandi, Adolfo 
Cavallaro, Vincenzo 
Ciambetiello, Giovanni 
Ciambetiello, Liberto 
Ciambetiello, Nicola 
Cimino, Domenico 
Colaciello, Giuseppe 
Colaciello, Nicola 
Colanero, Felice 
Colantuono, Andrea 
Colarusso, Francesco 
Colarusso, Giuseppe 
Colasessano, Felice 
Coletto, Nicola 
Comercia, Antonia 
Condino, Francesco 
Cuoccio, Raffaele 
Davia, Victor 
D'Alessandro, Antonio 
D'Allesandro, Giuseppe 
D'Alessandro, Pasquale 
D'Amico, Donato 
D'Amico, Michael 
D'Andrea, Victor 
D'Elia, Pasquale 
D'Uva, Giuseppe 
D'Uva, Michele 
D'Onofrio, Michele 
D'Onofrio, Pietro 
DeElsi, Giovanni 
DeFelice, Antonio 
DeFelice, Michael 
DeMaria, Giuseppe 
DeMaria, Sebastiano 
DePetris, Felice 
DeProspero, Antonio 
DiBartolomeo, Clemente 
DiBartolomeo, Domenico 
DiMarco, Giuseppe 
DiMarco, Umberto 
DiMaria, Angelo 
DiMaria, Michele 
DiMaria, Sebastiano 
DiMaria, Lucia 
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DiPlacito, Nicola 
DiSalvo, Celestino 
DiSalvo, Domenico 
DiSalvo, Felice 
DiSalvo, Fiorangelo 
DiSalvo di Antonio, Fiorangelo 
DiSalvo, Gioacchino 
DiSalvo, Giuseppe 
DiSalvo di Antonio, Giuseppe 
DiSalvo, Vincenzo 
DiSalvo, Vitale 
DiSalvo, Ruggero 
Dosa, Ventura 
Fallucca, Armando 
Fasanelli, Vincenzo 
Farese, Giovanni 
Feoli, Luigi 
Ferrara, Carmine 
Ferrara, Matteo 
Ferrari, Guiseppe:  born in San Giovanni in Fiore on August 31, 1879. On   
November 30, 1905, he married Rosa Bitonti. 
Fiorentino, Prospero 
Foglie, Antonio 
Frateiacove, Pietro 
Fratino, Antonio 
Fussaro, Giuseppe 
Gaetani, Francesco 
Gallo, Antonio: born in San Giovanni in Fiore in 1870 and married Teresa 
Guarascio 
Giacobini, Vincenzo 
Gioia, Antonio 
Gioia, Pietro 
Girimondi, Raffaele 
Guarascio, Francesco 
Guerra, Domenico 
Iaconis, Francesco:  had three sons and his wife returned to Italy in 1909. 
Iaconis, Giovanni 
Ianero, Gennaro 
Ianiro, Giuseppe 
LaVigna, Pasquale 
Lelli, Luigi 
Leonetti, Giovanbattista:  born in San Giovanni in Fiore in 1876. On May 28, 1900, 
he married Maria Guarascio.  
LaRosa, Carmine 
LaRosa, Francesco 
Lombardi, Giovanni 
Lopez, Salvatore 
Loria, Francesco 
Mainella, Domenico 
Manzo, Antonio 
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Manzo, Domenico 
Manzo, Leonardo 
Manzo, Michele 
Marinetti, Giuseppe 
Marra, Salvatore:  born in San Giovanni in Fiore on March 4, 1876. On July 24, 
1898, he married Teresa Tricoci, right after moving to Monongah.  
Mascia, Domenico 
Masella, Felice 
Mastropietro, Michele 
Meffe, Carlo 
Meffe, Francesco 
Meffe, Michele 
Meo, Cosimo 
Morsella, Pietro 
Oliverio, Giovanni:  born in San Giovanni in Fiore on February 10, 1894. On 
August 16, 1902, he married Giovanna Iaquinta 
Olivito, Antonio:  born in San Giovanni in Fiore on July 15, 1868. On october 25, 
1892, he married Anna Maria Lopez. 
Pasquale, Antonio 
Pellillo, Basilio 
Pellillo, Giacinto 
Perri, Thomas 
Pignanelli, Saverio 
Pirrocco, Nicola 
Prioletta, Berardino 
Prioletta, Francesco 
Prioletta, Pasquale 
Prioletta, Pietro 
Provenzale, Pietro:  born in San Giovanni in Fiore on October 14, 1862. On April 1, 
1893, he married Serafina Urso. 
Prozzillo, Carmine 
Riccinto di Domenico, Antonio 
Riccinto di Nicola, Antonio 
Riccinto, Domenico 
Riccinto, Pasquale 
Rinaldi, Antonio 
Rinaldi, Giuseppe 
Rizzo, Michele 
Scalise, Luigi:  born in San Giovanni in Fiore on November 30. On January 20, 
1898, he married Maria Febbo. 
Serafini, Giuseppe 
Silletta, Antonio 
Todero, Francesco 
Urso, Gennaro: born in San Giovanni in Fiore on September 26 to Bernardo Urso 
and Maria Iaquinta.   
Veltri, Leonardo:  born in San Giovanni in Fiore on January 1.  
Vendetta, Domenico 
Vendetta, Francesco 
Vergalito, Pasquale 
Vergalito, Antonio 
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Yannacone, Pasquale 
Zampino, Francesco 
Zeoli, Carmine 
Zeoli (Barone), Francesco 
Zeoli (Barone), Sebastiano 
 
 
 
Monongah mine disaster on the list of the American Red Cross’ relief expenditures, 
January 1, 1906-April 30, 1909, “Circulars,” FRUS, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 
1909), 7. Note 
that the second 
largest 
expenditure is the 
Italian earthquake.  
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APPENDIX D 
 
WOODROW WILSON’S FOURTEEN POINTS1
 
 
It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, 
shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret 
understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is 
also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and 
likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, 
now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age 
that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are 
consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow nor or at any other time the 
objects it has in view.  
We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the 
quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the 
world secure once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, 
is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and 
particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, 
                                                 
1 The Avalon Project, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wilson14.htm, January 25, 2007.    
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wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair 
dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the 
peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see 
very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The programme 
of the world's peace, therefore, is our programme; and that programme, the only possible 
programme, as we see it, is this:  
I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private 
international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and 
in the public view.  
II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in 
peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international 
action for the enforcement of international covenants.  
III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of 
an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and 
associating themselves for its maintenance.  
IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to 
the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.  
V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, 
based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of 
sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the 
equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.  
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VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions 
affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the 
world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the 
independent determination of her own political development and national policy and 
assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her 
own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may 
need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the 
months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her 
needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish 
sympathy.  
VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without 
any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free 
nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the 
nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of 
their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity 
of international law is forever impaired.  
VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the 
wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has 
unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that 
peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.  
IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly 
recognizable lines of nationality.  
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X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see 
safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous 
development.  
XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories 
restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the 
several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically 
established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the 
political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states 
should be entered into.  
XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure 
sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be 
assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of 
autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free 
passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.  
XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the 
territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free 
and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and 
territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.  
XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for 
the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial 
integrity to great and small states alike.  
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In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel 
ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together 
against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We 
stand together until the end.  
For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight 
until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and 
stable peace such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, 
which this programme does remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there 
is nothing in this programme that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction 
of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very 
enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or 
power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade 
if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace- loving nations of the 
world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place 
of equality among the peoples of the world, -- the new world in which we now live, -- 
instead of a place of mastery.  
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